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Toward a Comprehensive Legal
Aid Program in Canada:
Exploring the Issues
Mary Jane Mossman*
Proposals to incorporate civil legal aid services into a comprehensive legal aid program provide a unique opportunity to re-examine the policy rationales for legal aid in
Canada Traditionally,the rationalefor legal aid was based upon the norms of legal services
for paying clients. The author explores the "social indicator" approach as an alternative
method of defining needs, by means of identifying targetpopulations.
The paper assesses the criteriafor choosing policy objectives by looking at the legal
obligations,including those required by sections of the Charter, to provide legal aid services.
The functioning of Canadianfederalism is taken into account in examining the design and
implementation of a comprehensive legal aid program The author concludes by identifying
further areas of research to be considered
Les propositions qui supportent l'incorporation des services d'assistance judiciaire
civile dans un programme d'aide juridique comprehensif presentent l'occasion de
r~examiner le raison d'tre des politiques d'assistance judiciaire au Canada Traditionnellement, cette raison detre itait basee sur les normes qui s'appliquaient aux
client(e)s payant(e)s. L'auteure examine l'approche de "l'indicatifsocial" - c'est-ai-dire, une
approche qui identife les populations visges - comme methode alternative de difinir
les besoins.
Mme Mossman discute des critres n~cessairespour choisir les objectifs politiques qui
s'appliquerontaux services d'aidejuridique en portantattention 6 l'examen des obligations
lMgales, y compris celles contenues dans la Charte. tgalement, l'auteure tient compte de la
structure du frdiralisme canadien lorsqu'elle considre la formulation et l'ex~cution d'un
programmed'assistancejudiciairecompr9hensif En conclusion, Mme Mossman identifie des
domaines de recherche i) explorer de fafon plus approfondie.

* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario.
The research of Karen Thompson-Harry and Morag MacLean is warmly acknowledged, as well as helpful comments from colleagues involved in community legal clinics in
Ontario.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an assessment of policy rationales for civil legal aid services
in Canada. Its goal is to determine options for civil legal aid services as one
component of a comprehensive legal aid cost-sharing agreement between Canada
and the provinces,' an arrangement which has frequently been proposed as a
way of both rationalizing legal aid services in Canada and for extending services
to larger numbers of clients who need them. This analysis draws on principles
which have been developed in the evolution of legal aid services in Canada in
recent decades and suggests new directions for such services, as well as ideas
for further research in the development of legal aid programs.
Since 1972, the Department of Justice has been involved in cost-sharing
arrangements for criminal legal aid services in the provinces. Under current legal
aid cost-sharing agreements, there is a federal contribution to the cost of providing
criminal legal aid or young offender legal aid for eligible persons charged with
specified offenses. 2 The cost-sharing formula consists of two components: "a base
component reflecting 50 per cent of national shareable expenditures for the base
year"3 and "a growth component allowing for increases in the federal contribution
of 50 per cent of the provincial increase4 in costs up to a ceiling of the percentage
growth in the GNP minus 1 per cent".
By contrast, civil legal aid is currently administered by Health and Welfare
5
Canada under the CanadaAssistance Plan as an "item of special need" for eligible
individuals under the "assistance" provisions of the scheme. With the ceilings
for federal contributions set out in the cost-sharing agreements for criminal and
young offender legal aid services, civil legal aid has been cost-shared under the
Canada Assistance Plan on a 50-50 open-ended basis.6
At the time of the Federal Task Force on Program Review in 1986, it was
recommended that consideration be given to "rationalizing all federal involvement
in legal aid (criminal legal aid, legal aid for young offenders, and civil legal aid)
7
under a single agreement". The stated objectives of this recommendation were
This paper is a revised version of research prepared for the Department of Justice in
1990, contract #19081-9C046. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not

of the Department of Justice.

For example, Legal Aid Cost-Sharing Agreement, Canada and Ontario (1987-88), Part I.
For example, Legal Aid Cost-Sharing Agreement, Canada and Ontario (1987-88),
Schedule B.
4 Ontario, Ministry of Supply and Services, "Legal Aid in Criminal Cases" in Study Team
Report to the Task Force on Program Review, Improved Program Delivery: Justice System
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1986) 198 at 199 [hereinafter Task Force on Program Review].
2

3

5 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-I.

6 Task Force on Program Review, supra note 4 at 200. Since 1986, the federal government
has reduced its support to the provinces in relation to the CAP. For a good overview, see

"Constitutional Reform and Social Policy" (1991), CCSD Social Development Overview (#1)

at 1.

7

Ibid. at 201.
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"to achieve agreement with the provinces on the standards to be achieved, the
provision of stable funding to meet those long-term objectives and to
end the
ongoing process of federal/provincial negotiation which has been more
or less
continuous in this area since the early 1970's".8
Among a number of other recommendations,9 it was also suggested
that
consideration be given to developing "a civil legal aid program to replace
present
cost-sharing of civil legal aid under the Canada Assistance Plan". The
Report
suggested that civil legal aid coverage include those matters of "federal
areas
of interest (divorce, enforcement of maintenance orders, court-appointed
counsel
under the provisions of the Charter, federal administrative or quasi-judicial
tribunals, etc.)".10
Particularly in conjunction with the other recommendations of the
Task
Force, it is evident that these recommended changes for rationalization
of legal
aid under one agreement and the transfer of jurisdiction for civil legal
aid to
the Department of Justice were motivated primarily for reasons of administrative
efficiency and rationality. However, these recommended changes coincided
with
similar recommendations proposed by the Canadian Bar Association (CBA)
in
1985:
The separate agreements covering adult criminal, Y.O.A. and civil legal aid
cost
sharing should be unified, with federal responsibility given to the Minister of Justice
and provincial responsibility to the respective Attorneys General. This would remove
the present duplication of negotiation, administration and audit and allow priorities
to reflect need and not funding biases."
The basis for the CBA recommendations was broader in scope, suggesting
that
legal aid "is the expression of the basic, democratic principle of the protection
of the rights of individuals against the overwhelming power of the state"
and
an essential service "to ensure equal access to justice in our society". 2
8 Ibid. at 201-202.
The other recommendations included a suggestion for resistance to increases
in federal
contributions to provinces with "high unit costs" of delivering legal aid, particularly
because
of provincial reliance on the private bar; the possibility of assessing the
level of federal
contributions by reference to the cost of delivering services through a public
defender program
(with provincial autonomy to utilize any other delivery method); consideration
of a linkage
of the criminal legal aid cost-sharing formula to the unit costs of service delivery
per capita expenditures; and a review of provincial eligibility criteria to determinerather than
the extent
to which the program's intended beneficiaries ("the poor, including the working
poor")
are
excluded from service because of increasingly restrictive financial eligibility
requirements. Ibid.
at 201-202.
10Ibid. at 202.
11National Legal Aid Liaison Committee, Canadian Bar Association, "The
Provision of
Public Legal Aid Services in Canada: Report to the National Council" (1985)
at 23 [hereinafter
CBA Report, 1985]). Note that the CBA Report refers to three current cost-sharing
agreements,
including those for criminal and Y.O.A. matters, and the Canada Assistance
Plan for civil legal
aid matters. The CBA Report, 1985 was followed by two further reports: "Lawyers
and Pro
Bono Services" (1986) [hereinafter CBA Report, 19861; and "Legal Aid Delivery
Models: A
Discussion Paper" (1987) [hereinafter CBA Report, 1987].
12 CBA Report, 1985, ibid. at 1.
9
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Reflecting its broader objectives, the CBA Report recommended that "es3
sential legal service coverage" for eligible legal aid clients' include family law
5
matters; 4 criminal law matters;' administrative law matters "which present real
jeopardy to liberty, livelihood, health, safety, sustenance or shelter";16 other civil
7
matters presenting jeopardy to individuals' and groups where there is an inability
being fairly resolved by other
to retain counsel "and the matter is not capable of
8
advice.'
and
education
legal
public
and
means";
These recommendations proposed by both the Task Force on Program
Review and the Canadian Bar Association present an excellent opportunity to
assess the options for the civil legal aid component of a possible comprehensive
legal aid cost-sharing agreement. This paper is an effort to do so, having regard
to both the needs of potential clients of civil legal aid services and the needs
of government to rationalize such services.
In addressing these issues, the paper provides a detailed examination of the
principles appropriate to legal aid services in Canada. Traditionally, the rationale
for providing such services has focused on the "need" for legal aid services,
especially by comparison with legal services available to lawyers' paying clients.
While such a concept often appears objective, the analysis demonstrates how
the meaning of legal needs has evolved over more than two decades of statefunded legal aid programs in Canada, and suggests the inadequacy of "needs"
surveys as the primary method for defining a rationale for legal aid services.
Instead, it is recommended that legal aid needs should be recognized as normative
issues for policy-making, and the paper explores the usefulness of an alternate
method of defining such needs - the "social indicator" approach. Such an
approach recognizes the normative basis for particular policy options and offers
a means of identifying target populations in terms of defined policy objectives.
The paper then examines the criteria for choosing policy objectives about
legal aid services. This assessment includes both broadly-defined social and
'3

Ibid. at 6-7.

Including child welfare, custody and access, independent representation for children,
domestic violence and maintenance proceedings, divorce and nullity proceedings, division of
matrimonial property (subject to financial eligibility), paternity and adoption.
15 Including all indictable offenses, all summary conviction offenses where conviction is
likely to lead to imprisonment or loss of means of earning a livelihood or where there are
special circumstances requiring counsel to ensure the fairness of the adversarial process, all
Crown appeals and conviction and sentence appeals by an accused where there is apparent
substantial merit or a substantial miscarriage of justice.
16 Including workers' compensation, immigration, welfare, unemployment insurance,
housing, pension and human rights cases.
17 Including foreclosures, residential tenant evictions, uninsured motorists, and Charter
proceedings.
18 Including information to enable all members of society to "know, respect and exercise
their legal responsibilities and rights, to prevent legal problems, and to help themselves to resolve
legal problems without or with limited need for lawyers and courts". CBA Report, 1985, supra
note 11 at 7.
14
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political values of Canadian society as well as more specific legal obligations
entrenched by the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms9.As well, the choice
of policy objectives depends on the arrangements of Canadian federalism,
including the spending power and the potential impact of constitutional changes
on its use in future federal-provincial agreements.
In light of the principles identified in this analysis, the paper explores the
problems of target populations and their needs for legal aid services, particularly
the relationship of needs between potential civil and criminal legal aid clients.
The paper tries to identify additional research which would be helpful in further
identifying such needs and appropriate responses on the part of policy-makers
at the federal and provincial levels.
Overall, the paper attempts to provide an analytical framework for assessing
specific policy options for legal aid services in Canada in the coming years, taking
account of both past experiences documented in legal aid reports and evaluations
as well as more theoretical perspectives in academic writing. The paper has been
written with the intention of creating a purposeful framework for discussion of
policy options about legal aid services, having regard to both the individual needs
of low income clients as well as our society's collective aspirations for fairness
in the administration of justice. In identifying issues and suggesting differing
approaches to resolving them, the paper analyzes the implications of various
options, and identifies further research which will be necessary to make informed
policy choices, particularly in relation to scarce resources. This paper provides
an opportunity for reviewing and assessing legal aid programs which currently
operate in Canada as well as a basis for discussion and consultation about the
future of legal aid services within the Canadian justice system.
II. PRINCIPLES FOR LEGAL AID SERVICES: DEFINING NEEDS
The choice of an appropriate civil legal aid component for a comprehensive
cost-sharing agreement on legal aid services between the Department of Justice
and each of the provinces depends on the identification of guiding principles
for legal aid services in Canada. Such a search for principles is a complex task,
one which may involve an enunciation of basic philosophical and social values
as well as an assessment of fiscal and political contexts. As is evident in their
differing recommendations about the scope of legal aid services, the Task Force
on Program Review and the Canadian Bar Association adopted different principles
concerning the basis for legal aid services in Canada. Thus, the definition of
legal aid objectives as well as the selection of appropriate methods for achieving
them are dependent on the choice of guiding principles for legal aid services.
This paper examines the issue of appropriate principles for civil legal aid
services by focusing first on the identification of "needs" for civil legal aid services
and then on the development of appropriate rationales for governmental policy
19 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.1 1 [hereinafter Charter].
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responses to such needs, including rationales for a response from the federal
government of Canada. Such a process is not an easy one because the search
for principles is more a creative process of constructing ideas and models than
merely one of searching for and discovering them.
In addition, the task is difficult because such a search for principles about
legal aid at the end of the twentieth century requires us to confront the real extent
of our society's commitment to access to justice. Inevitably, the perspective from
which such questions are approached may significantly affect proposed solutions
as well, a point suggested bluntly in a recent policy paper on legal aid services
in Australia:
Expectations of the goals and objectives of legal aid policy, expenditure and legal
aid services depend upon the social vantage point of the person who answers the
question [about the purpose of legal aid services], and whether, for example, he or
social reform or is
she is employed by government, or is an advocate of legal or
20
subsidy.
welfare
or
support
income
government
dependent on
Thus, in developing rationales for governmental responses to legal aid needs,
a further objective of this paper is to define policy options for legal aid services
to target groups.
The Evolution of the Concept of "Needs"
The history of government-funded legal aid programs in Canada2l over the
past two decades illustrates the dynamic nature of the concept of "needs" for
civil legal aid services. For example, the 1965 Joint Committee Report, which
recommended Ontario's legal aid legislation, identified the need for civil legal
aid services characterized exclusively by reference to the legal services then
available to paying clients. Seeking to provide "equal" services for both legal
aid and paying clients, the Joint Committee Report stated that there was "no
20 National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, Funding, Providing and Supplying Legal Aid
Services (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Services, 1989) at 100 [hereinafter
Australian Legal Aid Services].
21 For an excellent account of the history of policy-making about legal aid in Canada,
see D. Hoehne, Legal Aid in Canada (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989). Hoehne's analysis
suggested three stages of policy development: the period of "individual coping" with the need
for legal services; the period of "charity" provided to indigent clients by lawyers; and the period
of "collective coping" with the development of state-funded legal aid programs. Hoehne also
identified a significant tension in legal aid policy:
Since legal aid policy develops under the combined influence of legal and political
demands, it will always be characterized by an inherent tension between the rights of
the individual and the demands of the dominant political order. The study argues that
this ambivalence of legal aid is its main characteristic. The price to pay for obtaining
free legal assistance is the acceptance of a legal system whose inner logic often militates
against the interests of those in need (at 8).
For an account of the history of legal aid in Ontario, see M. P. Reilly, 'The Origins and
Development of Legal Aid in Ontario" (1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 81; and for Manitoba,
see N. Larsen, "Seven Years with Legal Aid (1972-79): A Personal View of Some Events
and Background Literature" (1981) 11 Man. L.J. 237.
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logical reason" for excluding representation before administrative tribunals from
legal aid coverage. On this basis as well, the Committee concluded that there
was no principled difference between matrimonial proceedings and other civil
actions:
In the contemplation of the law of Ontario they are equal.... Any legal aid system
which intends to ensure the advancement of the protection of the legal rights of
the needy must surely include matrimonial causes.22
In this conception of civil legal aid needs, services were consciously patterned
on the services then offered to paying clients by their lawyers.23 Inspired primarily
by legal aid initiatives in the United Kingdom, the Ontario legal aid program
was designed essentially as a judicare system, with the same lawyers providing
services to both legal aid and paying clients.
This early conception of legal aid needs was soon challenged by developments
in the United States where government-funded legal services were initiated by
the Office of Economic Opportunity as part of the "war on poverty". Because
its objective was the elimination of poverty (rather than the extension of existing
legal services to non-paying clients), the American program expanded the idea
of legal needs beyond those of fee-paying clients to a focus on the legal needs
of the poor, and utilized staff lawyers with special interests in poverty law with
offices located in low income communities.24 The legal aid programs subsequently
adopted in Quebec and some of the western provinces in Canada reflected this
American notion of legal needs, at least in their formative years. In Saskatchewan,
for example, legal aid was originally understood as a means of achieving
fundamental societal reform, best reflected in a recommendation of the Carter
Committee that a "legal aid scheme should be capable of acting, on proper
occasions, as a vehicle for social change".25 In Ontario, this conception of needs
was eventually reflected in the mandate of the community legal clinics, a program
22 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of
the Joint Committee on Legal Aid
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965) at 65 [hereinafter Joint Committee Report].
23 For an account of the ensuing problems of this approach,
see Ontario Law Reform
Commission, Report on Administration of Ontario Courts (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1973) vol.
III at 126; and M. J.Mossman, "Legal Aid in Canada" (Wurtzburg, 1983) [unpublished]
at
19-21 [hereinafter "Legal Aid in Canada"].
24 For an account of the American legal services program,
see C. Menkel-Meadow, "Legal
Aid in the United States: The Professionalization and Politicization of Legal Services
in the
1980's" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 29. A more recent account is found in D. J.
Besharov,
"Legal Services for the Poor: Time for Reform" (New Orleans: Conference on Access
to Justice
in the 1990's, 1989).
25 DPA Group Inc., "Evaluation of Saskatchewan Legal
Aid" (1988) at 149 [hereinafter
"Saskatchewan Evaluation"]. As the evaluation report noted, this early conception
of the role
of legal aid in Saskatchewan has eroded over the years, particularly because of disagreements
within the justice system about the appropriate role for legal aid, the diminishing role
of local
boards, the increasing preponderance of criminal law matters, and "a general societal
away from civil rights interests towards more traditional ones". The report concluded move
that
legal aid scheme in Saskatchewan by 1988 did no poverty law cases except reactively the
on a
case-by-case basis (at 150).
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1970's to "take a more comprehensive
added to the judicare program in the mid2
approach to the problems of the poor". 6
These divergent perspectives on the definition of legal needs, broadly
illustrated by the differing approaches in the United Kingdom (legal aid services
United States
based on those offered by lawyers to paying clients) and in the
27
(the strategic use of law and lawyers in the "war on poverty") remain evident
in policy debates in Canada more than two decades after government-funded
legal aid programs were initially introduced. Indeed, it has been suggested that
the early initiatives of the federal government reflected these two approaches,
with the Department of Justice focusing on legal aid as part of its responsibility
for the administration of justice, and the Department of Health and Welfare
funding legal aid programs as part of its overall commitment to social welfare
for designated target groups in need.28
More recently, the "essential services" defined by the 1985 Canadian Bar Association Report similarly appear to reflect an awareness of both approaches to
the question of legal needs in the current legal aid context (along with a commitment
to a "mix" of delivery systems, now so characteristic of legal aid programs in
Canada). Thus, as Dieter Hoehne has persuasively argued, current Canadian legal
aid programs remain deeply ambivalent about their objectives, reflecting both their
historical development and the inherent tension within such legal services:
The main characteristic of any legal aid plan is the ambivalence of the service it
provides to the clients. While on the one hand strengthening their position within
on the other hand to a legal system
the adversary system of justice, it subjects them
29
interests.
their
whose logic militates against
For purposes of policy analysis, it is essential to recognize the impact of
these competing objectives for legal aid services on the process of defining service
needs. Indeed, much of the dynamic quality of the concept of legal aid "needs"
is the direct result of these competing visions, as will be evident in the following
analysis of the methodology for defining such needs.
A Methodology for Defining "Needs"
The definition of legal needs is often presented as a primary task in the
development of options for legal aid services. Such a task is also a difficult and
elusive one; as an American academic suggested recently:
Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Commission on ClinicalFunding
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1978) at 3. The views in this Report also reflected the impact of
the Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1974). The latter Report (the Osler Report) specifically identified the special
legal problems of the poor: see 39-40.
27 The classic articulation of the usefulness of lawyering on behalf of the poor, but with
significant direction from clients about the process, is found in E. Cahn & J. Cahn, "The War
26

on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective" (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 1317.
28
29

For a detailed analysis of these policy initiatives, see Hoehne, supra note 21 at 81ff.
Ibid. at 310.
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•.. in a society in which law at least potentially touches everything, there is no such

thing as a uniquely legal problem. There are only problems, which people have,
about which the law might have something to say if somebody asked it to. That
observation, even if it's a truism, suggests that the concept of legal needs is a moving
target and that it's propelled by considerations not of legal definition, but rather
of pragmatic benefit and cost. 30
Despite its pessimism about the possibility of defining legal needs, this comment
usefully emphasizes two special aspects of the concept of legal needs: first, its
essentially dynamic quality, and; second, its relationship to the broader context
of problem-solving, particularly for those who are poor. In seeking to define legal
needs, both of these aspects are critically important.
1. Surveys of Legal "Needs"
In seeking to define legal needs, there have been a number of different
approaches, reflecting the differing ways in which such questions can be posed.
Where the question is posed as one of measuring the amount of perceived need,
for example, the use of the survey method has frequently been adopted. As early
as 1974, the American Bar Association (ABA) conducted a national survey of
a representative sample of the U.S. adult population to examine "the incidence
of personal, non-business legal problems and the use of legal services in their
resolution".31 In 1989, the ABA conducted a follow-up survey, again of a
representative sample of adults, to determine whether there were changes in the
perceived needs for legal services and in the use of lawyers.
The results of these surveys are useful in defining general trends in the
perceived needs for legal services in the United States, and also for the ways
in which they demonstrate the intricate relationship between perceived needs and
other factors. According to the data, a larger proportion of those surveyed had
consulted lawyers in 1989 than in 1974. While the upward trend to increased
use of lawyers' services occurred among respondents of all age groups, the most
significant change was attributed to the demographic change in the population
over the 15-year period; specifically, while 44% of the 1989 population was
between age 25 and 45, only 37% of the 1974 population was within that age
group. Because "an older population will have had a greater exposure to risk
and, consequently, a higher incidence of legal problems and reason for seeking
help", the survey suggested that changes in demographic patterns might be the
factor responsible for the apparent change in the perception of legal needs. This
conclusion was reinforced by figures about the use of lawyers for home purchases,
where a downward shift occurred between 1974 and 1989. However,
•.. the downward shift was not... the result of a decline in the proportion of home

buyers who sought the advice and help of lawyers at the time of purchase. In both
30 E.A. Dauer, "A Wider Notion of Unmet Legal Needs" (New
Orleans: Conference on
Access to Justice in the 1990's, 1989) at 4-5.
31 B.A. Curran, "Report on the 1989 Survey of the Public's Use
of Legal Services" (New
Orleans: Conference on Access to Justice in the 1990's, 1989) at 1.
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1974 and 1989, around 40% of home buyers consulted lawyers. Rather, the reduction
in lawyer use is attributable to the decline in home purchases .... [Moreover,] the
decline in home purchases occurred primarily among adults under 35 years of age
32
and was most pronounced among 25-34 year olds.
Thus, it seems clear that both changes in the demography of clients and changes
in the pattern of their activities (such as home purchase) can affect the calculation
of legal needs.
The two surveys also questioned respondents about problems for which they
chose not to consult a lawyer. Within the lowest income group in 1974, 11%
of persons had chosen not to consult a lawyer and this figure declined to 8%
in 1989; similarly, the proportion of persons within the highest income category
who had chosen not to consult a lawyer declined from 14% in 1974 to 8% in
1989. The survey indicated that only 29% of respondents reported that:
... they had not consulted a lawyer because they had found some other way to
solve the difficulty. The second most frequently given reason was the cost involved
33
in taking the matter to an attorney or pursuing the matter through the legal process.
While these figures suggest the existence of legal needs which remain unserviced,
particularly for poor people, it is difficult to reach any firm conclusions about
the nature of the needs or the appropriate responses.
There have been a number of surveys of low income communities in terms
of legal needs, especially in the United States, 34 in Australia35 and in the United
Kingdom.36 In a 1989 nationwide survey of low income households in the U.S.,
Ibid. at 7.
Ibid. at 21-22.
34 There are over 25 such studies dating back to 1969, six of which were statewide while
others were limited to one city, one county or multi-county jurisdictions. See Spangenberg Group,
"National Civil Legal Needs Survey" (New Orleans: Conference on Access to Justice in the
1990's, 1989) at I and 7. This study offered "empirical data on a nationwide basis" for the
first time, having surveyed 500 low income households, with at least one respondent in every
state except Hawaii and Alaska.
A more theoretical, but nonetheless influential, study is G. Hazard, Jr., "Legal Problems
Peculiar to the Poor" (1970) 26 J. of Soc. Issues 47, in which the author identified problems
of poverty in terms of rampant consumerism: "lavish inducement on the one hand and strong
impulse on the other conduce to more or less chronic financial distress". In terms of this analysis
of the problem, Hazard suggested the need for substantive changes in consumer law as one
way of addressing the underlying issue (at 56-57).
35 There are a number of papers on legal needs in Australia collected in P. Cashman,
ed., Research and the Delivery of Legal Services (Canberra: Law Foundation of N.S.W., 1981).
See also M. Cass & R. Sackville, Legal Needs of the Poor (Canberra: Australian Government
Printing Services, 1975) and M. Cass & J. Western, Legal Aid and Legal Need (Canberra:
Australian Government Printing Services, 1980).
36 See M. Zander, Legal Services for the Community (London: Temple Smith, 1978); M.
Zander, "How to Explain the Unmet Need for Legal Services" (1978) 64 A.B.A.J. 1676; M.
Partington, "Legal Aid in Great Britain" in F. Zemans, ed., Perspectives on Legal Aid (London:
Greenwood Press, 1979) at 158; and J. Cooper, Public Legal Services (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1983).
32

33
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for example, the data suggested that "among the ten categories of problems,
respondents with family problems most frequently had legal assistance". 37 Indeed,
the authors concluded that there were some difficulties in the perception of a
broader range of legal needs among such respondents:
Our observation is that low income persons generally consider family and consumer
problems as those for which legal assistance might be necessary, but do not consider
the relevance of legal assistance when faced with problems in the medical, utility
38
and public benefits categories.
In Canada, such surveys have occurred less frequently. At the time of the
evaluation of the legal aid program in Quebec, a modest survey was conducted
among the population of the province aged 18 years or older whose annual income
at that time was less than $25,000. "The investigation was intended to identify
the needs for information and legal advice, the perception by the client population
of legal aid and the actual use of legal services". 39 The results demonstrated a
high level of awareness about legal aid services in the province: more than 50%
of the population considered themselves well-informed about the law, and more
than 90% had heard of legal aid (although it was noted that this level of awareness
might not be wholly attributable to the legal aid scheme)40
In the evaluation of other legal aid schemes in Canada, such legal needs
surveys have not generally been undertaken, partly perhaps for the reasons stated
in the Manitoba evaluation. Such studies are complex and thus "could not be
conducted within the budgetary and time restraints of this evaluation study". 4'
Some data about general legal needs is available for Ontario, from a survey of
about 3000 households undertaken in 1987-88. This survey was supplemented
by a series of focus group discussions, on experiences with the civil justice system
in relation to a number of problems: torts, consumer, debt, landlord and tenant,
divorce/separation, problems with various levels of government, discrimination,
and invasions of privacy.42
The preliminary results of the study indicate that one in three Ontario
households reported one or more serious civil problems in the preceding threeyear period. "Younger, better educated, and higher income households reported
more problems than older, less-educated, lower income households" but the data
did not suggest "substantial differences in compensation seeking between

37 Spangenberg, supra note 34 at ii.
38

Ibid. at ii.

39 Ministre

de la Justice du Qudbec, "Evaluation of Legal Aid" (1983) at 48 [hereinafter
"Quebec Evaluation"].
40 Ibid. at 49.
41 Department of Justice, "Legal Aid in Manitoba" (1987) at 118 [hereinafter "Manitoba
Evaluation"].
42 W.A. Bogart & N. Vidmar, "Problems and Experience with the Ontario Civil Justice
System: A Preliminary Report" (Toronto: Conference on Access to Civil Justice of the Ontario
Ministry of the Attorney-General, 1988). See now Bogart & Vidmar in A. Hutchinson, ed.,
Access to Civil Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 1.
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households in various levels of the socio-economic strata". 43 The data also
confirmed a generally satisfactory assessment of lawyers by those involved with
the justice system. However, the study also suggested that civil legal services
may need to be assessed as discrete units rather than as one system, suggesting
that different categories of claims may be treated very differently within the civil
legal services context:
Those with auto accident problems are more likely to get what they claimed, be
satisfied with the result, be satisfied with their lawyer's fees, not think the process
took too long, not think the cost was too high and to have a more positive attitude
toward the civil justice system. More or less, the opposite is likely to be true regarding
those points for those with discrimination and professional services problems. 44
All of these studies provide useful insights about individuals' perceptions
of their legal service needs, but none of the studies offer precise and accurate
conclusions appropriate, by themselves, for policy-making purposes. Moreover,
the absence of significant numbers of legal needs surveys in Canada precludes
their use as a scientific measurement of needs for civil legal aid services. Thus,
it is not a feasible option to design a new civil legal aid program on the basis
only of this existing data on the needs of low income people for such legal aid
services. On the other hand, the issue of whether governmental legal aid programs
might initiate such needs surveys is a more complex question. On the basis of
surveys which have been completed elsewhere, it is clear that the measurement
of legal needs is a complex sampling and statistical process, and one which yields
data which is more useful for establishing general trends than for defining precise
needs. On this basis, any such survey would have to be both comprehensive and
highly detailed, requirements which would both entail significant expense. For
these reasons, it may be more appropriate in the policy-making process to utilize
the available data merely as one group of indicators of problems experienced
by legal service consumers, but without relying on it for scientific accuracy.
This conclusion is strengthened by concerns that such surveys suffer from
a number of inherent weaknesses, both in their conception and in their administration. From a conceptual point of view, they are conservative by nature,
focusing on problems currently understood to be legal problems rather than on
*problems for which legal solutions may be appropriate even though previously
untried4 5 In this way, the survey format may actually impede an understanding
of legal needs as a dynamic concept. As well, "such a survey will provide
meaningful and useful information only if certain, rigorous prescribed procedures
are applied in selecting the sample of the population to be used, and in defining
the measures, instruments, and procedures to be used for collecting, processing
and analyzing the data".46 Even careful procedures, however, cannot address all
43 Bogart & Vidmar, ibid. at 88.
44 Ibid. at 91.
45 For a similar analysis, see ibid.at

12, and citing F.R. Marks, "Some Research Perspectives
for Looking at Legal Need and Legal Services Delivery Systems: Old Forms and New" (1976)
11 L. & Society Rev. 191.
46

"Manitoba Evaluation", supra note 41 at 117.
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the ambiguities inherent in the relationship between legal aspects of problemsolving and other factors. As was noted in the U.S. context:
... there is ...

no obvious line dividing legal problems from other problems. For

example, are legal problems not recognized by the person with the problems included
or excluded from legal need? Does legal need include those problems that a person
believes to be a legal problem but a lawyer does not? When a problem has other
47
solutions besides legal action, should it be classified as a legal problem?
Thus, both because of this ambiguity, and because the concept of "needs" for
policy-making purposes must be a dynamic one, there may be only limited utility
to a comprehensive legal aid needs survey in the context of governmental policy
needs to define appropriate civil legal aid services for a comprehensive legal
aid program.
2. Social Indicators of Legal "Needs"
An alternative method for determining the extent of needs for civil legal
aid services in Canada is the use of social indicators. In an analysis of methods
of implementing legal aid policy goals in Australia, Hanks4 8 identified two basic
methods for providing government services: the "demand-based" or expressed
need method and; the "needs-based" or measured need method. Moreover,
because most legal aid programs in Australia have relied on expressed need or
demand as the basis for policy choices about the allocation of governmental
resources, Hanks asserted that the need for legal aid services had been constructed
"in terms of the experiences of individuals involved in the provision of legal
services" and had reflected "current delivery patterns" - as if "current demand
and use patterns establish the course on which legal aid services are to develop".49
This assumption was seriously criticized in Australia in relation to welfare services:
Many Australian initiatives have been a response to expressed need rather than
measured need. To this extent, they have ignored the inarticulate or powerless who
have not known how to express their needs effectively. [Such a process] has very
little to do with the level of need in the community [and] largely ensures that resources
will go to the aspirant with the loudest voice. 50
By contrast, Hanks suggested the use of social indicators to measure the
extent and distribution of characteristics in defined populations which match the
defined aims of legal service delivery programs. The value of any particular
47 "The Legal Services Corporation and the Activities of Its Grantees: A Fact Book" (U.S.
Legal Services Corporation: 1979) at 10. Significantly, in the Australian context, researchers
have suggested that it is "intermediaries" who are most important "in the determination both
of whether a problem admits of a legal solution and of whether such a solution should necessarily
involve a lawyer". See Cass & Western, supra note 35 at 60.
48

P. Hanks, Social Indicators and the Delivery of Legal Services (Canberra: Australian

Government Publishing Services, 1987).
49 Ibid. at 1, citing Cass & Western, supra note 35 at 18.
50 Ibid. at 1-2, citing Senate Standing Committee on Social Welfare, Through a Glass Darkly

(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1979) at 57-58.
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indicator is dependent, of course, on its congruence with the objectives of the
service delivery program, as well as its accuracy and accessibility for policy
planners. Thus, in terms of the planning process, the use of social indicators to
assess needs requires policy-makers to first define their program objectives and
then to identify accurate and accessible indicators to measure needs accordingly.
It also requires some flexibility to permit policy-makers to recognize when they
need to supplement the information on program targets to achieve defined
objectives. In conceding this limitation, Hanks recommended that subjective data
be gleaned from both current service deliverers and consumers. 5'
Hanks' assessment of the use of social indicators in measuring needs in
Australia suggested that some agencies had developed quite sophisticated systems
for ensuring that program objectives were properly targeted to those most in
need of the services. In his view legal aid agencies were noticeably less
sophisticated in doing so than other service agencies, since they paid significantly
less attention to both the theoretical and methodological problems compared with
other agencies:
First, there has been little attempt to isolate the objectives of the delivery of legal
aid services - the needs which legal aid services are designed to meet. Some legal
aid agencies have identified target populations; but that identification appears to
have been influenced by the agencies' experience with their current clientele, rather
than by reference to their programme objectives. Finally, the selection of the indicators
which measure the location and distribution of the target populations has not displayed
the degree of rigour which other agencies' studies suggest is necessary .... If legal
aid agencies are to build on their experience in the use of social indicators, these
52
theoretical and practical problems must be addressed.
From a Canadian perspective, Hanks' analysis of the objectives of legal aid
programs in Australia (mainly derived from written documentation which stated
objectives only implicitly) is significant because it demonstrates the same pattern
evident in Canada: over time, a perceptible "narrowing of the scope" of legal
aid services. Despite some early statements in Australia about the possibility of
using legal aid "to change the political, economic and social status of the poor",53
Hanks suggested that the activity and work of legal aid agencies had more
consistently demonstrated a commitment to the narrower objective of achieving
"equality throughout the Australian community in access to and distribution of
standard litigation-oriented legal services"5 4 Recognizing that such an objective
focuses on equality of opportunity rather than on equality of outcome, Hanks

Ibid. at 5.
Ibid. at 37.
53 Ibid. at 46, citing R. Sackville, Legal Aid in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Services, 1975) at para 1.7.
54 Ibid.at 47. For a similar conclusion, see R. Cranston, "Legal Services and Social Policy"
in Cashman, supra note 35 at 41; and Armstrong & Graycar, "Two Pragmatic Views After
Ten Months of Operations from the South Australian Legal Services Commission" in Cashman,
supra note 35 at 91.
51
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asserted that even this narrower objective would lend itself readily to an assessment
of needs by social indicators:
•.. setting objectives for legal aid delivery (assuming an "equality of opportunity"

goal) hinges on the identification of those sections of the community who have two
characteristics - a need for legal services and a reduced capacity to obtain those
services through the private market. It is, at least, likely that these groups can be
identified from indicators of social deprivation - unemployment, geographic
isolation, ethnicity, and dependency on the social security system for income
support ....

55

Thus, the use of social indicators to define needs for civil legal aid services seems
to offer a more helpful approach for policy-makers in designing legal aid
programs, whether they are comprehensive or more narrowly focused.
The appropriateness of a social indicator approach has been accepted by
the National Legal Aid Advisory Committee in Australia. In a 1989 discussion
paper,5 6 the Committee confirmed that "social indicators [were] likely to have
a significant role in its recommendations on legal aid policy and evaluation of
legal aid", and that it would give consideration to the "identification and selection
of appropriate social indicators of needs for legal aid services". 57 In the latter
task, the Committee requested the assistance of those engaged in legal services
and in the work of courts and tribunals, as well as those in "the community and
the social welfare sector" to contribute to the collection of information which
would assist in the development of additional social indicators of the need for
58
legal aid services.
In Canada, the published reports of evaluations of provincial legal aid
programs disclose no use of social indicators in the process of designing and
55 Hanks, supra note 48 at 49. See also J. Handler & L. Trubek, Poor Clients Without
Lawyers: What Can Be Done (New York: Clearinghouse Review, 1985) at 371. An earlier
American study has also been influential for a number of writers on legal aid policy: C. Jerome
& J. Howard, "Legal Representation and Class Justice" (1965) 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 381.
56 Australian Legal Aid Services, supra note 20.
57 Ibid. at 24. The Discussion Paper accepted Hanks' suggestions about possible social
indicators of legal needs as an appropriate starting point.
58 Ibid.at 28. The Committee expressly recognized that it did not "pretend to be undertaking
a survey of those needs. At best, it appear[ed] to NLAAC that any evidence of needs [so provided]
by respondents [would] represent an informed 'indication' of needs for legal aid in the short
to medium-term" (at 28-29).
The Committee also recognized the impact of such an approach on the arrangements for
funding of legal aid services, particularly on the part of the federal government in Australia:
The establishment of legal aid indices, in conjunction with the collection and compilation
of reliable data about the cost and availability of legal services and community legal
services, would be the key to the proposal. Public funds could then be made available
to the legal aid program or legal aid providers in accordance with those indices, rather
than on a per capita or other basis unrelated to the effective implementation of legal
aid policies (at 55).
According to the Committee, the timeline required to implement such an approach meant that
the new arrangements could not be "fully effective" until after 1995-96.
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implementing program objectives as suggested by Hanks. Demographic data has
been used as a basis for conclusions about a program's effectiveness in responding
to needs for legal services. In the evaluation of the legal aid program in British
Columbia, for example, demographic data was used to isolate factors influencing
patterns of utilization (both the volume of use and rates of utilization) for criminal,
family, and civil non-family legal aid services. In this context, the data suggested
that "the major predictor of the volume of services [in family law] was the number
of single parent families with children under six". 59 As well, "the proportion of
the population composed of single female welfare recipients" was a good predictor
of family legal aid utilization rates. 60 By contrast, the utilization rates for civil
non-family legal aid matters was almost entirely predictable by the population
of the area, the budget of the legal aid office, and the number of lawyers on
its staff; that is "availability/resource factors" rather than need factors.6
The use of demographic data to assess utilization was similarly adopted in
the evaluation of the legal aid program in Manitoba, but the report concluded
that there were no strong links between the demographic profile/income
characteristics of regions and the use of legal aid services. Significantly, the
evaluators suggested that the absence of such strong links was probably itself
evidence of unmet needs for legal aid services:
While it is difficult to interpret the lack of strong relationships between utilization
of certificates and demographic, poverty and crime characteristics of regions, one
possibility is that there is still a large amount of unmet need. If all eligible persons
were receiving help then there should be a stronger relationship. The possibility of
62
unmet need warrants further investigation.
The absence of evidence that legal aid needs might be defined in Canada
using a social indicator approach may perhaps be explained by two factors. In
the first place, legal aid services in Canada have been primarily designed by
lawyers and others knowledgeable about the legal system. Thus, just as Hanks
found that legal aid programs in Australia had generally failed to use a
sophisticated approach to identify their program objectives and then seek measures
to achieve them, so legal aid programs in Canada have been substantially
fashioned by lawyers, unconsciously using the norm of legal services for paying
clients. Thus, like legal aid agencies in Australia, Canadian legal aid programs
have probably used demographic data to support decisions (about services and
office locations, for example) already taken - "presumably influenced by such
factors as demand, political considerations .... the attitude of legal practitioners,
... and managerial and 'professional' considerations".63 Clearly, such processes
do not utilize a social indicator approach in defining legal aid needs.
59 P. L. Brantingham & P. J. Brantingham, "An Evaluation of Legal Aid in British Columbia"
(1984) at 250 [hereinafter "British Columbia Evaluation"].
60 Ibid. at 250.
61 Ibid. at 253.
62
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"Manitoba Evaluation", supra note 41 at 137.
Hanks, supra note 48 at 36-37.
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Another factor, perhaps even more significant, is that the use of social
indicators to define legal needs is most appropriate for a decision-making process
about the scope of legal aid services and the setting of priorities among groups
of potential clients. Such a process is most evident at the commencement of a
legal aid program or in the context of a review of policies for the purpose of
extending services. The policies of governmental restraint for legal aid services
in Canada during the past decade have resulted in very few opportunities for
significant policy development and planning. The expansion program for community legal clinics in Ontario, for example, has routinely used such demographic
data to assess competing applications for the establishment of new office locations,
but their expansion has been an exceptional development among legal aid
programs generally in Canada.64 Moreover, the substantial requirements for legal
aid services in criminal matters agreed to in the federhl-provincial negotiations
have probably deterred at least some re-examination of the appropriate targets
for legal aid services in Canada. Some provinces have simply implemented the
cost-sharing agreements without offering many other services.65
If this latter point is valid, the need to develop options for a civil legal aid
component in a possible comprehensive legal aid program for Canada, offers
a unique opportunity to define national legal aid program objectives and to identify
social indicators which will assist the program to meet its defined goals. Such
a process of defining legal needs is more attractive than legal needs surveys.
The reasons for this are twofold: the use of defined goals and social indicators
recognizes the dynamic quality of the concept of needs and its complexity, and;
it permits a clear assessment of priorities.
At the same time, the proposed approach is not without difficulty. It will
be necessary to decide controversial issues such as the objectives for a national
legal aid program and to determine the weight to be assigned to particular social
indicators to implement policy decisions. Such concerns necessarily raise the
essentially subjective or political nature of legal aid decision-making, a matter,
according to Hanks, rarely confronted in legal aid policy discussions:
... if the difficulty were acknowledged, it would lead to a substantial modification
of "scientific" or "objective" attempts to measure the extent and incidence of the
need for legal services. That phenomenon is subjective and elastic: the definition

64

See Ontario Legal Aid Plan, Annual Reports, and M.J. Mossman, "Community Legal

Clinics in Ontario: A Personal Assessment" (1983) 3 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 375, especially
at 393ff [hereinafter "Community Legal Clinics"].
65 See DPA Group, Inc., "Evaluation of Legal Aid in New Brunswick" at 29-30 [hereinafter
"New Brunswick Evaluation"]. According to data in the report, the rate of criminal legal aid
(both certificates and duty counsel) appeared to have remained relatively constant for the tenyear period 1975-85. By contrast, the number of civil legal aid cases declined steadily (with
certificates declining at a greater rate than duty counsel services). The cuts for civil legal aid
services in New Brunswick were described more recently as cutting "to the bone"; according
to Judith MacPherson, President of the CBA-NB Branch, "aid for civil cases, such as matrimonial
disputes, restraining orders and physical abuse was dropped entirely". See the CBA National,
September 1989, at 37.
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of legal services (what lawyers can, or should, do) imports broad political and narrow
professional values, as well as being
influenced by the class-based experience of
66
the person offering the definition.
Thus, explicit recognition of both the subjectivity and elasticity, rather than
scientific objectivity, in the definition of legal needs necessarily requires a
normative assessment of the objectives of legal aid programs.
III. PRINCIPLES FOR LEGAL AID SERVICES: POLITICAL VALUES AND
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
The Context for Creating Legal Aid Objectives
Where the process of defining legal aid objectives depends on defining
"needs", the definition of needs is used to identify gaps in legal services; and
filling the gaps then becomes the rationale orjustification for a legal aid program.
By contrast, where the process of defining needs is recognized as less a scientific
process and more a normative one, the rationale for providing legal aid services
requires a different kind of analysis. Moreover, where the search for appropriate
objectives for legal aid services is a normative one, it raises questions about the
ways in which choices should be made, the criteria to be adopted in deciding
what options should be considered, and the extent to which future aspirations
as well as past experiences should influence choices required in the search process.
In a sense, this search for appropriate objectives is not a new task, of course,
since these issues were all considered both at an early stage when governmental
funding for legal aid programs was initiated, and subsequently each time reviews
have been undertaken. However, just as the attempt to define unmet needs for
legal aid services was an evolutionary process, so the process of defining objectives
has been a dynamic rather than static one. In the context of designing a civil
legal aid component for a comprehensive legal aid program in Canada, the
challenge to define legal aid program objectives is thus renewed.
The context of the development of legal aid programs and their express (and
implicit) objectives deserve scrutiny in the process of defining objectives for the
future. Legal aid programs, funded by government and (usually) created by
statute, 67 were established throughout Canada only within the past two decades,
coinciding with the creation of similar kinds of legal aid programs in other western
countries, all of which are now generally characterized as part of the worldwide "access to justice" movement. 68 Focusing on the creation and enforcement
66 Hanks, supra note 48 at 50. For a thorough discussion of the political nature of legal
aid service decision-making, see R. Abel, "Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced
Capitalism" (1985) 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 474.
67 A useful overview of legal aid legislation and programs a decade ago is found in Legal
Aid Services in Canada 1979/80 (Ottawa: National Legal Aid Research Centre, 1981). For
statistical information about the allocation of legal aid funds, see Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics, Ministry of Supply and Services, Legal Ai" 1981 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981).
68 M. Cappelletti, Toward Equal Justice: A Comparative Study of Legal Aid in Modem
Societies (Milano: Giuffre, 1975), especially at 26-31; and M. Cappelletti & B. Garth, "Access
to Justice: the Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective" (1978)
27 Buffalo L. Rev. 181.
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of rights for members of society traditionally disadvantaged in terms of political
and economic power, the access to justice movement supported legal rights and
processes "aimed at the challenging problem of making rights effective" in the
welfare state of the late twentieth century:
•..the rights at the center of access-improving reforms are those typical of welfare
state efforts to bolster the position of the weak - especially individuals in such
capacities as consumers, tenants, or employees - against relatively powerful
organizations. The welfare state has been characterized increasingly by the proliferation of such rights - rights that are designed to promote social change on behalf
of the "have-nots". The existence of substantive rights representing broad social goals
has helped to inspire the access-to-justice movement. 69
Within the access to justice movement, three "waves" of reform efforts have
been recognized: the enforcement of existing rights through efforts to ensure legal
representation; the extension of legal representation to groups with diffuse and
broadly-based interests traditionally excluded from the legal system (consumers,
environmentalists, for example); and efforts to experiment with new forms of
representation and dispute-resolution. Within each of the three waves, there is
a tension between the "procedural right of access to justice and the substantive
goals of many access-oriented reformers".70
The exact role of legal aid in the access to justice movement has changed
from one context to another. The three waves of reform efforts define a broad
range of tasks which might be undertaken by a legal aid program: representation
of individuals in relation to the enforcement of existing rights; representation of
individuals and groups with more broadly-based claims to rights as consumers,
etc.; or representation and participation in new forms of dispute-resolution.
Moreover, these essentially procedural tasks could be augmented by efforts at
substantive change within each of the three categories: efforts to use legal
representation to change the law's impact on the poor; attempts to use the
enforcement of legal rights in the interests of cleaner air, improved products,
or better housing, etc.; and willingness to design processes to better accomplish
substantive goals within the legal system. The point is that there is no reason
in principle which prevents a legal aid program from defining its objectives in
any or all of the ways described as the three waves of reform in the access to
justice movement. It is clear from evidence both in Canada and elsewhere that
various legal aid initiatives have been used to pursue many of these goals from
time to time. 71 In general, legal aid initiatives in Canada have focused less on
clearly-defined and positive objectives than on the apparent needs for legal
services, broadly characterized as "gaps" or "unmet needs". Only infrequently
69

M. Cappelletti & B. Garth, "Access to Justice as a Focus of Research" (1981) 1 Windsor

Y.B. Access Just. ix at xvi-xvii [hereinafter "Access to Justice"].
70 Ibid. at x.
71 For a number of examples, see M. J. Mossman with H. Ritchie, "Access to Civil Justice:
A Review of Canadian Academic Legal Scholarship 1977-1987" (National Conference on
Access to Civil Justice: 1988). See now A. Hutchinson, ed., Access to Civil Justice (Toronto:
Carswell, 1990) at 53.
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have there been statements of principle, such as the assertion of the Joint
Committee in Ontario that legal aid was "no longer a charity but a right"72 and
73
that it should be "the responsibility of the whole community". Similar sentiments
legal aid programs
provincial
were expressed at the time of the adoption of other
in the early 1970's as well, although legislation both in Ontario and elsewhere
carefully restricted those matters for which legal aid would be provided as of
right, and all the programs operated with considerable discretion. 4 As was noted
have frequently been more implicit than
by Hanks in Australia, program goals
75
context.
aid
legal
the
in
expressed
Discussions about the objectives of legal aid programs in Canada became
more overt, with the inception of governmental restraint policies in the early
1980's, when policy-makers began to focus more explicitly on objectives relating
to cost-effectiveness. As Lazar noted (perhaps ironically) in 1979:
When money was more readily available, discussions about legal aid concentrated
on meeting needs. Now discussions focus on controlling costs. But the objectives
of legal aid have not changed - they still relate to meeting needs. What has changed
interest in
is the resources available to legal aid. This, like our newly heightened
76
the costs of justice, is a result of government financial restraint.
The cautious optimism of this comment - that legal aid program objectives
were to continue to meet needs - has remained valid in most Canadian provinces
in the past decade only on the basis of a very circumscribed definition of needs,
that is, a political and normative process for deciding on legal aid objectives.
In the evaluation of the British Columbia legal aid program, for example, the
impact of provincial government restraint policies (and federal government
policies, to a lesser extent) was documented. The evaluation demonstrated not
only the staff reductions, elimination of coverage for some matters, and termination of programs for special groups, but also changes in the overall context
of legal services: the abolition of the Office of the Rentalsman and the complaint
and mediation services of the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, along
with all the investigative staff in the Human Rights office. 77 As the evaluator
suggested:
The reductions in coverage forced by restraint have also re-opened the issue of
whether legal aid is provided under a state responsibility to ensure justice, or is seen
simply as a social need which may or may not be filled. Clearly, in significant areas
of criminal and matrimonial coverage, legal aid was treated as a need to be addressed
subject to available funds rather than as a right which the state has a responsibility
78
to meet.
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Joint Committee Report, supra note 22 at 97.
by the Ontario Federation of Labour.
in Canada", supra note 23 at 17-40.

73 Ibid. at 51, citing brief submitted
74 For an overview, see "Legal Aid
75 Hanks, supra note 48 at 39-46.

76 A. Lazar, "Legal Aid in the Age of Restraint" (Canadian Institute for the Administration
of Justice Conference on the Cost of Justice: 1979) at 1.
77 "British Columbia Evaluation", supra note 59 at 47-53.
78 Ibid. at 51.
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Moreover, the recession of the early 1980's which resulted in governmental
restraint policies actually created a larger target population for legal aid services,
just as they were being so drastically reduced. As the evaluators in British
Columbia noted, "more persons were unemployed; more persons were on social
assistance; more persons were financially eligible for legal aid". 79
More recently, evaluations of other provincial programs have also drawn
attention to the gap between goals of access to legal aid implicit in the programs
and the actual services delivered. In New Brunswick, for example, the evaluators
reported that:
coverage in civil cases is not good enough, mainly due to inadequate funding.
Opinions range from feeling that the system is working, but will soon break down
if nothing is done about it, to the view that the system is so badly funded it is beyond
salvation. LANB [Legal Aid of New Brunswick] in theory covers all civil matters
except divorce proceedings. It will also not pay for disbursements in civil cases. These
80
are two serious constraints on coverage.
...

The report of the evaluation of the legal aid program in Saskatchewan also
documented changes in coverage since 1983-84, noting substantial changes from
"the original intent of the founders of Legal Aid": the provision of virtually all
services except those "fee generating".81 At the same time, however, the evaluators
concluded that services offered were the "more critical" services, suggesting that
if additional resources became available, services should be provided for summary
convictions, matrimonial property, poverty law, administrative tribunals, wills/
estates and landlord/tenant.82
The relationship among various legal aid services is also important in
assessing the commitment to such a program. In Saskatchewan, for example,
the restraint policy of the early 1980's resulted in a larger proportion of legal
aid resources being directed to persons charged with criminal offenses, presumably
because of the requirements of the federal-provincial agreement. Where the total
amount of resources is diminished without any change in the list of services to
which priority must be given, such a result seems inevitable. The evaluators noted
that "the gain in criminal matters ha[d] been mainly at the expense of civil
matters",3 and they drew attention to competing philosophies about legal
representation in criminal matters on the issue of whether representation should
always be available or whether there are some "trivial" matters for which legal
aid services are less necessary (especially in an era of financial restraint). Without
resolving this issue, the evaluators also made the important observation that
whether such representation in trivial matters is paid for by legal aid funds or
by private funds, there are public costs involved:
79 Ibid. at 53.
80
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"New Brunswick Evaluation", supra note 65 at 52.
"Saskatchewan Evaluation", supra note 25 at 174.
Ibid. at 180-181.
Ibid. at 147.
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Is the trend to greater amounts of litigation serving the cause of justice or is it selfserving to those who work in the justice system? If trying minor cases abuses the
justice system, should rich and poor have equal opportunity to do so? Since the rich
are rarely even charged with minor offenses, can the poor be denied even access
to counsel? Is the achievement of perfectly equal access to justice worth the social84
and economic costs, and do those costs in turn deny justice to the greater public?
The interrelationship of issues about legal aid services on one hand, and the overall
arrangements for the administration of justice on the other,85 is implicit in such
a comment. Yet, while the relationship between such arrangements is obvious,
the appropriate answers to the questions remain much less clear.
This brief review of possible rationales for legal aid services, either expressed
or implicit, in the history of the past two decades of government-funded legal
aid programs in Canada reveals the absence of consensus on this issue. At the
same time, it demonstrates the vitality of the ongoing debate. Indeed, the issue
has remained a lively one as new programs of the early 1970's have matured
over two decades in the midst of significant social changes in Canada, as
new developments in the legal system (such as the Young Offenders Act86)
have been introduced, and as Canada has experienced periods of economic
recession, especially at the beginning and end of the 1980's. The fact that the
debate over the appropriate rationale for legal aid services has remained a lively
one offers some evidence of the essential commitment to legal aid services and
their continued improvement on the part of both the federal and provincial
governments. Thus, the idea of creating a civil legal aid component as part of
a comprehensive legal aid program presents an opportunity to re-think the
rationale for legal aid services in Canada and to explore the potential for
developing a broader consensus about the fundamental objectives of such services
for the future.
In seeking to define objectives for a program of civil legal aid in Canada,
the social and political values of the late twentieth century welfare state
provide a general context for policy choices. In addition constitutional and
other legal obligations both within Canada and in terms of international
agreements may provide concrete requirements for defining goals for a civil legal
aid program. Moreover, there are important elements of financial relationships
between the federal government and the provinces which must be taken into
account.

84 Ibid. at 172. The evaluators did not try to answer these questions because of "the
complexity of the issues", referring to other recommendations about user fees in their report.
85 For an interesting assessment of the interrelationship of many factors affecting access
to justice, see S. Shetreet, "Judging in Society: The Changing Role of Courts" in S. Shetreet,
ed., The Role of Courts in Society (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) at 467. The practical concerns
about the myriad of relevant factors were also documented in the Ontario, Ministry of the
Attorney General, Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1987),
especially at 66ff.
86 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-I.
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Criteriafor Choosing Objectives: PoliticalValues
Both the implicit and expressed objectives of most legal aid programs in
Canada to date have focused on the need to achieve equality87 in relation to
the law. Yet, just as the access to justice movement has demonstrated how ideas
about equality have changed from the elimination of formal barriers in the
nineteenth century to that of affirmative state action in the twentieth, so ideas
about the meaning of equality have differed within the legal aid context.
In general terms, these ideas fall into two categories. For those involved
in the initial efforts to establish government-funded legal aid programs, there
was an emphasis on the need for equality of opportunity for fee-paying and poor
clients in terms of legal representation; the goal was the creation of formal equality
among litigants by ensuring that all had legal assistance. In pursuit of this goal,
it was assumed that legal aid clients would require the same kinds of services
and that the representation of poor people would make no different demands
on arrangements for the administration of justice.88 In this conception of the
purpose of legal aid as one of equalizing the position of poor people before the
courts, there was no recognition of inequality as a structural problem and little
appreciation of the potential impact of changes in legal aid on the overall
administration of justice.89
87The emphasis on equality in the social policy process in Canada extends beyond debates
about legal services, of course, to many other areas of concern. In this context, see A. Moscovitch
and G. Drover, eds., Inequality: Essays on the Political Economy of Social Welfare (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1981); Report of the Special Senate Committee on Poverty, Poverty
in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971), especially at 141ff; D. Guest, The Emergence of
Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980); and more

recently, G. Drover, ed., Free Trade and Social Policy (Ottawa: C.C.S.D., 1988). In the

international context, see Herausgegeben von, Broekman, Opalek and Kerimov, Social Justice
and Individual Responsibility in the Welfare State (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden
GMBH, 1985), especially chap. 3.
88Hoehne noted that such a conception of legal services did not challenge the traditional
service roles of lawyers; only the source of funding was altered, thereby ensuring the continued
control of legal services by the legal profession:
[The Ontario Plan] did not upset the established structures and principles of the earlier
legal aid service. The profession stayed in control of the service and every lawyer had
the option to participate in the plan. Adopting the judicare concept did not require a
change in the profession's underlying philosophy of legal aid. The only change affected
funding of the service. Funding by individual members of the profession was replaced
by external funding.
See Hoehne, supra note 21 at 59-60.
89 Hoehne has carefully documented the process by which legal aid services came to be
characterized in terms which went beyond the idea of due process in the courts, including
U.S. developments on the right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and
Argersinger v. Hamlin 407 U.S. 25 (1972)); the 1966 debate on capital punishment in Canada
(and concerns about ensuring proper convictions); Warren Allmand's Private Member's Public
Bill in 1970 supporting an effective legal aid scheme; the Trudeau Government's interest in
issues of justice and equality; and the impact of developments within the Department of Health
and Welfare on the concept of legal aid as a matter of "social welfare". See Hoehne, ibid
at chap. 3.
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At the same time these early initiatives to establish legal aid programs in
Canada established firmly the idea of affirmative state action to redress inequality
(however defined) in the administration of justice. In the past two decades of
debate in Canada about legal aid, there has been little serious questioning of
the existence of a basic state obligation to ensure equality in the justice context
through funding for legal aid programs. Even though there has been controversy
about the extent of the obligation, the nature of a federal-provincial responsibility
for funding services, and the kinds of services covered, there has been quiet
consensus about the existence of a state obligation to provide legal aid services
to ensure access to justice.
This consensus is an important starting point for defining goals for legal
aid services, even though it is still necessary to decide on the details of any such
program, a process which may be more controversial. Such an obligation has
increasingly been recognized in the context of measures to ensure equality for
all citizens, 90 and in the trend to extend rights to individuals, notjust in the criminal
law context but also in matters of civil rights, matters which "directly affect the
burning issues of the economy and economic structures - of wealth and poverty
and all their consequences in terms of equality, of power and subordination, of
culture and ignorance".91 Characterized as a part of the "new vision of justice",
measures such as legal aid foster the "quest for effectiveness", a quest which
embraces:
..effective right of action and defence, effective access to court, effective equality
of the parties - encompassing all the once-neglected problems of legal aid, of delay,
of costs and small claims, in a pervasive attempt to bring this new justice within
92
the reach of all.

In Canada, ideas such as these have been expressed frequently over the
past two decades. In 1969, for example, the Minister of Justice stated that
one of his three main objectives was "to move as far as we can towards
equality of access and equality of treatment before the law for rich and poor
90 See for example, M. Cappelletti, "Access to Judicial Remedies in Civil Litigation:
Comparative, Constitutional, International, and Social Trends" in M. Cappelletti, The Judicial
Processin Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 215:
Despite remarkable differences in emphasis and timing, Western and Eastern, developed
and developing societies, all share a common trend: to abandon and demythicize
ineffective proclamations of liberties not accessible to all (at 264).
9' Ibid. at

265.

Ibid. at 266. In the American context, the existence of such an affirmative state obligation
has been defined in this way:
...if justice is a "special" characteristic in our legal system, further efforts are required
to create more effective and comprehensive solutions to access problems .... [Because]
there is a unique character tojustice,. . . the capacity of every individual to have effective
access to legal services is an essential element of the nation we seek to become. Since
the free market seems unable to provide a true equality of access to legal services of
reasonable quality, some form of subsidized delivery system may be needed.
G. Singsen, "Legal Clinics and Access to Justice" (New Orleans: Conference on Access to
Justice in the 1990's, 1989) at 34.
92
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alike". 93 More recently, such an affirmative state obligation to redress inequality
in the justice system was clearly asserted in the 1985 CBA Report. "the primary
responsibility to ensure that these essential [legal aid] services are provided lies
with government".94 The rationale offered to support this assertion was similar
to that suggested above:
Legal aid services are essential because they help to ensure equality before the law.
Together, representative government and equality before the law form the base of
our democratic system. The first requires the right to vote and the second requires
95
equal access to the judicial system.
The report also suggested the need for fairness in court proceedings as a related
justification for legal aid programs.
Recognition of such an affirmative state obligation to provide subsidized
legal aid services has also contributed to the creation of a second way of
approaching the goal of equality, a conception which focuses on substantive
outcomes achieved by legal aid services rather than merely the right to formal
representation. Such an approach recognizes inequality in society as structural
rather than individual: "it is the mark of a civilized society to aim at eliminating
such inequalities as have their source, not in individual differences, but in its
own organization".96 In this context, the idea of equality is one which advances
the goal of achieving justice for individuals within the structure of the welfare
state. Indeed, the CBA Report apparently recognized this form of equality as a
rationale for legal aid programs as well:
[Legal aid] is the expression of the basic, democratic principle of protection of the
rights of individuals against the overwhelming power of the state. As such, legal
aid is essential in order to ensure equal access to justice in our society. Justice is
indivisible; if it is not accessible to everyone then it does not exist. ....97
Societal acceptance of a state obligation to provide legal aid services on
the basis of a rationale of protecting "the rights of individuals against the
overwhelming power of the state" also suggests the complex roles of the modern
welfare state: both as the provider of fundamental legal aid services to ensure
equality in relation to the law and, frequently at the same time, as the litigation
opponent of the legal aid client. In such a context, it has been suggested that
"access to justice necessarily implicates issues central to the politics of the modern
welfare state",98 especially because of the increased capacity for the enforcement
of rights where legal aid is available. Indeed, some of the ambiguity in levels
93 Hon. John Turner (House of Commons, November 7, 1969); the other two objectives
related to law reform and the balance between citizens' rights and the government. Cited in
Hoehne, supra note 21 at 99. Hoehne concluded that "legal aid policy was to be part of the
constructive political action whose ultimate goal was to create the 'just society"' (at 100).
94 CBA Report, 1985, supra note 11 at 3.
95Ibid. at 2.

R.H. Tawney, Equality (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1931) at 57.
97CBA Report, 1985, supra note 11 at 1.
98 "Access to Justice", supra note 69 at xvi.
96
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of support for legal aid services may be related to the political tension between
the creation of rights and governmental expectations about their enforcement:
One assumption access reformers may make is that the legislative creation of a right
implies a societal commitment to its full enforcement. The political reality is much
more complicated. At one extreme new rights may represent political symbols enacted
by those who wish to mollify dissent without effecting any serious change. At the
other extreme would be rights that policymakers wish to have enforced at virtually
any cost. The typical situation is that legislators proliferate rights with an understanding that they will be enforced at a certain level and impose a more or less
predictable burden on those against whom they are enforced. Access reforms may
drasticallyaffect that level of enforcement, and that in turn may lead to a strongpolitical
reaction manifested in hostility to the underlying substantive law or to the procedural
reform (emphasis added).99
In this context, legal aid services represent the effort to balance societal values
which promote equality for individuals (especially those who are vulnerable or
disadvantaged) with the state's goal of efficiency and effectiveness in the
administration of justice. Thus, in the choice of legal aid objectives, social and
political values may frequently be in tension, reflecting the difficulty of finding
acceptable compromises among competing goals.
In the end, only two basic aspects of legal aid policy seem clear in terms
of social and political values in Canada. One is that legal aid is intended to promote
equality in the justice system. Even though it has continued to be unclear whether
the equality objective is formal or substantive or both, the sense that fairness
demands equality in relation to the law is widely accepted. As well, there appears
to be consensus that there is an affirmative state obligation to fund legal aid
services. On this issue, there is little agreement about the extent of the obligation
and the appropriate measures for implementing it, but there is also little dissent
about the existence of such an obligation. For policy-making purposes, therefore,
the significant point is the existence of substantial consensus in Canadian society
on these two issues. In the context of designing programs which broadly reflect
social and political values, such consensus is an important first step in the
development of goals for legal aid services in Canada.
Legal Obligations and Legal Aid Objectives: The Charter
As part of Canadian society's "shared consensus" about values, it is often
argued that the law is an expression of the community's social and political values,
and that it should be taken into account in designing a civil legal aid program.
In the American context, the idea of law as such an expression of social and
political values has been explained in this way:
The justification for access rights [rights to legal aid] derives from an analysis of
the role of courts and the legal system in society. In the modern state, the legal
system provides a "general normative code" performing integrative functions in the
social system by use of formal dispute resolution mechanisms .... As members of
99 Ibid. at xvii-xviii.
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society, individuals are entitled to effective access to the law. Legal aid is a means
of providing such access to those who cannot otherwise afford it. 100
In the Canadian context, such a view suggests that the enactment of
constitutionally entrenched rights in the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms

must now be taken into account in seeking to define appropriate principles for
a civil legal aid program in Canada. Whether one subscribes to the interpretivism
view of the Charter (that judges should confine themselves to the stated norms
in the text in Charterdecisions) or the non-interpretivism view (that judges should
go beyond the text to enforce norms not found there),101 it seems to be generally
accepted that the Charterhas established both legal and equality rights obligations
which provide direction to governmental policy-makers and administrators, as
well as to judges.102
Because the legal rights provisions of the Charter became effective law in

1982, while the equality rights provisions have been effective only since 1985,
judicial interpretation of the scope of Charter provisions continues to be an
evolving process. In general terms, the interpretation of Charterprovisions has
tended to be purposive and expansive, especially in the Supreme Court of Canada.
In Hunter v. Southam, for example, the court asserted that the Charter should
be interpreted "with a broad, purposive analysis, which interprets specific
provisions of a constitutional document in the light of its larger objects".103 In
a subsequent case, R v. Big M Drug Mart,104 the Chief Justice enumerated a threepart test to determine whether there had been an infringement of the Charter,105
suggesting that there should be a generous rather than a legalistic interpretation,
designed to give individuals the full benefit of Charterprotections.106 Despite these
100 M.J. Berger, "Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis" (1982) 60 N.C.L. Rev.
282 at 287. For a similar analysis, see L. Mayhew, "Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice
and the Public" (1975) 9 Law and Soc. Rev. 401; and G. Hazard, Jr., "Social Justice Through
Civil Justice" (1969) 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 699. For a more pessimistic account, see M. Galanter,
"Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change" (1974)
9 Law and Soc. Rev. 95.
101P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 693. See
also J. Bakan, "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Canadian Constitutional Thought" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 123 at 153; and P. Macklem, "Constitutional
Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117.
102 B. Slattery, "A Theory of the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 701.
103 Hunter v. Southam, [19841 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at 649.
104 [1985] i S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart cited to D.L.R.].
105 The test provided that first, the Charter right must be ascertained by reference to the
purpose of the guarantee in light of the interests it was meant to protect; second, four factors
need to be considered in determining purpose (character and objects of the Charter, language
of the right or freedom; historical origins of the concepts enshrined; and the meaning and purpose
of other specific rights and freedoms); and third, the interpretation should be a generous one.
See also S. Peck, "An Analytical Framework for the Application of the Canadian Charterof
Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. I at 13-21.
106 There has also been discussion of the relationship between purpose and effect in the
interpretation of Charter provisions. See Big M Drug Mart, supra note 104 at 353, and D. Gibson,
The Law of the Charter General Principles (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 54.
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assertions, the current view is that the Charterdoes not provide a constitutionallyguaranteed right to the provision of legal aid services. At the same time, some
of the decided cases offer assistance in defining the scope of Charter rights and
the nature of societal values underlying such rights, both of which are useful
in identifying values and principles for the Department of Justice's policy-making
process in relation to legal aid services.107
1. Legal Rights
The legal rights sections of the Charterthat relate to legal aid services include
section 7, section 10(b), and section 11 (d). Among these sections, section 7 has
been given the broadest interpretation to date. In relation to this section, which
guarantees the right to "life, liberty and security of the person" and the right
not to be deprived thereof "except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice", Wilson J. (dissenting) has indicated that it should not receive
a restricted meaning:
Some have suggested that the terms "life, liberty and security of the person" refer
to one's physical being and therefore guarantee only freedom from physical harm
or restraint ....

My own view is that this is much too niggardly an interpretation

of a document proclaiming the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizen.

08

The court has also clearly indicated that it is not appropriate to draw a distinction
between the substantive and procedural parts of section 7, suggesting instead
that the provision was designed to secure for a person "the full benefit of the
Charter's protection ... while avoiding adjudication of the merits of public
policy".09
107 For example, there is an excellent analysis of Charter decisions and their impact on
poor women in E. Abner, "The Merits of the Use of Constitutional Litigation to Unravel the
Fabric of the Feminization of Poverty in Canada" (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 1989). The
thesis concludes that constitutional analysis may be of only limited use in the process of achieving
better life conditions for women on welfare. The analysis of Charter provisions in the context
of legal aid services bears some similarity to the analysis of the Charter and the "right" to
social assistance: see M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter" (1987)
20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257; S. Wain, The Impact of the Charterof Rights on Social Assistance(Toronto:
Social Assistance Review Committee, 1987); I. Morrison, "Security of the Person and the Person
in Need: Section Seven of the Charterand the Right to Welfare" (1988) 4 J.L. & Social Pol'y
1; and I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charterand Constitutionally Protected Welfare" (1988)
46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1. There is a useful examination of fiscal federalism in H. Beatty, "FederalProvincial Fiscal Arrangements: Their Impact on Social Policy and Current Prospects for
Reform" (1988) 3 J.L.& Social Pol'y 36.
108 Jonesv. R., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 at 317.
109 Reference Re s.94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 24 D.L.R.
(4th) 536 at 546, Lamer J. In R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 45, 44 D.L.R. (4th)
385 [hereinafter Morgentaler cited to S.C.R.], Wilson J. suggested that where an infringement
of a protected interest had been made without fundamental justice, there could be no inquiry
under section 1 of the Charter as to the reasonableness of the governmental action. Similarly,
in Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481, Wilson J. raised,
without deciding, the issue of whether there were deprivations of life, liberty and security of
the person which could not be justified no matter what procedure was employed. See also
Abner, supra note 107 at 101-103.
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In Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration,lo the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the then current procedures for determining
"Convention Refugee" status under the Immigration Act"' were not acceptable, with three judges relying on section 7 and other judges focusing on the
CanadianBill of Rights,12 to reach the same conclusion. In Singh, Wilson J. stated
that:
...the

principles of natural justice and procedural fairness which have long been
espoused by our courts, and the constitutional entrenchment of the principles of
fundamental justice in s. 7, implicitly recognize that a balance of administrative
convenience does not override the need to adhere to these principles.1I 3
In Morgentaler, Dickson C.J., quoting from Mills v. the Queen,]4 expanded on
the idea of security of the person suggesting that it included protection against
"stigmatization of the accused, loss of privacy, stress and anxiety resulting
from
a multitude of factors, including possible disruption of family, social life and work,
legal costs, uncertainty as to outcome and sanction".'1
Both Wilson J.'s language, suggesting a need to override administrative
convenience where other issues are at stake, and Dickson C.J.'s recognition of
the adverse consequences for individuals criminally charged and at trials, suggest
some regard for the value of individual security which arguably might include
a need for legal aid. Nothing in these decisions, however, focused the court's
attention explicitly on the need for legal aid services, even in the context of the
required hearing for refugee claimants in Singh.
Ironically, the constitutional right to a hearing in the immigration context
(mandated by Singh), was augmented by a judicial decision requiring the
Legal Services Society of British Columbia to provide legal aid to an indigent refugee claimant for a hearing under the newly-revised immigration legislation. Holmes J.held that the Society was obliged to provide
legal aid to the refugee claimant pursuant to B.C.'s legal aid legislation
which guaranteed legal representation to anyone who "may be imprisoned
or confined through a civil proceeding" (concluding that an immigration inquiry is a "civil proceeding" and deportation is akin to "imprisonment or

110[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 22 [hereinafter Singh cited to S.C.R.].

I
112

R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-4.
S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter Bill of Rights].

113 Singh, supra note 110 at 219. In Morgentaler, supra note 109, Wilson, Beetz, Estey,
Lamer, JJ. and Dickson C.J. all refer to state interference with psychological as well as physical
well-being as a breach of the guarantee of security of the person.
114

[1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, 52 C.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter Mills cited to S.C.R.].

115 Morgentaler, supra note 109 at 55. In the same case, the Chief Justice decided that
"state interference with bodily integrity and serious state-imposed psychological stress,
at least
in the criminal law context, constitute a breach of security of the person" (at 56).
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confinement").,16 Unlike a Charter guarantee, however, the right to legal aid
services held to be available in this case could be altered by a legislative
amendment to the British Columbia Legal Services Society Act" 7 at any time.
Thus, to date, the guarantees of section 7 of the Charter have not included
legal aid services. 18Moreover, in Bernard,the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held
that security of tenure of a public housing tenant was an economic interest and
therefore not within the scope of protection of section 7:
...the right asserted was a proprietary right which bestowed a direct economical
benefit on the appellant and as such has no constitutional protection afforded under
s. 7 of the Charter

19

Because of some procedural irregularities on the facts of the case, Bernard may
not offer a determinative decision on this issue, but the failure to find constitutional
protection for a low-income tenant's housing needs may suggest less support for
the existence of such protection in relation to a poor person's right to legal aid.
At the same time, it is arguable that the benefit of public housing is an economic
benefit in a way that the right to legal aid is not, and that a right to legal aid
is more in the character of a democratic or process right than an economic
116Case of Marcos Gonzalez-Davi, as reported in the Globe and Mail (4 January 1990)
A2 [now reported as Gonzalez-Davi v. B.C. (Legal Aid Services Society) (1991), 55 B.C.L.R
(2d) 236, 81 D.L.R. (4th) 12 (C.A.)]. The newspaper report stated that the Legal Services Society
had decided to appeal the decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. Under current
arrangements, federal funding for refugee claimants is provided where the claimant makes
the claim on arrival in Canada; such federal funding is not, however, available for "inland
claimants", those who arrive in Canada with a different status and then subsequently make
a refugee claim. See also the report in the Lawyers Weekly (19 January 1990) 1 in which the
judge is reported to have stated that the issue of rights between an individual and the state
is one which is "amongst the most fundamental of civil rights" (at 7).
17 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 227.
H8 In an earlier case in which section 7 was raised, the court ordered counsel to be appointed
but did not rely on section 7 in doing so. In R v. Powell(1984), 30 Alta. L.R.(2d) 83, 4 C.R.R.
54 (Prov. Ct.), the accused were charged with two counts of truancy in relation to their children,
contrary to a section of Alberta's SchoolAct, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-3. The accused had been refused
legal counsel by the legal aid program in Alberta, but Litsky J. held that it was a case in
which counsel should be appointed and made an order accordingly. However, in reaching this
conclusion, Litsky J.relied on Re White and the Queen (1976), 1 Alta. L. R. 292 (S.C.) (a
pre-Charter decision) in which criteria were listed for consideration by a judge prior to deciding
to order the appointment of counsel, including: the financial circumstances of the accused;
the availability of a legal aid certificate; the educational level of the accused; the complexity
of the case; the difficulty of marshalling evidence; and the likelihood of imprisonment upon
conviction. Ironically, because the accused wanted to raise Charterissues as part of their defence,
Litsky J. concluded that "[tihe Court surely cannot expect lay people to become legal pundits
navigating this case with provocative points of fact and law into unsettled seas of constitutional
issue", thereby suggesting as an additional factor for consideration: the fact that Charter
arguments might be presented. In this case, however, it seems that the judge relied on the
court's inherent power to order the appointment of counsel, in accordance with the reasons
of Re White and the Queen, rather than on the existence of guaranteed rights to legal representation
in the Charter.
"19 Bernard v. Dartmouth Housing Authority (1989), 88 N.S.R. (2d) 190 at 196 (S.C.).
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benefit.20 This argument raises again the need to make a fundamental characterization of legal aid: whether it should be regarded as a procedural right in
the context of the administration of justice, or whether, on the other hand, it
should be characterized as a social welfare right capable of achieving substantive
changes in the lives of the poor.
For administrators, it is important to note the criticism which has been
directed at efforts to use the Charteras a policy-making tool in cases like Singh.
It has been suggested that the court is not a suitable forum for designing
comprehensive procedures for governmental initiatives such as refugee determination because it is not able to look at the process as a whole. Furthermore,
the decision in Singh placed priority on due process at the expense of other
substantive policy objectives. As a result of the court's decision, policy-makers
were required to work within its framework, and substantive policy changes in
immigration determination procedures occurred, directly in response to Singh.
These changes, according to Mandel, left refugee claimants in a worse position
overall even though their procedural rights were guaranteed:
Singh dictated the form of our response. There shall be hearings.But this form could
in no way contradict the substance: not more but rather less generosity in granting
refugees admission to the country. The right to a hearing turned out to be no more
than a consolation prize for our stinginess .... (emphasis in original).121
In this context, the issue of whether legal aid services may be protected
by section 7 is important for policy-makers and administrators. If there is
potential for such a court decision, the freedom of policy-makers to design an
appropriate and comprehensive scheme is more substantial prior to (or in the
absence of) judicial determination of any such issue. Because of the increasing
complexity of law's impact on the lives of individual citizens, the court's broad
definition of the scope of section 7 protection might well be found to encompass
a need for timely and professional legal assistance in certain contexts. Thus,
although the cases decided to date have not yet mandated a right to legal aid
services under section 7, the views expressed make it impossible to foreclose
the possibility that such protection may be held to exist in some future fact
situations.
In such a context, the goal of policy-makers should be to take account of
the requirements of section 7 in designing appropriate programs before being
required to do so by judicial decisions, both to avoid the possibility of less
appropriate programs and to prevent the inevitably adhoc nature of such solutions.
In the absence of judicial determination of the issue, policy-makers obviously
have greater latitude to design programs which ensure fairness and consistency,
120 See also J. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of
the Charter" (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 455. Whyte argues that the purpose of the Charteris to
protect the fundamental interests of minorities "in order to enhance their representation in the
political process" (at 469).
121 M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto:
Wall and Thompson, 1989) at 182.
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and which meet program objectives efficiently and effectively. Moreover, while
taking account of the spirit of the court's determinations on section 7, policymakers are not confined only to these considerations, but they can nonetheless
ensure that constitutional values guaranteed by section 7 are substantively
achieved in the design of a comprehensive civil legal aid program.
In addition to section 7, there are two other sections of the Charter which
mandate legal rights of individuals. Section 10(b) of the Charterapplies to persons
"on arrest or detention" and section 11(d) applies to persons "charged with an
offence". Both of these rights focus on the criminal justice system, and seem
less relevant as a basis for creating rights to civil legal aid services in Canada.
At the same time, the potential for these sections to create rights to legal aid
services in matters of criminal law may significantly impact on the availability of resources for civil legal aid services. For this reason, some assessment
of the potential impact of judicial interpretation of these sections is also warranted
here.
Neither of these sections has yet been interpreted to include a right to
legal aid.122 In the Alberta decision, R v. Robinson,123 the court reviewed the
legislative history of the adoption of section 10(b) and concluded that the
federal government did not intend to confer a right to legal aid.124 Similarly,
in R v. MacKay,125 Alberta Chief Justice Sinclair reviewed section 1 l(d) in the
context of a claim to legal aid representation and concluded that "nowhere in
this section does it say such a person has the right to have counsel paid for at
public expense". 26 By contrast, Craig J. concluded in an Ontario case that there
might be rare cases where the right to a fair trial (entrenched by the Charter
in section 1 l(d)) would be impossible to achieve in the absence of counsel; in
such cases, he concluded that the court should order state-funded legal aid, but
that the accused's right to such legal aid was the same as the right available

122 For an overview of the impact of section 10(b), see M. Finkelstein, The Right to Counsel
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1988). A number of pre-Chartercases considered the issue of entitlement
to state-funded counsel, most of which recognized an inherent power of the court to so order
the appointment of counsel although the circumstances in which such orders were granted
were narrowly construed. See Re Ciglen andthe Queen (1978), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont. H.C.J.);
1? v. Littlejohn and Tirabasso(1978), 41 C.C.C. (2d) 161 (Ont. C.A.); Re Gilberg and the Queen
(1974), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 356 (Alta. C.A.); Re Ewing and Kearney and the Queen (1974), 18
C.C.C. (2d) 356 (Alta. S.C.); and Re White and the Queen, supra note 118 in which McDonald
J. set out a list of factors for consideration in the exercise of the court's inherent power to
appoint counsel. For an overview of the right to counsel in civil matters from a comparative
perspective, see E. Johnson, Jr., "The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International
Perspective" (1985) 19 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 341.
123 (1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (Alta. C.A).
124 The court referred to Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence of the SpecialJoint Committee
of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada (1980-81) 46:125
(January 27, 1981), testimony of Mr. Jean Chretien.
125 R. v. Stiopu (1983), 8 C.R.R. 216 (Alta. Q.B.).
126 Ibid. at 232.
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at common law.127 Indeed, both these sections can be contrasted with the wording
of section 14 of the Charter which guarantees the "right to the assistance of
an interpreter for a party or witness who does not speak the language of the
proceedings or who is deaf". Such wording, according to Peter Hogg, seems more
apt for the conferral of a right to governmental funding than that in sections
10(b) and 11 (d):
The interpreter should probably be paid for out of public funds, at least for a party
or witness who cannot afford to pay the cost himself (compare the right to retain
and instruct counsel in s. 10(b)).128
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that section
10(b) requires police officers to provide information regarding the availability
of legal aid services to persons who are arrested or detained.29 In reviewing legal
aid and duty counsel systems across Canada, Lamer J. [as he then was] noted
"the extent of Canada's recognition of the importance of the right to counsel
for all persons detained in connection with criminal offenses" contained in the
Bill of Rights and the Charterand also in Canada's commitments internationally.130
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that a right to counsel paid out
of public funds might be possible by reading the Charter in conjunction with
Canada's international legal obligations.13' As a signatory to the International

127 Deutsch v. Law Society of Upper Canada Legal Aid Fun4 Lawson
and Legge (1985),
48 C.R. (3d) 166 at 174 (Ont. S.C. [Div. Ct.]). The issue was considered in terms of sections
7 and 11(d). The court noted that section 15 was not yet in force at the time of the accused's
application for legal aid, but concluded that there was no suggestion that the legal aid guidelines
were discriminatory against any persons or groups in society; "rather, the [Legal Aid] Act was
designed to overcome possible discrimination that might exist in relation to economically
disadvantaged persons" (at 175).
See also R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 25 O.A.C. 321, 63 C.R.(3d) 113, for a similar conclusion
about the court's inherent power to order counsel to ensure a fair trial. In that case, the accused
had been denied legal aid because the area legal aid director believed her earnings were sufficient
to enable her to retain a lawyer. However, the Court of Appeal decided that, while it was
appropriate to take account of the opinion of the area legal aid director, it was apparent that
she could not afford a lawyer for a 12 month hearing in a complex drug case. The court relied
on sections 7 and 1l(d) to provide a right to funded counsel, leading a CBA representative
to comment that "[tihis country is gradually moving towards a right to be represented in any
serious court case, be it criminal, civil, or family". For an account of the case and these comments,
see M. Kideckel, "Legal Aid: The State of the Union", (September 1988) Can. Law. 14, especially
at 17.
128 P. Hogg, CanadaAct, 1982 Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1982)
at 49.
129 R v. Brydges (1990), 74 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.). The court decided that
such information
should be included "as part of the standard caution" on arrest or detention in accordance with
section 10(b), and permitted police forces across the country a period of 30 days to comply
with the decision.
130

Ibid. at 148-150.

J. Claydon, "International Human Rights Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1982), 4 Supreme Court L. Rev. 287 at 290-291; see also
M.J. Mossman, "The Charter and the Right to Legal Aid" (1985) 1 J.L. & Social Pol'y 21
[hereinafter "Right to Legal Aid"].
131
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights132 and its Optional Protocol since 1976,
Canada is bound by Article 14(3)(d) of the Covenant which provides a right to
legal assistance in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by the person charged "if he does not have sufficient means to pay
for it". Arguably, this international legal obligation might require the provision
of legal aid in criminal matters other than those currently offered by some of
the provincial legal aid programs. Moreover, if sections 10(b) and 11 (d) were
to be considered domestic law implementing Canada's international obligations33
under the Covenant, the scope of these Chartersections might also be extended.'
Such an analysis may be even more useful in the context of equality rights in
the Charterand will be discussed further in that context.
2. Equality Rights
Section 15 provides for the protection of equality "before and under the
law" as well as "equal protection and equal benefit of the law", without
"discrimination" and in particular without discrimination on the basis of a number
of listed grounds. Some commentators have suggested that the equality rights
provisions in the Charter signalled a striking departure in Canadian law and
politics. Peter Russell, for example, expressed his concern about the adoption
of such rights without "a widespread public and parliamentary discussion about
34
the principles and practice of equality".1 The extent of such concern depends
on assumptions which are made about its intended purpose. Was section 15
(subintended just to codify existing rights or was it intended to effect some
3
this
In
5
Canada?
in
change
stantial, and perhaps substantive) societal
was
15
section
which
(to
date
context, the three-year delay in its effective
that
believed
governments
that
suggests
subjected, unlike any other section),
rights
equality
the
of
requirements
the
some changes were to occur to meet

132

Signed 16 December 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.16)

52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, (1966), in force for Canada 19 August 1976.
133 Such analysis might also draw on pre-Chartercases, and the distinction between the
Bill of Rights and the Charterin relation to the right to counsel. For such a suggested analysis,
see "Right to Legal Aid", supra note 131 at 27-30.
134 P. Russell, "The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian
Courts" (1982) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. I at 26. Russell continued:
The public and legislative discussions concerning it provide little guidance to our judges
as to how far or how fast it is desirable to eliminate all forms of discrimination in
Canadian society. Leaving these matters to our judges may have the unfortunate
consequence of relieving ourselves as citizens from the responsibility of reasoning
together about acceptable answers to these questions of social justice.
135 For differing views at the time of the Charter's enactment, see M. Gold, "A Principled
Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L. Rev. 131;
Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, eds., The Charter of Rights: Commentary (Toronto: Butterworths,
1982); and N.Lyon, "The Charteras a Mandate for New Ways of Thinking about Law" (1984)
9 Queen's L.J. 241.

The Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues

1993

provisions.136 This fact alone reinforces the view that the equality rights provisions
were intended to be more than a codification of existing rights.
Section 15 has been considered in a number of decisions since 1985.
The
most significant decision to date is Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia,]37
a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in which a majority
of the court
held that a legislative requirement of Canadian citizenship for admission
to the
legal profession in British Columbia violated the Charter'sequality rights.
Writing
for the majority on the issue of the infringement of section 15, McIntyre
J. stated
that decisions about the equality guarantee must have regard "to
the content
of the law, to its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it
applies, and
also upon those whom it excludes from its application".138
At the same time, McIntyre J. recognized that the modern welfare
state
depends on legislation which creates distinctions among various groups
of citizens.
The creation of governmental benefits inevitably depends on the
creation of
eligibility criteria which categorizes those for whom the benefits
are intended
and excludes others. As McIntyre J. suggested,
...it is not every distinction or differentiation in treatment at law which will transgress
the equality guarantees of s. 15 of the Charter.It is, of course, obvious that legislatures
may - and to govern effectively - must treat different individuals and groups
in
different ways .... The classifying of individuals and groups, the making of different
provisions respecting such groups, the application of different rules, regulations,
requirements and qualifications to different persons is necessary for the governance
of modern society.139
Thus, the issue in Andrews was how to define those distinctions which
are
acceptable according to section 15 and those which are not, especially
in the
context of eligibility criteria for becoming a member of the legal profession
of
a province. In deciding this issue, McIntyre J. focused on the link in
section 15
between the equality guarantees and the discrimination clause to conclude
that
equality must be defined by reference to discrimination, and that discrimination
was:
a distinction, whether intentional or not ... which has the effect of imposing
burdens,
obligations, or disadvantages on [an] individual or group not imposed upon
others,
or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available
to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed
to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely
escape
136 The federal government released its preliminary
paper, Equality Issues in FederalLaw:
A Discussion Paperin January 1985, three months before section 15 became effective.
thereafter, the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney-General released its study, SourcesShortly
of the
Interpretationof Equality Rights Under the Charter:A Background Paper.
Neither paper made
recommendations, and it appeared that few changes occurred during the three-year
delay before
April 1985.
137 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R (4th) 1 [hereinafter Andrews
cited to S.C.R.].
138 Ibid. at 168.
139 Ibid. at 168-169.
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the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities
1 40
will rarely be so classed.
Similarly, LaForest J. defined discrimination in terms of the "relatively
powerless" political position of non-citizens, persons "whose interests are likely
4
to be compromised by legislative decisions".' ' Wilson J. adopted the language
of an American decision in concluding that non-citizens permanently resident
in Canada formed a "discrete and insular minority",142 vulnerable to having "their
interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated" and
to "becoming a disadvantaged group in our society".143 Moreover, she emphasized
that the determination that non-citizens were protected by section 15 was one,
... which is not to be made only in the context of the law which is subject to challenge
but rather in the context of the place of the group in the entire social, political and
legal fabric of our society. While legislatures must inevitably draw distinctions among
the governed, such distinctions should not bring about or re-inforce the disadvantage
groups and individuals by denying them the rights freely accorded to
of certain
44
others.

All of the judges agreed that it was not appropriate to use the "similarly
Rights,46
situated" test 45 so frequently adopted in cases decided under the Bill of
believing that it was that test which resulted in the denial of equality claims.
They also were in agreement that the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination
in section 15 was not closed, thereby permitting non-citizens to be entitled to
its protection. However, the justices declined to offer any further directions as
to what other groups might qualify.
This latter issue is especially important in the legal aid context because it
is necessary to decide whether those poor persons who are denied legal aid services
form a disadvantaged group, a "discrete and insular minority", or a group which
is "relatively powerless politically". In light of the fact that those who are denied
legal aid services are poor, it seems arguable that they will also be disadvantaged47
Canada
as a group and that they will be politically among the least powerful in
Ibid at 174-175.
195.
142 Referring to US. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152-153, n.4 (1938).
143 Andrews, supra note 137 at 152.
144 Ibid.
14 See, for two examples of differing approaches, McKinney v. University of Guelph (1987),
46 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. C.A.); and Re Andrews and Law Society of British Columbia, [1986]
4 W.W.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.).
146 See R v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282; A.G. Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349;
and Bliss v. A.G. Canada,[1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
141 See Canadian Council on Social Development, Not Enough. The Meaning and
Measurement of Poverty in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1984), which characterizes wellbeing as comprised of psycho-social well-being, economic well-being, and political participation
well-being. These three dimensions of well-being are also inter-related so that "if a basic level
of economic well-being is not achieved, the other aspects of well-being can seldom be fulfilled
either"; moreover:
140

141 Ibid. at
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Moreover, if discrimination is defined in McIntyre J.'s words as a distinction which
has the effect of "imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on [an individual

or a group which are not imposed on others] or which withholds or limits access
to opportunities,benefits, and advantagesavailableto other members of society" 148
(emphasis added), the failure of a legal aid program to provide such services
to some persons who are poor might violate section 15.
The reasoning in Andrews adopts a sophisticated and purposive approach
to the process of defining equality and discrimination in the modern welfare
state. 149 It accepts the need for governmental policies to be implemented using
classifications and eligibility criteria, and that the process of doing so means that
distinctions must be drawn. However, no longer is legislative policy immune from
review by the courts in terms of the distinctions adopted to achieve governmental
objectives. Indeed, not only may the court assess the validity of the distinctions
but also the ways in which the distinctions are related to governmental policy

objectives.

People with persistently low-incomes do not simply live scaled-down versions of the
lifestyle of middle-income people; they are in fact required to lead markedly different
lives. Poverty is a "package" of economic conditions of which low income is only
one... (at 10- 1).
The Report also noted that people who are poor and who live in poverty for a while become
overwhelmed with a sense of powerlessness and worthlessness (at 37).
148 Andrews, supra note 137 at 168.
149 By contrast with Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada
concluded that there was
no violation of section 15 in R v. Turpin, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1296. The court found that certain
sections of the Criminal Code resulted in inequality before the law (by permitting persons accused
of murder in Alberta, but not in other provinces, to elect to be tried by a judge alone rather
than in a trial by judge and jury). However, the court also concluded that the distinction drawn
by the Code was not discriminatory in its purpose or effect, and accordingly that it was not
a violation of section 15:
It would be stretching the imagination to characterize persons accused of one of the
crimes listed in s. 427 of the Criminal Code in all provinces except Alberta as members
of a "discrete and insular minority..." Differentiating for mode of trial purposes between
those accused of s. 427 offenses in Alberta and those accused of the same offenses
elsewhere in Canada would not, in my view, advance the purposes of s. 15 in remedying
or preventing discrimination against groups suffering social, political and legal
disadvantage in our society. A search for indicia of discrimination such as stereotyping,
historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice would be fruitless
in this case ....(at 1332).
As a result of the Turpin decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal changed its view with
respect to differences in the criminal justice context, differences which do not meet the test
for discrimination set out in Andrews: see Lawyers Weekly (12 January 1990) 1. As well, in
two other cases, those asserting equality rights were found not to constitute the category of
disadvantaged persons, as in Turpin: see Reference Re ConstitutionalValidity of Sections 32 and
34 of the Worker's Compensation Ac4 1983 (Nfld), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922; and Mirhadizedah
v. Ontario (1990), 69 OR. (2d) 422 (C.A.).
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The use of section 15 as a basis for challenging legislation on behalf of
the poor has not occurred frequently and the judicial decisions are not entirely
consistent. However, the pattern is becoming clearer, especially after Andrews.
More recently, when section 15 was argued as a ground for striking down
provisions limiting the availability of legal aid in appeals from criminal convictions
to those with merit, the court concluded that the absence of legal aid services
in such a context did not violate section 15 of the Charter. On the basis that
the right of appeal from conviction in Canada is a "sharply qualified, often merely
permissive, right", McClung J. in R. v. Robinson asserted that it was impossible
to find "an unqualified right to state-funded counsel to advance it".150 The court
considered the test in Andrews in connection with section 684 of the Criminal
Code] 5 (permitting a court to exercise discretion to appoint counsel for an indigent
where legal representation is necessary), and whether the refusal of legal aid
in this case constituted discrimination. In deciding that there was no discrimination,
the court stated:
The refusal does not flow from some irrelevant personal characteristic of the convicted
accused. The indigent with meritorious appeals will be funded. The indigent without
meritorious appeals will not .... Indigency does not decide; trial guilt that is not
reasonably disputable, in fact or law does .... If indigency can fell legislation under
the Charter,the Charter should say so .... Legislation that allows a court or judge
is undeserving
to declare that public funding should be refused where an appeal
52
either.
values
Canadian
established
of
violation
a
pose
does not
Commenting on this case, the lawyer who acted for the accused offered
a different interpretation, suggesting the existence of two different rights of appeal,
one for the rich and one for the poor.
[The decision] allows the person who has money to order transcripts, to retain counsel
and to proceed forward with [his] appeal. But if the person has no funds to get the
to argue before the Court
appeal books, ... then you don't have documentation
53
appeal.
your
with
proceed
can't
you
of Appeal and
The question of indigency thus poses an interesting one for the equality guarantee.
Where an accused cannot pay for trial transcripts necessary to proceed with an
appeal, does the legislation impose "a burden, obligation or disadvantage" on
the accused which is not imposed on others? Does the legislation "withhold
or limit access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other
members of society"? Clearly, the obligation to pay for the transcripts is
implicit, rather than explicit as was the citizenship requirement in Andrews,
and the accused's inability to pay is not created by the statute. How should

,50 Supra note 123.
151 R.S.C.

1985, c. C-46.

Robinson, supra note 123 at 321.
Lawyers Weekly (1 December 1989) 1. For an excellent analysis of the decision, see
also D. Schneiderman and C. Graydon, "An Appeal to Justice: Publicly Funded Appeals and
R v. Robinson; R v. Doles" (1990) 28 Alta. L. Rev. 873.
152
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inequality, which is the result of impecuniosity,54 be interpreted in the context
of section 15?
One suggestion is found in The Queen v. Hebb,155 in which the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court considered the problem of poverty in relation to a person sentenced
to pay a fine who had no money to do so. The Nova Scotia government had
not implemented provisions of the CriminalCode making fine options (community
work to the value of the fine) available, and thus Ms. Hebb's failure to pay was
likely to result in her imprisonment. The court considered section 646 of the
Code which authorized a court to review the circumstances before issuing a
warrant for commitment for convicted persons between the ages of 16 and 22
years, and held that the restriction of this section to only these young persons
violated section 15 of the Charter.In the result, the court held that the appropriate
remedy was to remove the age references from section 646 so as to make
it
age-neutral, thus permitting the court to conduct the review of circumstances
for the accused who was older. In the result, the court quashed the warrant of
commitment against Ms. Hebb.
The decision in Hebb is not one which directly involved the court in the
issue of poverty as a ground of discrimination under section 15 of the Charter.
At the same time, there is considerable evidence that Kelly J. understood that
Ms. Hebb was a disadvantaged person. After indicating his awareness that some
persons choose not to pay fines but to serve time in jail instead, and that others
fail to pay in hopes that their failure will not be noticed, he acknowledged that
poor persons do not have such choices:
No such choice exists for those who are unable to pay their fine because of a temporary
financial limitation brought on by either misfortune or bad judgment on their part.
As well, no such choice exists for those, such as the applicant in this matter, who
are the walking wounded of our society, those who cannot now and are unlikely
ever to be in a position to pay a fine of any amount in excess of a few dollars.
Judith Ann Hebb comes before this court as a person without financial resources
or any prospect of having sufficient resources to pay the fine which is assessed against
56
her.1
The other question raised by the equality guarantee in the context of benefits
provided by legislation in the welfare state is the extent to which section 15 can
mandate the provision of such benefits. Some cases have required governments
154 For a comparative analysis, see G. Binion, "The Disadvantaged
Before the Burger Court"
(1982) Law & Pol'y Q. 37. A few cases in Canada have approached this issue more directly,

including Kask. v. Shimizu (1986), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 64 (Alta.Q.B.); Mangold v. 330002
Ontario

Ltd (1987), 57 O.R. (2d) 716 (H.C.); and Mullaly v. Younggreen (21 December 1988), (B.C.)
[unreported]. However, in relation to all of these cases, it has been suggested that the decisions
to strike down provisions which adversely impact on an impoverished litigant's opportunity
to participate in a court process may be less the result of "a heightened interest since the advent
of the Charter" and more likely "simply a continuation of the court's general respect for the
need to protect such access". See Abner, supra note 107 at 87-89.
'55 (1989), 89 N.S.R. (2d) 137 (S.C.(T.D.)).
156 Ibid. at

142.

Vol. 4

Toward a Comprehensive Legal Aid Program in Canada

to extend benefits beyond the category of persons included in a legislative
scheme,15 7 while others have merely held the legislative scheme unconstitutional,
58
leaving it to governments to determine how to rectify the problem of invalidity.1
Cases have also considered the constitutionality of eligibility criteria, some
concluding that the court should not alter the legislatively-defined criteria for
benefits,159 while others have declared unconstitutional the limits imposed on
60
eligibility criteria in legislative schemes, sometimes fashioning remedies which
alter the legislative scheme itself.161
In such an evolving context, it is difficult to identify precisely the elements
of an equality guarantee for civil or criminal legal aid services. What is evident
in the cases is the court's ongoing concern to ensure fair access to the litigation
process even if special measures may be needed to accomplish this goal for those
who are poor. However, the exercise of discretion on an individual basis, a measure
which is consistent with the court's historic power to ensure fairness in the litigation
process, is significantly different from ajudicial decision mandating an affirmative
governmental action to ensure the availability of legal aid on a broad basis. In
the policy-making process therefore, the court's careful attention to issues of
157 See Hoogbruin v. A.G. British Columbia (1986), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 718, where the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held that it was unconstitutional for the province not to have a
procedure for absentee voting, especially where it would be relatively inexpensive to make
such procedures available. In Ontario, in R. v. Sheldon S. (1988), 26 O.A.C. 285, the Ontario
Court of Appeal decided that there had been a violation of the accused's equality rights when
a statutorily mandated alternative measures program for young offenders had not been
implemented in Ontario, unlike in other provinces. Such decisions may need to be reconsidered,
of course, in light of Andrews, supra note 137.
158 In Reference Re Family Benefits Act (N.S.) Section 5 (1987), 75 N.S.R. (2d) 338, the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held unconstitutional the legislation which provided welfare
benefits to women in some circumstances but not to men. The possibility that all benefits would
be eliminated was overcome when the government passed regulations under another section
of the Act. See also A.G. Nova Scotia v. Phillips(1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 633 (C.A.). In a similar
case in British Columbia, Silano v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia (1987), 42 D.L.R.
(4th) 406 (S.C.), where welfare benefits which provided lesser amounts of money for recipients
under the age of 26 were held unconstitutional, the government responded by raising the benefits
of the younger group and decreasing the amounts paid to the older group, ensuring that both
groups received the same amounts. The net cost to the government also remained the same.
159 See Bregman v. A.G. Canada (1987), 57 O.R. (2d) 409, where the Ontario Court of
Appeal declined to use section 15 to interfere with the residency requirement for receipt of
an allowance under the War Veteran's Allowance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-3.
160 See Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (1988),
88 N.R. 6, where the Federal Court struck down provisions of the Unemployment Insurance
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1, which disentitled persons over the age of 65 from receiving benefits.
See also Schachter v. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679,
92 C.L.L.C. 14,036, in which the court decided that provisions offering parental leave to adoptive,
but not to natural, fathers was unconstitutional. In this case, the government responded with
new provisions making the same parental leave available to both, but reducing the number
of weeks available to adoptive fathers in the process.
161 For discussion of remedies in Charter cases, see B. Morgan, "Charter Remedies: The
Civil Side After the First Five Years" in N. Finkelstein & B. Rogers, eds., Charter Issues in
Civil Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 48.
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equality of access to justice must be taken into account as a legal obligation,
however difficult to describe in precise terms, not just as a social and political
value.
In doing so, it may also be useful to take note of the international legal
obligations which focus on equality of access to the justice system. In addition
to the InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights,162 Canada is a signatory
to the Universal Declarationof Human Rights163 which proclaims that "[a]ll
are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection
of the law".64 As well, Canada has signed the International Convention on
the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination165and the Convention
on the
Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women,66 both of which
were
designed to remove barriers to full participation in society.
In the context of international obligations, the European Human Rights
Convention 167 also offers a useful guide for policy-making about legal aid,
even
though the Convention is not binding in Canada. Article 6.1 of the Convention
states:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Even though this provision does not guarantee any right to free legal aid as
such,
the Airey Case 168 in 1979 decided that Article 6 required that a woman applying
for a legal separation in Ireland, where such a decree could be obtained
only
from the High Court, required legal assistance because the procedure was complex
despite the fact that there was no legal aid scheme in Ireland.169 The European
Court of Human Rights therefore ordered that legal assistance be provided, stating
that Article 6:
...may sometimes compel the state to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when
such assistance proves indispensable for effective access to court either because legal
representation is rendered compulsory ...or by reason of the complexity of the
procedure or of the case.' 70
162

Supra note 132.

163

Adopted by the General Assembly, 10 December 1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (III), 3

U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.13) 17, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
164

165
166

1982).
167

Ibid. at Article 7.
21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (in force for Canada 13 November 1970).

18 December 1979, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979) (in force for Canada 10 January

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

4 November 1950, Eur. T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
168 (1979), Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 32.
169

See also J.Thornberry, "Poverty, Litigation and Fundamental Rights" (1980) 29 I.C.L.Q.

170

Airey Case, supra note 168 at 15-16.
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For purposes of policy-making in Canada, such decisions may be extremely useful
to "confirm domestic sources of inspiration"'' 7 about the meaning of equality
in the legal aid context.
3. Section 1: Reasonable Limits
In the few years since the Charter'senactment, cases addressing issues of
both legal and equality rights have indicated some of the factors which will be
considered by courts in deciding whether legislative provisions violate these
constitutional rights. For administrators and policy-makers in the legal aid context,
some of these decisions are helpful in defining, for example, the court's strong
support for procedural fairness (in cases like Singh) and its concern for those
who are disadvantaged or who are "discrete and insular minorities" and for whom
the equality rights provision was intended to provide some remedy to overcome
their powerlessness in Canadian society (in cases like Andrews). However, in
Chartercases where such violations are established, there is also a need to address
section 1 of the Charterwhich offers an opportunity for governmental justification
for infringements of Charter rights.172
In a Charter challenge, "the burden of persuading a court that section 1
justifies a law or other governmental act that is ostensibly in breach of a Charter
right rests on the government".173 In R v. Oakes,174 the Supreme Court of Canada
set out the test for assessing whether a law could be justified in accordance with
section 1, suggesting that justification depends on 1) whether the objective is
pressing and substantial; and 2) whether the means chosen are proportional to
the objective. In applying the first part of this test in Andrews, Wilson J. confirmed
that because "section 15 is designed to protect those groups who suffer social,
political and legal disadvantage in our society, the burden resting on government
tojustify the type of discrimination against such groups is appropriately an onerous
one"1 7 Moreover, in applying the proportionality test, the court is required to
balance "the nature of the right, the extent of its infringement, and the degree
to which the limitation furthers the attainment of the legitimate goal reflected
in the legislation".176 In applying this test in Andrews, Wilson J. also concluded
that the citizenship requirement did not meet the test in Oakes, agreeing with
Claydon, supra note 131 at 302.
It has been suggested that section 1 may have a lesser role to play in relation to those
sections of the Charter which are themselves limited by notions of reasonableness, such as
section 7. See Hogg, supra note 101 at 679ff.
173Ibid. at 681.
171
172

174 [1986]
175

1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
Andrews, supra note 137 at 177. In his dissenting view, McIntyre J.suggested that

a less onerous burden might rest on government and that:
...the first question the court should ask must relate to the nature and purpose of
the enactment, with a view to deciding whether the limitation represents a legitimate
exercise of the legislative power for the attainment of a desirable social objective which
would warrant overriding constitutionally protected rights (at 159).
176 Ibid. at 177.
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the British Columbia Court of Appeal that the requirement did not "appear to
relate closely to those ends, much less to have been carefully designed to achieve
them with minimum impairment of individual rights".177
The strictness of the Oakes test in relation to section 1, particularly as it
was applied by the majority in Andrews, suggests that the government would
have an affirmative obligation to demonstrate that any program of legal aid
services was coherent (in terms of coverage and eligibility criteria) to justify an
infringement of Charter rights, if such a violation could be established by a
claimant in the first place. It has been suggested that such a justification may
need to be demonstrated affirmatively by government and that:
where there is room for argument about the legitimacy of the legislative purpose,
or that the statute is unlikely to achieve the purpose, or that the purpose could be
achieved by other means which did not involve restriction of a Charter right, or
that were less restrictive of a Charter right, the court would need detailed reports
or studies on the topic (if they exist), or a study prepared specifically for the case
and filed as a social science brief (or Brandeis brief), or expert evidence from
economists or other social scientists who are able to testify as to the necessity for
and the likely efficacy of the impugned law. Only with this kind of information
is the Court in a position to give due weight to the governmental purpose that is
asserted in justification of the Charterinfringement 78
For legal aid policy-makers the impact of section 1 is significant, necessitating
clearly-defined objectives for legal aid services and coherent choices about
measures to implement their objectives. Moreover, the opportunity to create a
coherent and justifiable legal aid program is not only necessitated by the
requirements of section 1, but it also helps to ensure that courts will be less likely
to find an infringement of Charterrights in the first place. From a policy-making
perspective, the creation of rational and comprehensive legal aid programs is
clearly preferable to the potential for more ad hoc arrangements by courts in
the context of Charter challenges. In this way, section 1 can be regarded as defining
the parameters of administrative choices in the creation of a comprehensive legal
aid program in Canada.179
Although it seems difficult to identify precisely the parameters of the
protection offered by sections 1, 7, 10(b), 11 (d) and 15 of the Charter,it is clear
that the Charter'sprovisions have strengthened the general social and political
value of equality and the idea of fairness it embodies. It also seems clear that
the Charter cases recognize "powerlessness" in terms of equality rights, an
important indicia for advocates of poverty as one of the grounds for discrimination.
Ibid. at 178.
Hogg, supra note 101 at 688-689.
179 The creation of a comprehensive legal aid program in a federal statute (or a combination
of federal and provincial statutes) would clearly be subject to the Charter,and it is likely that
a formal agreement would do so as well. See Charter,section 32. For an expansive interpretation
of s.32, see Y. de Montigny, "Section 32 and Equality Rights" in A. Bayefsky and M. Eberts,
eds., Equality Rights and the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985)
177
178

at 565.
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These cases imply the need to eliminate "stress and stigmatization" as part of
the process of achieving a right to security of the person, similarly important
elements in the characterization of goals for legal aid services for the poor.
Moreover, there is some acceptance of the appropriateness of governmental
funding for legal aid services, even in the cases which deny a Charter remedy,
at the same time as there is still deference to the legislature to define eligibility
criteria and coverage for legal aid programs. Such a judicial approach suggests
that it is perhaps unlikely that the courts will declare a right to legal aid in a
Charterchallenge case. However, it does not negate at all the need for policymakers and administrators of legal aid programs to take the spirit of Charter
rights into account in designing eligibility criteria and coverage - so as to ensure
that Charter protections are achieved within the legislative and administrative
process. Indeed, the creation of comprehensive and rational programs, rather than
ad hoc programs created by courts (with potentially unjustifiable distinctions
among classes of potential recipients of legal aid services), may be the best way
of insulating legal aid program initiatives from judicial review. In this way, the
Charter indirectly strengthens the recognition of a governmental commitment
to equality and the existence of an affirmative state obligation, already evident
in social and political values in Canada, in the legal aid context.
4. FundamentalJustice, Equality and Lawyers
The recognition that provisions of the Chartermay create affirmative state
obligations for legal aid services, however defined, necessarily occurs in the
context of providing benefits for poor clients. What is also clear is that such
an affirmative obligation ensures the availability of more clients for the legal
profession. While non-poor clients will continue to assume the cost of their legal
services personally, governmental schemes will enable lawyers to act for poor
clients and receive payment for these services as well. In a sense, the existence
of rights to legal aid services may benefit members of the legal profession as
much as the poor clients for whom they are intended. As one commentator has
caustically explained:
The most obvious winner in the Chartersweepstakes is the legal profession .... The
right to counsel ... means nothing if not plenty of work for lawyers. The decision
in Howard (1985) may have put a strain on Legal Aid funds throughout the country
by guaranteeing all prisoners the right to counsel in prison disciplinary hearings...
but it relieved a lot of financial strain for lawyers who had a captive market of
tens of thousands of "clients" opened wide to their services.... Around the same
time as his court was delivering the Singh decision, Chief Justice Dickson ... cited
the Charteras a reason for optimism about [lawyers'] job prospects. 80
180Mandel, supra note 121 at 167. In Howard v. Stony Mountain Institution Inmate
Disciplinary Court (1984), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 502, appeal quashed for mootness, [1987] 2 S.C.R.
687, the Federal Court of Appeal held that an inmate of a penitentiary was entitled to counsel
in disciplinary proceedings. The court held that there was a presumption that inmates required
counsel in order not to be deprived of fundamental justice.
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Even those who are less scathing about the self-interests of the legal profession
recognize that the issue of legal aid services is one with some potential conflict
of interest for lawyers. In the assertions of the Canadian Bar Association that
legal aid is essential to ensure equality before the law, the implicit need for lawyers'
services to be accordingly available and compensated is not so clearly identified.
At the same time, both the CBA and others have repeatedly criticized legal aid
arrangements in Canada in terms of the general inadequacy of compensation
for lawyers who are willing to undertake work for legal aid clients.8I To its credit,
the CBA formally reviewed the issue of the extent of lawyers' obligations to do
pro bono legal work, an obligation adopted by many law associations in the United
States faced with serious cutbacks in funding for legal aid services for poor
clients.182 Focusing primarily on obligations of lawyers for the delivery of legal
aid services, the Report recognized the requirements of the Law Society of Upper
Canada Professional Conduct Handbook, including Rule 12:
Lawyers should make legal services available to the public in an efficient and
convenient manner that will command respect and confidence, and by means
that are compatible with the integrity, independence and effectiveness of the
profession.183

The Report noted that this obligation was demonstrated by recent actions of the
profession, notably in the decision of the CBA branch in British Columbia to
sponsor an interim program in civil and administrative legal aid matters to
"supplement legal aid coverage ... (that had been) substantially cut back" in
recent years, and the (then) proposal in Ontario for a province-wide levy on all
lawyers to contribute to the cost of legal services.184

181 See CBA Report, 1987, supra note 11. See also Social Planning Council of Metropolitan
Toronto, "Legal Aid in Ontario: From Rights to Charity" (June 1983) 2 Social Infopac (#2)
[hereinafter "From Rights to Charity"]; and "An Examination of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan"
(January 1986) 5 Social Infopac (#1) [hereinafter "Examination of Ontario Legal Aid Plan"];

and Alberta, Office of the Attorney-General, The Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid,

(Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 1989) at 5 [hereinafter Alberta Task Force].
182 See CBA Report, 1986, supra note 11 especially at 4-5. In its report, the CBA defined
pro bono legal work quite broadly to include the direct representation of clients without
remuneration, but also the provision of such services "at a level of remuneration which is less
than would be the normal rate"; participation in clinical or mentor programs or decision-making
committees of a legal aid program without remuneration beyond expenses; employment by
a legal aid program "where the remuneration is less than that which the lawyer would receive
if performing the functions on a private basis"; participation in law reform or public legal
education activities without remuneration; and the provision of legal and advisory services to
charitable or public interest organizations at no remuneration or for a nominal stipend (at 1-2).
183 Formerly Rule XIII, as noted in CBA Report, 1986, supra note 11 at 2. This Rule is
also similar to Canon 2 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Rules.
184 Ibid. at 3-4. Hoehne's analysis, supra note 21 at 357, demonstrates the ongoing historical
concern of the legal profession concerning access to legal aid services, documenting the debates
within the profession from just after the First World War. According to Hoehne, the legal
profession played an ambivalent role in relation to legal aid services:

Vol. 4

Toward a Comprehensive Legal Aid Program in Canada

The main point of the CBA Report was that the provision of legal aid services
was essentially the responsibility of government, apparently concluding that
neither the Law Society of Upper Canada's Professional Conduct Handbook nor
isolated (or even widespread) acts of goodwill by lawyers in assisting in the
availability of such services detracted from the existence of such a primary
obligation on the part of the state:
Legal services must be considered a right in this nation. To suggest that such legal
services ought to be performed on a pro bono basis, whether partially or wholly,
is to put such services on the level both of charity vis-ai-vis the government's funding
obligation and vis-az-vis lawyers' time, energy and effort. The profession cannot
support a return to the charitable concepts standing alone as were present in 1495.
The government's obligation is of primary importance. 185
Significantly, the CBA Report relied in part on the enactment of section 15 of
the Charter as support for its assertion about the government's responsibility for
making legal aid services available. In the words of the report, equal benefit of
186
the law can be achieved only "if there is universal access to legal services".
Although these issues continue to be controversial ones within the legal
profession, there can be no doubt that the role of lawyers is a critical factor for
determination in designing a comprehensive legal aid program. The roles of
lawyers will necessarily impact on the design and implementation of effective
legal aid programs, especially where they play key roles in a proposed delivery
system, but sometimes even when they do not. For these reasons, it is essential
to take account of the role and organization of the legal profession in terms of
its impact on Charter rights and in relation to the development of appropriate
principles for civil legal aid services in Canada, a matter discussed in greater
detail later in this paper.
Had it not been for the reluctance of the professionals, a nationwide scheme could
have been put in place as early as 1930. In contrast to their American colleagues,
however, Canada's lawyers put the ball into the court of the politicians. Even when
it became obvious that no government was going to pick up the ball, the profession
remained inactive. The needs of the clients had first to affect the lawyers themselves
before they took an interest in legal aid policy. Rising case loads in the Fifties motivated
the provincial [law societies] to seek government assistance.
The extent to which social welfare principles are more evident in social policy in Canada in
contrast to the U.S. seems to be reflected in the differences in the rhetoric (at least) about
pro bono legal services. For an interesting analysis of the ways in which changes in legal aid
services may demand more use of pro bono lawyers from private practice in the work of American
legal aid clinics, see J.A. Tull, "Implications of Emerging Substantive Issues for the Delivery
System for Legal Services for the Poor" (New Orleans: Conference on Access to Justice in
the 1990's, 1989) at 33. Tull points to the need for systemic legal solutions to problems like
adequate child care or unemployment, and the need for complex fact-based advocacy as requiring
the skills of private practice lawyers working with legal aid lawyers.
185 CBA Report, 1986, supranote 11 at 3. The reference to 1495 is to the date of enactment
of An Act to Admit Such Persons as are Poor to Sue "In Forna Pauperis", the CBA report
suggested that this statute did not recognize a right to legal aid, but merely its availability
as charity.
186 Ibid. at 3.
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IV. FEDERALISM: FUNDING CIVIL LEGAL AID SERVICES
Federalismand the Division of Powers
The design and implementation of a comprehensive criminal and civil legal
aid scheme in Canada necessitates consideration of the role of the federal government and the provinces in any such scheme. Because of the constitutional
division of legislative powers in Canada, there are some constraints on the ways
in which the federal government may participate in a national and comprehensive
legal aid program. Interestingly, just as our understanding of the meaning of concepts like "legal needs" and "equality" (explored earlier in this paper) appear to
have evolved over a number of decades, so has the role of the federal government
within the Canadian constitutional setting been dynamic. It has reflected changes
in perception over time about which matters require national attention. In the constitutional context, this dynamism has been described (with approval) as follows:
... the original BNA Act did not constrain the ability of Canadians to create new
processes and even new structures as and when the need arose. It is probably going
too far to claim that the constitution is endogenous, but it is my view that when
it comes to the evolution of the federation, the constitution is at best conditioning

and not determining.

87

The flexibility which has permitted Canadian constitutional structures to
accommodate changing needs has been reflected also in the structures of the
federal government itself. In a study of the evolution of the Department of Justice,
for example, one commentator has documented the significant change in the
mandate of the Department beginning in 1970 and reflected most strongly in
the Charter enacted in 1982. According to Sutherland,188 the Department's original
responsibility for "providing legal advice to those who decide on what to do,
on how to do it and in finding appropriate ways and means of implementing
those decisions once made" was formally augmented in 1970 by additional
responsibilities which "recognized that the lawyer should play a much more active,
indeed creative, role in the decision making process of government", thereby
suggesting a belief that:
187 T.J. Courchene, "Meech Lake and Federalism: Accord or Discord?" in K. Swinton
& C. Rogerson, eds., Competing Constitutional Visions (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 121 at 126.
The author also quoted Carl Friedrich to the effect that:
... federalism should not be seen only as a static pattern or design, characterized by
a particular and precisely fixed division of power between government levels. Federalism
is also and perhaps primarily the process ...of adopting joint policies and making
joint decisions on joint problems.
Cited in R. Bastien, Federalism and Decentralization: Where Do We Stand? (Ottawa: Supply
and Services Canada, 1981) at 48.
In his major work on Canadian constitutional law, Peter Hogg has also noted the swings
of the pendulum between centralized and decentralized exercises of constitutional power by
the federal government and the provinces, especially in relation to matters of fiscal responsibility.
See Hogg, supra note 101 at 127-131.
188 S.L. Sutherland, "The Justice Portfolio: Social Policy Through Regulation" in B. Doern,
ed., How Ottawa Spends (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1983) 173.
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... significant developments in this area will in turn produce more responsible and
credible laws, both civil and criminal, and promote a greater functional equality
for the individual before the courts and tribunals under the laws of this country.
Indeed, the historic concern of the lawyer for freedom under the law must be made
an effective counterweight within those continuing processes and pressures that tend
to involve modern government, sometimes quite intimately, in the lives of all of
us. 189

On the basis of this change in focus in the work of the Department, it has been
suggested that "it may well be said [in the future] that the decade and a half
from 1970-85 saw, in the implementing of this statement, a formal re-making
of the foundations of citizenship in Canada".90 The continuing concern for access
to justice and the agreements for the delivery of legal aid services within this
period clearly attest to the changing view of the role of law (and lawyers) in

government.
The same period was one of experimentation with the formal structures of
federalism in Canada. Through legislation such as the Canada Assistance Plan 1,
and the use of conditional agreements (and later, unconditional block grants),
the federal government attempted to make its vision of social assistance, health

care, pensions, and education (in addition to legal aid in criminal matters), for
example, available to citizens in most parts of Canada. In contrast with federal
structures in the United States and in Australia, Hogg has argued that Canadian

federalism provides significantly less opportunity for unconstrained centralization
of fiscal power. Instead, he has suggested that "cooperative federalism" has
become the norm of federal-provincial relations in Canada,92 asserting that:
189Ibid. at 176, quoting the "General Explanation" provided by John Turner, then Minister
of Justice, at the time of presentation of the Department's Estimates. In this conception of the
role of the Department of Justice, the ideas of Pierre E. Trudeau, Prime Minister for most
of the relevant period, are also evident: see P. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians
(Toronto: MacMillan, 1968) [hereinafter Federalism];and P. Trudeau, Federal-ProvincialGrants
and the Spending Power of Parliament(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).
190Sutherland, supra note 188 at 176. The author also traced some of the changes in
the Department's expenditures and apparent policy priorities over the period to 1984, noting
development of the federal-provincial agreements on legal aid; by 1984, the author noted that
"criminal legal aid [was] another important policy issue", particularly because of the escalating
number of applications for legal aid and the likelihood of provincial cutbacks. As well, Sutherland
suggested:
And while legal aid is a cornerstone of the Liberals' accomplishments in the Justice
portfolio, the federal government is likewise on an austerity drive. It is also in a mood
to negotiate hard when legal aid agreements come up for renewal next year. This is
because all provinces tend to give low visibility to the federal involvement in the delivery
of the legal aid programs. Just last year, the federal government pledged to be very
sensitive to such matters when it established its priorities for funding. It is likely,
therefore, that the question of who should pay for the citizen's right of access to legal
assistance to defend against criminal charges will become an issue of strong contention
between the federal government and the provinces (at 192-193).
191Supra note 5.
192 Hogg, supra note 101 at 13 1, referring here to federal-provincial financial arrangements,
in particular.
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The ideal of cooperative federalism is that each government recognizes its interdependence with the other governments, and is concerned about the repercussions
of its actions on the policies of the others. This requires much more than respect
for the legislative authority of others; it involves consultation with others before
exercising one's own undoubted legislative authority, in order to ensure that one's
own actions are as far as possible compatible with the plans of others .... [In Canada,]
cooperation has become the rule and unilateral initiative the exception. 193
In such a context, the constitutional framework for a comprehensive legal
aid program in Canada is a complex matter involving an analysis of both legislative
authority of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, 94 (and its interpretation) and the prospects
for federal-provincial cooperation. In terms of the constitutional division of
powers, the federal government has authority to legislate with respect to matters
of criminal law (s. 91.27), marriage and divorce (s. 91.26), naturalization and
aliens (s. 91.25), and unemployment insurance (s. 91.2A). Thus at first glance,
the list suggests that the federal government might claim jurisdiction to legislate
in respect of legal aid services for those involved in matters of criminal law,
divorce (and corollary matters),195 immigration and refugees, and unemployment
insurance. Although such a list appears somewhat ad hoc, it is arguable that a
legal aid scheme for persons affected by these matters could nonetheless address
problems of some significance to those concerned: advice and representation in
matters of criminal and family law (in so far as it relates to divorce, at least),
in the context of difficult issues of immigration and refugee status, and with respect
to income security in relation to employment patterns throughout the country.
None of these matters are necessarily simple and all may have potentially
significant repercussions for the persons concerned, both in terms of legal rights
and in terms of personal liberty (criminal and immigration) or economic security
(family benefits or unemployment insurance) or perhaps both.
Even within its own list of powers, the federal government may legislate
about legal aid services only so long as its legislation can be characterized as
fundamental to the implementation of objectives within its legislative competence.
In a 1966 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal government
could legislate exclusively on "matters which are a vital part of the operation
of an interprovincial undertaking as a going concern", and that, therefore
"....

provincial minimum wage laws were not applicable to a federal undertak-

ing".196 Such a principle might be used, for example, to enable the federal
government to legislate with respect to legal aid in immigration hearings on the
basis that legal aid is a vital part of the immigration hearing process; such an
Ibid.
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3. ss. 91-2 [hereinafter Constitution
Act 1867].
195 The validity of corollary relief provisions of current divorce legislation was confirmed
by a number of judicial decisions; see Papp v. Papp, [1970] 1 O.R. 331 (C.A.); and Zacks
v. Zacks, [1973] S.C.R. 891.
196 Commission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co., [1966] S.C.R. 767 at 772,
Martland J.
193
'94
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arrangement would be feasible only if legal advice and representation, like labour
relations, can be characterized as vitally and integrally related to the federal
undertaking.
In addition to problems of characterization, there is a more fundamental
difficulty with any such proposal. A legal aid program which encompassed only
the matters referred to in the above list of federal constitutional powers might
inevitably appear ad hoc or incomplete, thereby creating invidious distinctions
which are unacceptable in terms of policy-making objectives, including the need
to conform to the equality guarantees of the Charter.What kind of program
rationale can be suggested for a national legal aid scheme which offers assistance
to unemployed persons and not to those entitled to welfare or to workers'
compensation (all of whom receive state-funded income security); or which offers
assistance to those who are immigrants or refugees but not to those who are
imprisoned in provincial institutions or who are psychiatric patients (all of whom
suffer or may suffer a deprivation of liberty); or which offers assistance to those
involved in divorce but not to family members when the state intervenes to remove
a child from its parental protection and authority (arguably, both family law
matters)?
In addition to these policy problems, it is also necessary to take account
of the provinces' competing list of matters within their exclusivejurisdiction. Under
the Constitution Act, 1867,197 the provinces may legislate with respect to matters
relating to property and civil rights in the province (s. 92.13) and the administration
of justice in the province, including procedure in civil matters in provincial courts
(s. 92.14). It is therefore the provinces which arguably have primary responsibility
for legal aid programs, as is evidenced by provincially-enacted legislation
concerning legal aid services currently in existence in most of the provinces across
Canada. As well, the provinces have responsibility for all matters of a local or
private nature in the province (s. 92.16), local works and undertakings (s. 92.10)
and hospitals (s. 92.7), all matters which might include arrangements for some
kinds of civil legal aid services.
For all these reasons, the creation of a comprehensive scheme of civil legal
aid services in Canada seems to require federal-provincial cooperation.98 This

Supra note 194.
198 The constitutional validity of legislation concerning legal aid in Canada, focusing on
the division of legislative powers, has not been the subject of litigation very frequently. In R
v. Happeney (1970), 2 N.B.R. (2d) 699, however, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal considered
a challenge to the constitutional validity of section 590 of the CriminalCode which authorized
a court of appeal or a judge of such a court to "assign counsel to act on behalf of an accused"
in appellate proceedings where in the court's opinion it appeared "desirable in the interests
of justice that the accused should have legal aid and where it appear[ed] that the accused
ha[d] not sufficient means to obtain that aid". The argument that section 590 was ultra vires
the Parliament of Canada because it interfered with the provincial jurisdiction over the
administration of justice (section 92.14) was rejected by the Court. According to Hughes J.A.:
197
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conclusion is further strengthened by consideration of the range of services which
might be included in any such comprehensive program. Where legal aid services
encompass, in addition to legal advice and representation, other activities such
as counselling, public education, organizing or lobbying, how should these
additional activities be characterized for purposes of constitutional jurisdiction?
The possibility of characterizing such activities as "a vital part of the operation"
of matters within legislative competence demonstrates how necessary it is to define
the scope of legal aid services, both for purposes of constitutional jurisdiction
and in terms of social and political values. Yet, although the courts have taken
an expansive approach to the content of activities within a constitutional
category, 199 nothing can alter the essentially ad hoc nature of the list of matters
within federal legislative competence. For this reason as well, federal-provincial
cooperation seems essential to the creation of a comprehensive legal aid services
program. Such cooperation requires an assessment of the federal spending power
and the impact of potential constitutional reform on fiscal federalism in Canada.
Fiscal Federalism and ConstitutionalReform:
The financial arrangements between the federal government and the provinces are complex and multi-faceted. 200 In relation to legal aid programs, the
federal government's ability to use its spending power and the implications of
constitutional reforms on the spending power, are especially significant. As Hogg
has suggested, the CanadaAssistance Plan (pursuant to which some cost-sharing

In a sense the appointment by a court of appeal or a judge thereof of counsel for
an accused who is a party in a criminal appeal is a step in the procedure on appeal
to be taken as conditions require and as such it falls within the broad definition of
the power given to the federal parliament to legislate in criminal law and criminal
procedure .... But even if it is not strictly a step in a criminal proceeding in the sense
referred to... it is nevertheless necessarily incidental to the proper conduct of a criminal
appeal and hence is within the legislative competence of the Parliament of Canada
to provide for it (at 703).
See also J. Marchessault, "Constitutional Aspects of Legal Services in Canada" (1979) 3 Can.
Legal Aid Bulletin 282.
199 For example, it has been held that human rights legislation constitutes legislation
respecting employer and employee relations and thus could not apply to persons employed
in a federal undertaking, Re Culley and Canadian PacificAirlines (1977), 72 D.L.R. (3rd) 449
(B.C.S.C.); and the Supreme Court of Canada has held that a provincial Occupational Health
and Safety statute was in pith and substance in relation to labour relations and not applicable
to a federal undertaking, Bell Canadav. Quebec Commission de la Santg et de la S~curitg du
Travail, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749.
Note that Bell Canada was arguably a classic case to which the double aspect doctrine
might have been applied (that is, that subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall
within section 92 may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within section 91), in
which case both pieces of legislation are valid unless there is a direct conflict; then, the federal
legislation is applicable. In Bell Canada,by contrast, the court said that if there was any effect
on labour relations within a federal undertaking, the provincial legislation would have no
application at all.
200 For details of the arrangements of fiscal federalism, see Hogg, supra note 101, c. 6.
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of civil legal aid services now occurs) is an excellent example of the use by the
federal government of the conditional grant, "a transfer of funds which is made
on condition that the grantee use the funds in accordance with the stipulations
of the grantor".201
Such grants have had the merit of assuring "all Canadians a high minimum
level of some important social services" over the years (including grants for
education, health care and pensions), but they have also "effected a substantial
shift in the distribution of power within confederation" by redirecting provincial
funds to those programs for which federal cost-sharing has been available at
the expense of provincial priorities for which such cost-sharing is absent.202 As
Courchene has argued, the problem with shared-cost programs for the provinces
arises in part because the federal largesse available in the "fiscally-flush days
of the 1960's" (which made such programs so attractive that the provinces simply
could not refuse to participate) has diminished greatly, even after the conversion
of many of them to unconditional block-funding arrangements in the 1977 fiscal
package. From the perspective of the provinces, therefore:
Shared-cost-programs do represent a real contribution to the ability of the provinces
to offer effective programs to their citizens. However, once these programmes become
established and the citizens have come to appreciate them, they are in the system
to stay. Since Ottawa also knows this as well, the nature of the shared-cost game
changes rather dramatically. The federal government can unilaterally cut back
funding or impose new requirements and the provinces are rather helpless ... to
do much about this, both because the citizens will insist on maintaining the programs
and because these shared-costarrangementsarefederalacts so that in the final analysis
20 3
the Parliamentof Canada can alter them.... (emphasis added).

In response to such criticism, the federal government proposed in 1969
that such grants should be subject to two requirements: that a shared-cost
program within provincial jurisdiction should be established only after evidence of a broad national consensus favouring the program; and that a decision
of a province to forego participation in a program should not result in a
fiscal penalty to the province.204 Since 1969, there have been some "opting out"
201

Ibid. at 119.

202 Ibid. at 121.
203 Courchene, supra note 187 at 43-44. As Courchene explained, the provinces were

initially pleased with the conversion of the conditional grants to unconditional block funding.
However, in the face of diminishing resources, the federal government proposed to reduce the
agreed upon annual rate of escalation in the block grants; when the provinces refused to accept
this departure from the fiscal agreement of 1977, the federal government responded by cancelling
its intended conversion of the Canada Assistance Plan. Subsequently, the federal government
imposed other constraints on the block grants which made shared-cost arrangements less
attractive to the provinces (at 14-17 and 40-43).
204 Hogg, supra note 101 at 121-122. With respect to the first condition, the federal
government proposed that such a consensus would be established by prior submission of the
federal proposal to provincial legislatures. Hogg suggests that both these conditions may now
be regarded as "current federal policy" because "there have been no new programmes which
have violated these precepts" since 1969 (at 122).
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arrangements in place for these conditional grants, although, as Hogg has noted,
"all of these opting out arrangements bind the opting-out province to continue
established programmes without significant change, or in the case of new
programmes to establish or continue comparable provincial programmes".205
Thus:
... the province gains little more than the trappings of autonomy: the federal
"compensation" to an opting-out province is really just as conditional as the federal
contribution to participating provinces. 206
In spite of its widespread use, the constitutional authority for the spending
power which permits the federal government to impose stipulations on programs
outside federal legislative power is not explicit in the Constitution Act, 1867.207
Moreover, the authority to exercise this power outside objects within federal
legislative competence has been subject to significant criticism from a number
208
of sources:
The raisond'&reof the federal spending power (and of conditional grants in particular)
is to permit the federal government to use fiscal means to influence decision-making
at the provincial level. In other words, it allows national majorities to set priorities
and to determine policy within spheres of influence allocated under the Constitution
to regional majorities. Thus, both by design and effect, the spending power runs
counter to the political purposes of a federal system. 209
Yet, even critics of the federal spending power have conceded that it is now
an established part of Canadian "realpolitik", and that the courts have abandoned

205

Ibid. at 123.

Ibid. Courchene also identified the pattern of "opting out" which has characterized
much of Canadian constitutional history in the past few decades, particularly in Quebec, as
one which permits greater flexibility and opportunities for experimentation within the federation.
206

Opting out has allowed Quebec to pursue its own socio-economic goals (decentralizing),
while at the same time it has allowed the rest of Canada to develop a far more unified
approach to personal income tax than would be possible if there were no opting out
(centralizing).
Courchene, supra note 187 at 16.
207 Hogg has suggested that the only possible basis for the spending power is an inference
from the powers to levy taxes (s. 91.3), to legislate in relation to public property (s. 91.1A),
and to appropriate federal funds (s. 106). "Plainly the Parliament must have the power to spend
the money which its taxes yield, and to dispose of its own property". Hogg, ibid. at 124.
208 See Federalism,supra note 189; and A. Petter, "Federalism and the Myth of the Federal
Spending Power" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 448 [hereinafter Federal Spending]. Petter noted
that "legal scholars have proposed a number of theories" as a basis for the spending power
(including the royal prerogative, the federal jurisdiction with respect to appropriation, and
Parliament's authority to legislate in relation to the public debt and property), but concluded
that "[none of these theories is particularly convincing" (at 455). See also Petter, "Meech
Ado About Nothing? Federalism, Democracy and the Spending Power" in Swinton and
Rogerson, supra note 187 at 187 [hereinafter "Meech Ado About Nothing?"].
209 Federal Spending, ibid. at 465.
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any desire to "undo forty years of political development".20 Moreover, Hogg
has suggested that the spending power is indeed an appropriate interpretation
of the objectives of confederation:
It seems to me that the better view of the law is that the federal Parliament may
spend or lend its funds to any government, or institution, or individual it chooses,
for any purpose it chooses; and that it may attach to any grant or loan any conditions
it chooses, including conditions it could not directly legislate. There is a distinction,
in my view, between compulsory regulation, which can obviously be accomplished
only by legislation enacted within the limits of legislative power, and spending or
lending or contracting, which either imposes no obligations on the recipient ... or

obligations which are voluntarily assumed by the recipient. There is no compelling
reason to confine spending or lending or contracting within the limits of legislative
power, because in those functions the government is21not purporting to exercise any
peculiarly governmental authority over its subjects. '
On this basis, and the "slender case-law", Hogg has asserted that such a broad
interpretation of the spending power is appropriate.
The significance of such a conclusion for the creation of a comprehensive
legal aid program in Canada is clear. The authority to enter into agreements
with the provinces about legal aid services, in civil matters as well as in criminal
matters, seems to be constitutionally valid, just as such agreements concerning
welfare, pensions, education or health care (all matters arguably within the
legislative authority of the provinces) have been negotiated within the constitutional context. Moreover, it seems possible that Parliament could enact valid
legislation concerning the funding arrangements (and conditions for such funding)
for legal aid services in the same way. These arrangements appear preferable,
from a policy perspective, by contrast with a legislative scheme for legal aid
210 Ibid. at 468 and 473, citing in particular Winterhaven Stables Inc. v. A.G. Canada(1988),
53 D.L.R. (4th) 413, in which the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiffs challenge
to the constitutional validity of federal health, education and welfare expenditures (including

the Canada Assistance Plan). Irving J.A. noted in particular that "no citizen would doubt that
Canada... has established a robust posture in negotiating with the provinces toward establishing
these shared-cost programmes which are intended to provide all Canadians with common
national standards of services". In response to the plaintiff s argument that the federal government
should not be able to attach conditions to its funding which it would not be able to legislate
directly, he stated shortly:
The conclusion does not follow. Parliament has not by legislative force achieved the
result. The Constitution does not proscribe those incentives or economic pressure. If,
for example, all or a substantial number of provinces decided not to accept the conditions,
there would be no effect on matters within provincial jurisdiction (at 433).
211 Hogg, supra note 101 at 126. In his article, Petter cited part of this quotation and
then suggested:
With respect, the views of these scholars have a sense of unreality about them. What
they seem to forget is that governmental spending is not an isolated activity. When
a government spends, it must derive the revenue from somewhere. The way that
government usually does this is through the imposition of taxation, something which
is, without doubt, the exercise of a "peculiarly governmental authority" ("Meech Ado
About Nothing?", supra note 208 at 461).
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services embracing only those areas clearly within federal legislative competence:
criminal law, divorce, immigration and unemployment insurance. This conclusion
is strengthened, having regard to doubts about whether broadly-defined legal aid
services would meet the test of matters which are "vital" to the operation of
any such legislative undertaking.
These issues of funding within the federal context must also take account
of suggested reforms. Even though the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown
Accord proposals were not successful,22 there have been changes in the federal
arrangements for financing services, such as legal aid, in the provinces.213 On
this basis, it is important for the policy-making process to take account of the
dynamic nature of fiscal federalism in the process of designing legal aid services.
V. RE- VISIONING CIVIL LEGAL AID SERVICES IN CANADA
Creating Objectives in Context
In this review of principles for legal aid services, a number of factors have
been identified as relevant to the process of designing a legal aid program in
Canada, and for determining its appropriate civil legal aid component. In the
first place, the importance of recognizing the concept of "needs" as a normative
one has been emphasized, along with its dynamic quality in relation to problems
which are characterized as legal problems. Such a concept makes it essential
to take account of,
... the essentially political nature of any assessment of legal needs and of any
statement of legal aid goals. The claim that the only need is for access to
conventionally organized legal services within the framework of the current legal
system is a statement of confidence in the scope of those services and in the shape
of the legal system: it is a statement that society is well designed and that it needs
only a little oil to function at maximum efficiency .... The claim that the need is
for legal education activity is (again) a statement of confidence in the legal system
although it may express some reservations about legal services .... The claim that
the need is for law reform and community development work is a statement that
the legal system and the current social structure ... are inadequate and require change.
The claim that the need is for legal action to press the interests of conservation
212 The Charlottetown Accord constitutional reform package, was put to the Canadian
people by way of a referendum on October 26, 1992. See Shaping Canada's Future Together
Proposals(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1991), especially at Part III. This referendum
did not pass and presumably constitutional proposals which may have had a bearing on federal
legal aid funding are no longer under consideration in the manner envisioned by these proposals.
213 The federal government has reduced its contributions to the provinces in relation to
Established Program Financing inrecent years, and has altered its commitment under the Canada
Assistance Plan to share 50% of the cost of providing social assistance and social services in
the three provinces which do not receive equalization payments. A legal challenge to the federal
government's decision was not successful: see Reference Re C.A.P. (B.C.) (August 15, 1991),
Doc. 22017 (S.C.C.), rev'g (1990), 46 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (C.A.). For critiques of the federal
government's approach, see "Constitutional Reform and Social Policy" (1991), CCSD Social
Development Overview at 1-6; and A Canadian Social Charter (Min. of Intergovernmental
Affairs: 1991) at 9-13.
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as opposed to development or of tenants as opposed to landlords is a statement
that
2t 4
those interests are of special value and deserve protection and promotion.
In contrast to a process of legal needs surveys, the use of social indicators in
making normative determinations of needs for legal aid services may be more
appropriate for the policy-making process.
In making political choices about objectives, this analysis has explored the
extent to which Canadians share a strong social consensus about the importance
of equality in the context of law and justice, and their acceptance of state-funded
legal aid programs as a means of implementing a societal commitment to equality.
As the analysis of legal principles has demonstrated, there has been no clear
judicial decision as yet supporting the entrenchment of a right to state-funded
counsel pursuant to the provisions of the Charter.Yet, within the jurisprudence
on the Charter,there have been a number of comments which can usefully guide
the policy-making process in relation to legal aid services.
In relation to the exercise of legal rights, for example, the comments in Singh
and Morgentaler suggest that it is not administrative convenience but rather the
fairness of proceedings which is determinative in relation to section 7, and that
security of the person encompasses freedom from "stigmatization, loss of privacy,
stress and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible
disruption of family, social life and work, legal costs, uncertainty as to outcome
and sanction". In considering the issue of coverage in a comprehensive legal
aid program, for example, such comments are important directions about the
content of section 7. Moreover, in relation to sections 10(b) and 11 (d), courts
have also indicated a willingness to assure that the right to counsel and the right
to a fair trial are substantively recognized (in cases like Brydges) even though
no court has yet recognized an affirmative right to state-funded legal aid services.
Yet, in reasserting inherent powers of the court to order the appointment of counsel
in cases like Deutsch, courts have demonstrated a willingness to ensure substantive
fairness in judicial proceedings and the effectiveness of counsel in achieving this
goal. Such approaches to the issue of fairness in trial proceedings and the need
for legal representation also provide important signals for the policy-making
process.
More fundamentally, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada concerning section 15 equality rights in the Andrews case offers a significant test
for the coverage of legal services programs: whether distinctions (intentional or
not) impose burdens, obligations or disadvantages on some persons and not
on others, or limit access to opportunities, benefits and advantages available to

214 p. Hanks, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Legal Aid Programs: A Discussion of Issues,
Options and Problems (Canberra: Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission, 1980) at 37. Hanks
conceded that "these political questions are difficult" but argued that they were nonetheless
unavoidable because even "a modest conservative statement of community needs for legal
services reflects a definite political position", and that the political nature of the goal-setting
process should therefore "be open to the broadest possible range of interest groups" (at 37).
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others,215 whether the persons contemplated by the legislation (even in terms of
exclusion, apparently) are "relatively powerless", form "a discrete and insular
minority", or are vulnerable to "becoming a disadvantaged group in our society".
All of these tests are most useful for policy-makers in the process of deciding
on issues of coverage and eligibility appropriate to a comprehensive legal aid
program.
These social, political and legal values provide the basic principles for policy
choices about coverage and eligibility for state-funded legal aid services in
Canada, and may also impact on the issue of delivery system in terms of the
assurance of accessibility. In addition to these values, the principles which guide
policy-making must accord with the requirements of the constitution. Accordingly,
it is necessary to define those legal aid services which might be provided by
the federal government, acting within its constitutional authority (section 91).
As has been suggested, it is likely that there is constitutional authority to provide
legal aid services in the defined areas of federal jurisdiction, although the result
of such an approach would be a legal aid program which looked more ad hoc
and piecemeal (and not at all comprehensive).
To achieve a comprehensive legal aid program, an alternative approach is
the use of the spending power by the federal government, enabling it to make
funding for legal aid services available in areas of provincial jurisdiction (pursuant
to section 92 of the Constitution). In spite of the fact that the spending power
is not defined in the constitution, its existence for such purposes appears
unchallengeable. Thus, while the constitutional principles constrain the methods
of implementing a comprehensive legal aid program, they do not alter the scope
of legal aid services in terms of fundamental social, political and legal values
in Canada. Indeed, the practice of cooperative federalism seems especially wellsuited to a consultative political process designed to define legal aid program
objectives and to identify appropriate social indicators to implement them.
Designing Legal Aid Services: The Legal Services Context
In the process of designing legal aid services, the traditional (and often
implicit) starting point has been the context of legal services provided by lawyers
to paying clients. This has shaped legal aid services in differing ways. In the
context of some civil legal aid matters, the original objective of providing to
poor people the same legal services available to paying clients has been modified
in practice, at least in some cases, to include services directed more specifically
at the special needs of poor people (including welfare representation, housing
standards advice, and other issues in "poverty law"). Yet, in the-delivery of legal
aid services in criminal matters, by contrast, it has been expected that the services
215 An interesting argument is whether the sections of the Chartercan be read cumulatively,
Le., whether the sections mandating a right to counsel and a fair trial, read together with section
15 (benefits and advantages available to others) would thereby create a right to state-funded
legal counsel. For an earlier version of this argument, see "Right to Legal Aid", supra note
131 at 35-36.
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generally available to paying clients will be substantially the same as those
provided to eligible legal aid clients. In both cases, the basic standard is legal
services available to paying clients, whether the legal aid services are designed
to reflect them, or to depart from them in significant ways.
Yet, whether or not the legal aid services actually provided are modelled
on services available to paying clients, the standard of services to paying clients
must nevertheless be taken into account in the overall design of a legal aid
program. Because the legal system is a complex and interrelated decision-making
system, the effectiveness of legal aid services depends in part on the extent to
which they are integrated within the overall system. In this context, the scope
of services available to legal aid clients, by comparison with those available to
paying clients, may have an impact on the effectiveness of legal aid services
as well as on the efficiency of the legal system overall.
In general terms, legal services for paying clients may encompass a broad
range of activities from advice, preventive action and planning; to negotiation,
mediation and other forms of persuasive intervention; to representation and
advocacy before courts, tribunals, municipal councils, governmental task force
inquiries, legislative committees and other decision-making agencies. Both in
Canada and elsewhere, such activity by lawyers has been regarded as both
acceptable and desirable in the interest of serving clients well:
The professional and ethical standards of the bar not only recognize the importance
of the role of the lawyer when representing a client's interest before a legislative
lawyers to participate in the process
and administrative tribunal, they also encourage
21 6
because of being uniquely qualified to do SO.
Yet, particularly where legal aid services are state-funded, the scope of
services available to legal aid clients may be significantly less than those provided
to paying clients. This may be a result of either express restrictions on such
services27 or more frequently, from funding constraints which lead necessarily
216 Tull, supra note 184. The author cited Rule 3.9 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, requiring a lawyer engaged in representation before an administrative agency to meet
the same standard of conduct as if he or she were engaged in litigation before a court of law.
The Law Society of Upper Canada Professional Conduct Handbook similarly provides in Rule
9 that:
The principles of the Rule apply generally to the lawyer as advocate and therefore
extend not only to court proceedings but also to appearances and proceedings before
boards, administrative tribunals and other bodies, regardless of their function or the
informality of their procedures (See para. 18: "Scope of the Rule", which also refers
to the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-15).
217 In the United States, for example, "draconian measures" were undertaken by the Board
of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation in the years of the Reagan administration "to
eliminate legislative and administrative advocacy" on behalf of legal aid clients" (Tull, ibid.
at 33). According to Tull, "the fundamental difference between an agency engaging in general
grass-roots lobbying and an advocate representing a client before a legislative or administrative
body has too often not been clear to either friends or critics of legal services"; however, the
virulence of the attack on such legal services over the past decade has resulted, in Tull's view,
in the education of both Congress and other national leaders on "the importance to legal services
clients of legislative and administrative representation by legal services advocates" (at 33-34).
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to choices to provide only those legal services traditionally regarded as matters
of priority, such as advice and representation in serious matters. 2 8 In this way,
the level of funding provided may itself operate as a policy choice to restrict
the scope of legal aid services, thereby diminishing the extent to which legal
aid clients achieve real equality with paying clients in terms of access to legal
assistance. In addition, the restricted scope of services available to legal aid clients
may also impact on the effective use of legal aid resources, both for legal aid
clients and in terms of the overall legal system.
The context of legal services available to paying clients also influences the
design of legal aid services in terms of the organization of legal services, that
is, the ways in which lawyers (and others who provide legal advice) structure
the availability of their services to the public. Both in Canada 219 and elsewhere, 220
there has been increasing interest in the variety of organizational arrangements
for the delivery of legal services and the impact of these arrangements on the
services available to a broad range of clients. By characterizing legal services as
part of a "marketplace", some commentators emphasize that different consumers
may need different kinds or levels of services, and moreover that some legal services
may be competently provided by persons who are not lawyers at all:

In Canada, the most assertive recognition of the broad range of services provided by lawyers
to clients is found in Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney-General Report of the Commission on
ClinicalFunding(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1978), in which the report identifies the shortcomings
of the fee-for-service system of legal aid services in meeting the "needs" of the poor:
The private Bar and its clients know that it is sometimes not sufficient merely to resolve
the immediate problem. Often the client's welfare dictates much more. He must know
the dangers in order to avoid them in the future, and if they cannot be avoided, he
may have to combine with others to attack the root of the problem, which perhaps
can only be done in the councils or legislatures of the land. Services such as these
are well within the field of the private Bar, and if the aim of Legal Aid as often stated
is the rendering to the poor of the same legal benefits as those available to their more
fortunate brothers, some method needs to be found to provide them (emphasis added)
(at 1-3).
The regulation authorizing funding for Ontario's community clinics subsequently defined the
scope of clinic services as "activities reasonably designed to encourage access to such services
or to further such services and services designed solely to promote the legal welfare of a
community..." 0. Reg. 391/79, s. 148(2).
218 The funding constraints of the past decade in Canada have operated to restrict the
scope of legal aid services in most provinces, as is evident in the evaluation reports. For details,
see the evaluation reports of British Columbia, supra note 59, Saskatchewan, supra note 25
and New Brunswick, supra note 65.
219 See D. Gill, The Market for Legal Services (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1988); J. Hagen,
M. Huxter & P. Parker, "Class Structure and Legal Practice: Inequality and Mobility Among
Toronto Lawyers" (1988) 22 L.& Soc. Rev. 501; and S. Colvin et aL, "The Market for Legal
Services" (Toronto: Professional Organizations Committee, 1978).
220 See Lord Chancellor's Department, The Work and Organizationof the Legal Profession
(London: HMSO, 1989) [hereinafter The Legal Profession]; and Committee on the Future of
the Legal Profession, A Time for Change (London: General Council of the Bar and the Council
of the Law Society, 1988).
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...access to legal services by those who need them is fundamental to the rule of
law and the preservation of liberty. It is important to recognise, however, that such
access does not necessarily mean access to a lawyer. Much depends on the level
and type of legal service required. In some cases a friend or advice agency may
a lawyer but also a specialist lawyer,
suffice; in others advice by one who is not only
22
such as a patent lawyer, may be essential. '
The range of apparent choices for legal services consumers now includes
diversity both within and outside the profession. Among lawyers, there have been
traditional divisions between those who practised law as generalists (usually in
smaller or one-person firms) and those who did so as specialists (more frequently,
in large firms). However, there is mounting evidence of the difficulties of
continuing to practise as a generalist in the face of pressures on large firms to
merge, both nationally and internationally. 222 These developments within the legal
services "marketplace", have occurred at the same time as other changes have
increased the accessibility of legal services for middle-income families and
individuals in areas such as: prepaid legal insurance plans;223 independent paralegal

services, 224 and; "fixed price" legal service schemes.225 Perhaps partly in response
to the increasing variety of services available,226 many of the prohibitions on
advertising by the legal profession have also been relaxed in recent years.

The Legal Profession, ibid. at 5.
See D. Watson, "The 1990's and the Mega-Firms", (March 1989) Can. Law. 18. The
author quoted the lament of a senior Toronto lawyer for the role of the generalist in the profession:
There's a lot to be said for the old, generalist lawyer who wasn't an expert in all fields.
He wasn't a tax lawyer, wasn't a securities lawyer. I think if someone with that general
expertise disappears, the client is left dealing with a bunch of lawyers who are specialized
and can't see the whole picture (at 20).
Yet, both the lawyer quoted and the author appear to agree that "the national firms will continue
the trend toward specialization in the 1990's" (at 20).
223 See L. Wilson & C. Wydrzynski, "Prepaid Legal Services: Legal Representation for
the Canadian Middle Class" (1978) 28 U.T.L.J. 25; and D. Majury, "Into the Era of Prepaid
Legal Services" (1981) 5 Can. Community L.J. 45. The Canadian Auto Workers introduced
the first prepaid legal services program in Ontario.
224 The role, if any, for independent paralegals in providing legal services in Canada remains
undecided. At its meeting in August 1989, the Canadian Bar Association opposed granting
permission to unsupervised paralegals "to provide legal services directly to the public". Its
recommendations, however, included encouragement for open panel prepaid legal insurance
programs and the employment of paralegals in law firms "to pass along cost-saving to the
legal services consuming public". See "Recommendations of the Special Committee on the
Status of Paralegals to the CBA Council" (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, 1989). In Ontario,
a provincial Task Force was established in 1988 to make recommendations to the government
about the role for unsupervised paralegals in delivering legal services directly to the public;
the Task Force report recommended that qualified paralegals be permitted to provide legal
services in specified areas on retainers similar to those used by lawyers. See Ontario, Ministry
of the Attorney General, Task Force on Paralegals(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1990).
225 Established in Toronto, for example, by Jane Harvey Associates.
226 For an excellent overview of trends, both among large law firms and in relation to
other forms of legal services, see G. Fung, Issues in the Delivery of Legal Services (Toronto:
Research and Planning Committee, The Law Society of Upper Canada, 1987).
221
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This proliferation of sources from which to obtain legal services, coupled
with the broad range of services which lawyers may provide, makes the legal
services "marketplace" a complex (and even bewildering) system for consumers.
Yet, for those consumers with clearly-defined needs and resources to pay for
services, the legal system probably works reasonably well. For consumers who
are less certain of their legal needs (who may not know whether their problem
is "legal" at all, for example) or for those whose resources are less certain, the
effort to obtain assistance within a complex marketplace may be more difficult.227
These concerns dramatically illustrate the interrelationship between issues
concerning the availability of legal aid services, and the design of legal aid
programs as part of the issue of access to justice more generally. The structure
and operation of the court system and administrative tribunals, the variety of
arrangements for dispute-resolution for legal problems, the availability of
measures such as prepaid legal insurance schemes to pay for legal services, and
the extent to which both lawyers and other agencies are accessible to consumers
of legal services all make a significant impact on the context within which legal
services are generally provided.228 All of these factors also have an impact on
the extent to which some consumers will perceive needs for legal aid services,
while changes within the general legal services context may significantly influence
the effectiveness as well as the appropriateness of individual legal aid programs.
In such a context, it is necessary to understand that legal aid is only one element
in a complex and dynamic legal system, and to take this concept into account
in designing guidelines for legal aid services.
This analysis also demonstrates that a legal aid program designed to replicate
for its clients both the breadth of services available to paying clients and the range
of service providers (including lawyers) for different kinds of problems would likely
be both costly and complex. At the same time, it is essential to take account of
both these features of legal services generally available in Canada in the 1990's
(breadth of scope of activity and range of service providers) as features to be
considered in designing appropriate legal aid services for the future. As well, the
need to provide for methods to continually assess priorities for legal aid services
227 Concerns have often been expressed that this group includes, in addition to some poor
clients, those middle-income clients who are too well-off to qualify for legal aid, but too poor
to pay for legal services themselves. In Australia, such consumers are referred to as the "sandwich
class", middle-income legal clients with neither the financial resources of the wealthy nor
sufficiently poor to qualify for legal aid. See E. McCarthy, "Aussies Study How Lawyers' Earnings
Affect Legal System" Lawyers Weekly (2 March 1990) 13. As eligibility guidelines for legal
aid become more stringent, of course, the numbers of those in the "sandwich" class inevitably
increases.
228 This point was stressed in the Australian context in Australian Legal Aid Services, supra
note 20 at 25:
The need for legal aid services cannot be divorced from questions of timely and
appropriate access to courts and tribunals, efficiency and effectiveness, procedural,
technological and administrative innovation, funding and public policy issues in the legal
system. In turn, the functions of the legal system and its institutions are affected by
wider social, political and economic factors.
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is clearly demanded by the dynamic nature of current changes in the work and
organization of lawyers and others involved in the delivery of legal services.
"Coverage" and Legal Aid Objectives
The process of defining the parameters of a legal aid program ("coverage")
is one of translating general values and objectives about legal aid services into
concrete criteria which can be implemented so as to actually achieve the objectives
identified. Such a process requires that the objectives be clearly defined and that
the methods used to implement them be successful for their purposes - both
difficult goals to accomplish.
The issue of coverage for legal aid programs is one which has been the subject
of ongoing debate since the introduction of legal aid legislation in Canada. Although
at the outset, it had been suggested that there was no rational way to distinguish
between the need for legal aid services in criminal matters and for services in
other areas, such as matrimonial proceedings, the lack of sufficient funding for
legal aid in all possible cases limited the availability of services in practice in
different ways across Canada. The 1985 CBA Report, requesting the provision
of funding for legal aid services in an expanded range of categories, demonstrated
the continued vitality of this debate about the range of legal aid services which
should be available to all persons, regardless of their ability to pay.
In deciding on the coverage appropriate to a comprehensive legal aid scheme,
it is necessary to adopt a rationale (or rationales) for the provision of legal aid
services. Because legal aid services are currently being provided according to
the cost-sharing agreements for criminal and Young Offender legal aid services,
one option is to extend legal aid services for matters which are justified by the
same rationales which support these current services. On the other hand, it may
be possible to develop a new rationale for legal aid services, one which better
accords with the social indicator approach to legal needs and which takes account
of current political and legal values in Canada, as the basis for determining
coverage for the future.
Both these approaches assume that a comprehensive legal aid program should
include a criminal and civil component and that the rationales for these two
components should be consistent, whether they are included in a cost-sharing
agreement or in legislation. For practical purposes, of course, it may also be
possible to create a civil legal aid component, utilizing the social indicator
approach, for example, without altering the current arrangements for criminal
and Young Offender legal aid services at all, on the basis that new funds are
available to create a civil legal aid component and that it should be designed
and administered separately from the current program. In the discussion which
follows, the emphasis is on the creation of a comprehensive scheme which has
a purpose and rationale which is consistent overall.229
There is no discussion here about the constitutional arrangements for legal aid services.
For a discussion of these issues and the problems of a civil legal aid program encompassing
only those matters for which the federal government has legislative authority, see supra c. IV.
229
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1. Extending the Rationalefor Criminal Legal Aid
The existence of guidelines for the provision of criminal (and Young
Offender) legal aid services has contributed already to uniformity in the nature
and extent of such services in Canada, and provides some sense of the "bottom
line" as to when an accused must be able to obtain state-funded legal counsel.
The policy decision to make legal aid services available for accused persons in
criminal proceedings resulted from the federal government's constitutional
responsibility for criminal law and its willingness to provide cost-sharing to
provinces which introduced legal aid for accused persons, on condition that the
provincial arrangements meet the federal guidelines for cost-shared legal aid
services. Thus, such a pattern is available for replication in other matters for
which similar rationales may exist.
Legal aid coverage for criminal and Young Offender matters accorded with
a fundamental rationale for legal aid services: that such services should be
available to persons in proceedings in which the state, with all its resources, was
the other party. This rationale also took account of the need to provide legal
aid where the accused, on conviction, might face loss of liberty (imprisonment)
and perhaps loss of livelihood. The principles adopted in the federal-provincial
cost-sharing agreements for criminal legal aid services, in utilizing these rationales,
reflected developments in the American Supreme Court confirming a constitutional right to counsel for an accused facing a possible deprivation of life or
liberty.230
If the rationale for legal aid services in criminal and Young Offender
proceedings is the fact that the state, with its resources, is the other party to
the proceedings, it would logically follow that other kinds of legal services in
which the state is the other party should also attract the same level of commitment
for legal aid services. In the civil legal aid context, such an analysis would support
funding for legal aid services for parents in disputes with the state as to whether
their children are "in need of protection" (possibly resulting in removal from
parental care); for psychiatric patients in determinations about involuntary
committal and for these and other patients in relation to matters of involuntary
treatment; for immigrants (and especially refugees) in determinations about their
acceptability as residents of Canada; and for many persons involved in determinations about their entitlement to governmental benefits, including welfare;
unemployment insurance; workers' compensation and other entitlements based
230 See Powellv. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W. (2d) 64 (1981)
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1981), the court considered the impact of funding constraints on the availability
of counsel, concluding that if no funds were available to enable the Public Defender to proceed
in the case, the accused would be entitled to be discharged rather than being prosecuted without
the benefit of counsel. The role of the lawyer in such a case, and the issue of whether a private
solicitor appointed by the court to act without payment is a deprivation of property without
due process under the American Constitution, is also explored in L.S. Dickens, "Appointed
ProBono Defense: Involuntary Servitude And-Or An Unconstitutional Deprivation of Property?"
(1982) 50 U.M.K.C.L. Rev. 207.
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on disability; old age, veterans' and other pensions; child care deductions; and
student loans. In all of these (and other similar situations), the legal dispute involves
an individual litigant as one party and the state as the other. Thus, if the rationale
for providing legal aid services is based on the disparity between the parties
because one party is the state, there are many other legal services, in addition
to those needed for criminal proceedings, which should attract legal aid
funding.
If, on the other hand, the rationale for legal aid services in criminal
proceedings depends not only on the disparity between the parties because one
party is the state, but in addition the likelihood of loss of liberty, would all the
above listed matters still attract legal aid funding? Arguably, both the psychiatric
patient and the immigrant (especially the refugee) may also face a loss of liberty,
and for both of them the result may be more serious because it may be for an
indeterminate period, by comparison with an accused sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. Similarly, while parents whose children are removed from their
care do not themselves experience a loss of liberty, their children may do so;
and moreover, the loss of custody of children might well be characterized as
of at least equal significance to that of a deprivation of liberty as a result of
imprisonment. It may also be argued that, since procedures for the hearing and
determination in child welfare cases, in some jurisdictions, provide many of the
same due process protections to parents which are available to accused persons
in criminal proceedings, this factor lends support to the conclusion that such
proceedings might well be "equal" in terms of gravity to a criminal conviction.
In all of these cases, it is arguable that the rationales which support legal
aid funding in criminal and Young Offender proceedings should similarly justify
such funding in these civil cases. In contrast to these matters are the cases involving
disputes about eligibility for governmental benefits, cases in which there may
be disparity between the parties because one party is the state, but in which it
may appear more difficult to argue that the potential outcome for the individual
is as grave as a loss of liberty. Arguably, a decision to deny entitlement to welfare
or other income maintenance programs, for example, is one which affects
economic well-being as opposed to political liberty. Yet for the affected applicant,
such a distinction may often appear tenuous, particularly where the result of the
decision may be poverty, homelessness, hunger or illness. In cases where the result
of a negative decision about such benefits creates economic vulnerability for the
applicant, it may be callous to suggest that living in extreme poverty is less grave
for the individual than a period of imprisonment (where at least shelter, food
and medical care are generally available). Thus, although it may appear that
these cases should be distinguished from the others, it is arguable that the potential
economic vulnerability of a negative outcome should be taken into account in
deciding on the appropriateness of legal aid in these cases, just as the potential
for imprisonment or loss of livelihood is currently taken into account in decisionmaking about the availability of legal aid for accused persons. Such a decision
may be a matter for an eligibility determination rather than being completely
foreclosed by lack of coverage.
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In this way, the underlying rationales for legal aid in criminal and Young
Offender matters support the extension of legal aid services to civil cases. Yet,
even where the same rationales can be shown to exist, there has been a traditional
preference for criminal legal aid services because of the philosophical significance
attached to a finding of guilt in relation to a criminal offence. On this basis,
it might be argued that such a comparison of rationales is incomplete because
it does not take account of the qualitative difference which attaches to proceedings
in which the state is one party but in which the outcome may also be a
determination of criminal liability.
The argument that criminal and Young Offender legal aid services must
retain priority within a comprehensive scheme, notwithstanding that other legal
aid services might qualify according to the same underlying rationales, must be
addressed. The philosophical significance of criminal liability cannot be denied,
although both the proliferation of quasi-criminal offenses as a means of state
regulation and the use of scarce legal aid resources in such a context make the
issue more complex than the bare philosophical question admits. Moreover, the
actual significance of the stigma of criminal liability depends, to some extent,
on the crime alleged to have been committed; it is not all criminal matters which
carry philosophical significance for a finding of guilt, at least for adult accused.
In the context of legal aid services for Young Offenders, of course, there may
be the added significance that the accused faces the possibility of criminal liability
in relation to a first offence, a factor which should certainly be taken into account.
An important critique of the philosophical perspective which supports priority
for criminal legal aid services focuses on an analysis of the demography of the
clients of such services. To the extent that a disparate proportion of those who
commit, and are convicted of, criminal and Young Offender offenses are male
persons, the priority accorded to these legal aid services disproportionately benefits
males in Canada. Women accused of criminal offenses do, of course, have similar
entitlement to legal aid services. However, the creation of a legal aid program
which not only provides services primarily to one group of potential legal aid
clients (males), and which at the same time routinely denies legal aid services
for proceedings to enforce child support which might benefit another group
(females), may seem to allocate scarce resources inequitably between males and
females231 who are potential legal aid clients.
This problem has, indeed, led to suggestions that a continuation of the current
level of funding for criminal and Young Offender legal aid services should be
231 Moreover, if one accepts Mandel's argument that it is lawyers, and not clients at all,
who benefit from the extension of legal aid services, it is arguable that the priority attached
to criminal and Young Offender legal aid services benefits male lawyers (who are substantially
more numerous in the criminal law bar than women lawyers); by contrast, an increase in the
availability of legal aid services for family law matters generally would benefit female lawyers
as least as much as male lawyers in the same field. For preliminary data on the demography
of the legal profession and the work done by male and female lawyers in Ontario, see F. Kay,
Women in the Legal Profession (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1989). See also, Law
Society of Upper Canada, Transitions Report (1991).
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matched by a similar level of funding for services in the family law context,
both for issues of divorce and corollary relief and for other matters like the
enforcement of support orders and assistance for legal problems arising out of
family abuse and violence. 232 Such a suggestion demonstrates the importance of
determining the underlying rationale for both current and proposed legal aid
services. If the rationale for criminal and Young Offender legal aid services is
the fact that the state is one party and that the possible penalty may involve
a deprivation of liberty, it seems at first glance that there would be no basis
for extending services to persons involved in family disputes. However, if the
frequent disparity of resources between men and women in family disputes is
taken into account, 233 along with increasing data on the "feminization of poverty"
after marriage breakdown,234 it is at least arguable that the impact of legal
problems for criminal and family legal aid clients may not be so dissimilar.
For policy purposes, therefore, it is important to analyze the priority currently
accorded to criminal and Young Offender legal services, both because the
rationales underlying legal aid services for these clients may be persuasively used
to justify the extension of services to other (civil) legal aid clients, and because
of gender disparity in the current allocation of legal aid resources. The present
priority for criminal and Young Offender legal aid services is, of course, most
justifiable if they are included within a comprehensive legal aid program which
provides resources for (at least) those additional services which are shown to
share the same rationales. In the absence of extension to these and other areas
of client need, a policy which allocates most of its resources to one group of
potential clients, while denying it to others who share the same reasons for needed
services, is increasingly difficult to justify. For policy purposes, the appropriate
course of action, therefore, is a re-examination of the use of criminal and Young
Offender legal aid services, coupled with an analysis of other legal proceedings
for which such services may be needed according to the existing rationale.
Such an approach has the advantage that it can build on the experience
of the past two decades, and that it is incremental in terms of policy changes.
On the other hand, it may also obscure problems with the current policy by
precluding the need for fundamental re-thinking about the objectives of legal
aid services and appropriate policies for implementing them. Even in the context
of criminal and Young Offender legal aid services, for example, there is some
need to understand not only the gender of accused persons, but other factors
which may identify them as persons particularly at risk or disadvantaged in
Canadian society (because they are Native Canadians or a visible minority, for
232 An interesting analysis of this problem was presented by Christine Boyle (Halifax: CBA
National Conference on Legal Aid, 1985).
233 For a thorough analysis of the statistics on men and women who divorce in Canada,
see C. McKie, Divorce: Law and the Family in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983).
234 See MJ. Mossman & J. MacLean, "Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a New
Equality" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 79; and L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (New York:
Free Press, 1985).
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example) and which may influence the policy-making process in relation to legal
aid for criminal matters as well. For all these reasons, it may be appropriate
to adopt a different policy approach to the issue of coverage for legal aid services.
2. The "Disadvantaged"and Legal Aid Services
An alternative approach to defining coverage for legal aid services is the
use of the social indicator method, recently considered in the Australian context.
According to Hanks, this approach requires "the identification of those sections
of the community who have two characteristics - a need for legal services
and
a reduced capacity to obtain them through the private market".235 Further,
he
suggested that these groups could be identified using "indicators of social
deprivation - unemployment, geographic isolation, ethnicity, and dependency
on the social security system for income support...".236 It is likely that
use of these factors for the creation of target areas for legal aid services
would also direct resources to those with greatest need, rather than simply
reflecting current delivery patterns or the range of legal services offered to paying
clients.
Such an approach offers a new method for defining matters to be covered
by a comprehensive legal aid program in Canada. Although it appears to
be
a dramatic departure from previous approaches to defining coverage for legal
aid services, the basic idea of the social indicator approach reflects some of
the
underlying assumptions about social and political values evident in recent Charter
decisions. In particular, it clearly reflects concerns very similar to those expressed
in the interpretation of section 7 about "stigmatization,. . . loss of privacy, stress
and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors..".237; and in the definition
of
the equality guarantee in section 15 in Andrews as designed to protect those who
are "relatively powerless"238 or vulnerable to becoming "a disadvantaged group
in our society",239 taking account of "the place of the group in the entire social,
political and legal fabric of our society".240 These judicial definitions of the scope
of Charter guarantees, particularly in the context of access to law, suggest
the
desirability of a legal aid program which takes seriously the idea of disadvantage
in Canadian society and which actively marshals resources to redress such
inequities.
However, any decision to adopt the social indicator approach to the definition
of coverage in a comprehensive legal aid program requires both the determination
of objectives for the program and the identification of social indicators most likely
to target those whose needs are reflected in stated objectives. Such a process
235
236

Hanks, supra note 48 at 49.
Ibid.

239

Mills, supra note 114 at 876.
Andrews, supra note 137 at 195.
Ibid. at 152.

240

Ibid.
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238
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is one which requires time, both for the creation of appropriate legal aid objectives
and for the process of choosing suitable indicators to identify groups most likely
to be in need of legal aid services. A policy decision to implement such an approach
to defining coverage must take account of the time-frame required for such a
task, and the need for further research to define both objectives and social
indicators.
At the same time, such a process need not occur in isolation from the
wealth of existing data about disadvantaged groups in Canadian society, and
research which has already identified their vulnerability in terms of legal
assistance. There have been a number of studies documenting, for example,
243
242
conthe problems of mental patients,4' the disabled, Native Canadians,

241 Canada, Department of Justice, Legal Aid for Mental Patients: An Evaluation Report
by A. Himelfarb & A. Lazar (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981). More recently, see Ontario, Ministry
of the Attorney General, Report of the Review of Advocacy for Vulnerable Adults, You've Got
a Friend(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1987); Ontario, Ministry of Health, Evaluation Committee
for the Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office, Advocacy in PsychiatricHospitals (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1987); and Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office, FirstReport, (Toronto: 1984), especially
the statistical review of cases at 13ff.
242 See Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of a Study: Access to Legal Services
by the Disabledby Judge Rosalie S. Abella (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1983). The report focused
on legal needs of the disabled, including persons "with physical or mental disabilities which
interfere with their ability to do readily those things which non-disabled persons do readily"
(at 10). The report defined the problem as follows:
For no one are the problems of access to legal services as severe as for the physically
and mentally disabled. Added to the difficulties anyone else might have are the additional
problems of mobility, communication, isolation and a parochial public attitude. And
these obstacles are in addition to the financial hardship and lack of information which
have traditionally impeded access to legal services. All of these impediments combine
to make legal services practically unattainable for a significant number of disabled
persons (at 11) and quoting from Report of the Special Committee on the Disabled
and the Handicapped, Obstacles (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1981).
243 See J. Hathaway, Native Canadians and the Criminal Justice System: An Evaluation
Assessment of the Native CourtworkerProgram(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1984). The report
documents the "culture of poverty" in which many Native Canadians live, including housing
problems, unemployment, high mortality rates, especially for infants, and family breakdown.
It also reports on the reasons for high levels of criminal activity:
In order to understand native criminality, ... one must look to the social situation
in which most natives find themselves. It is generally agreed that socio-economic status
is negatively related to crime rates. As such, a meaningful reduction in the native crime
rate can be achieved only by the adoption of an approach that recognizes native crime
as a symptom of an inequitable social and economic order, rather than as a problem
in and of itself. Clearly, no amount of courtroom intervention to assist natives can
reduce the incarceration rate unless an effort is made to attack the factors underlying
the criminal behaviour (at 46-47) and quoting R.M. Bienvenue and A.H. Latif, "Arrests,
Disposition and Recidivism: A Comparison of Indians and Whites" (1974) 16 Can.
J. Crim. 105; See also C.P. LaPrairie, "Native Juveniles in Court: Some Preliminary
Observations" in T. Fleming & L. Visomo, eds., Deviant Designation Crime, Law and
Deviance in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) and J. H. Hylton, The Native Offender
in Saskatchewan: Some Implicationsfor Crime Prevention Programming(1982).
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sumers, 244 children and young persons, 245 welfare recipients,246 persons who live
in remote areas, 247 and women. 248 All of this research can be utilized as the starting
point for the process of creating objectives and identifying social indicators.

244 For an interesting study of the legal problems of consumers,
see National Consumer
Council, Ordinary Justice, Legal Services in Courts in England and Wales: A Consumer
View
(London: HMSO, 1989). The study suggests that the legal system responds only very inadequately
to the problems of consumers:
Lawyers often seem to see our system of civil justice as a hand-tailored suit - too
good for everyday use. This report is about off-the-peg justice. We want a legal system
that is simple, quick, cheap and fair, and which can be used by ordinary people to
sort out ordinary problems .... [In practice], most individuals forego their rights.
Individual consumers start at a disadvantage because they meet the legal system only
rarely, have a limited understanding of how it works and limited resources in terms
of money, time and energy. Their opponents use the courts frequently, have expert
legal departments, and enough time and money to see the case through. The legal
system does little to redress the balance. Most people do not even consider going to
law. Of those who consider it, many reject it as being too costly or troublesome, and
those who persevere have a number of obstacles thrown in their path (at 1-3).
245 This concern was identified in Government Activity Review
Branch, "Ontario Legal
Aid Plan" (Management Board Secretariat: 1987) at 90, referring in particular to the
CBAOntario report, "Access to Justice - An Inquiry into Legal Aid in Ontario" (Toronto:
1986). The Management Board report recommended "a further in-depth analysis CBAO,
of these
problems" (at 90).
246 See Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions.
The Report of the Ontario Social
Assistance Review Committee (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988).
247 See Canada, Department of Justice, Legal Services in
Rural Areas: An Evaluation, by
L. Snider (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1978; revised 1981). There is also an interesting,
although
now dated analysis of legal services in the north in C. Hunt, "Creative Law in the
North"
in Canadian Council on Social Development, Access to Justice: Report of the Conference
on
Legal Aid- 1975 (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1976) 122 [hereinafter
Access to JusticeReport]. This brief paper lamented the report of the 1966 Carrothers Commission
which ended the possibility of consideration of "a unique, native culture-oriented approach
to laws in the North" (at 122). It also described eloquently the difficult task faced by
a lawyer
working for native peoples in the north, and concluded that: "Justice ... will never be attainable
by the native peoples of Canada unless our legal and governmental system is used
in ways
which reflect their special needs and aspirations" (at 129).
For an examination of the issues of justice in rural areas in the United Kingdom, see
K.
Economides & M. Blacksell, Access to Justice in Rural Britai" Final Report (Oxford:
SocioLegal Group Annual Conference, 1988). The authors reported in this paper on the
findings
of the Exeter Access to Justice in Rural Britain project, which included surveys of three
remote
rural parishes. The authors found that the use of legal services was not dependent
only on
the nature and quality of available advice, but also on "personal circumstances":
Mobility is a critical factor and even though travel and communication did not emerge
as posing serious difficulty in the initial survey, the follow-up revealed that for some
groups, the elderly, the poor and women, they raised almost insuperable problems (at 10).
248 See D. Ellis, J. Ryan & A. Choi, Lawyers, Mediators
and the Quality of Life Among
SeparatedandDivorced WomerL"Report #25, (Toronto: Laidlaw Foundation, 1988); and
National
Association of Women and the Law, Gender Equality in the Courts (NAWL: 1989). In an
earlier
study by C. McKie & P. Reed, Women in the Civil Courts: Research Study #9 (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 1979) at 20, the authors documented the lesser participation of women in the
courts
and suggested some possible explanations:
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Moreover, as Hanks suggests, demographic data about income sources,
geographic location, housing, etc. may also be used as indicators of "at risk"
groups in society, along with information from those who provide legal services.
In deciding to try to implement a social indicator approach in the Australian
legal aid context, moreover, the National Legal Aid Advisory Committee noted
the additional need to take account of the broader context of legal services
249
aid clients.
generally, and changes in the legal system affecting potential legal

It is important to note the limits of such an approach. Although the social
indicator method of defining legal aid services might significantly alter the
traditional pattern of legal aid services, focusing on the needs disclosed by the
most "at risk" groups in society instead of on current delivery patterns of service
(sometimes related to the needs of paying clients), such an approach will achieve
only what Hanks calls "equality of opportunity" goals. The social indicator
approach does not, by itself, question the basic structures of the legal system
nor does it change the inherent power relationships within it.250 It merely alters

...

the frequency with which women are found in civil .

..

cases across the nation

is possibly an indicator of their less than full participation, as a class of persons, in
mainstream activities in this society. This under-participation in social affairs is a product
of culture (the accretion of habits, ways of doing things, socialization, and notions of
what behaviour is appropriate for men and women, etc.), and of law (the inbuilt bias
in favour of men being major property holders and manipulators). This latter lawproduced distortion becomes evident in the non-exercise, by women as a class, of those
economic rights which lead through their exercise to participation in legal actions as
a "cost" of entrepreneurial activity (at 20-21).
For suggestions about how to use the idea of "disadvantage" in the Andrews decision in relation
to women's rights to legal equality, see L. Gotell, The Canadian Women's Movement, Equality
Rights and the Charter(Ottawa: Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women,
1990).
249 The report noted:
NLAAC has already observed that there have been appreciable changes in needs for
legal aid services since the early 1980's. In particular, it has noticed the increase in
numbers of people receiving federal income support, changes to the administration
of the Social Security Act 1947 (Cth.), including the CSS [enforcement scheme for child
support], changing demographic patterns, State and Territorial domestic violence
legislation, the emergence of specialist community legal centres, problems of access
and availability in isolated areas and amongst underprivileged groups and the growth
of urban concentrations (Australian Legal Aid Services, supra note 20 at 27).
250 For an interesting analysis of the role of law in making social change, see R. Brooke,
"Legal Services and Social Reform" in Access to Justice Report, supra note 247 at 99. Brooke
quoted from R. Lefcourt, Law Against the People: Essays to Demystify Law, Orderand the Courts
(New York: Random House, 1971) at 137:
The belief that sufficient funds for legal services would considerably alter the economic
status of the poor ignores the harsh reality that legal assistance cannot change existing
social, economic and political relationships. Rather, the struggle for change in legal
services must be part of a strategy toward the liberation of oppressed people, not towards
a mythical legal equality.
See also V. Chouinard, "State Formation and the Politics of Place: The Case of Community
Legal Aid Clinics" (1990) 9 Political Geography Q. 23.
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the pattern for assigning priorities to the allocation of scarce resources from the
"demand-based" model to a "needs-based" one. 25'

Such an approach, by focusing on "at risk" groups, demands a policy analysis
and an assessment of (perhaps competing) rationales for both current and proposed
legal aid services. Moreover, while the overall arrangements for the organization
of the legal system and the work of lawyers must be taken into account, these
factors are also not determinative of the issue of what legal aid services should
be provided and what services should be accorded priority in the allocation of
scarce resources. In this way, the use of a social indicator approach focuses policymaking attention on the process of defining objectives and identifying useful
indicators to implement the objectives. Such an approach, moreover, defines the
range of services which should be provided to legal aid clients by reference to
their particular needs and interests, an approach which permits "equality of
opportunity" objectives but does not exclude the possibility of more systemic
legal action. This approach may, of course, alter current patterns of legal aid
services, thereby affecting issues such as eligibility criteria and delivery systems
(including the role for lawyers) as well.
Eligibility Criteria
Central to the system of Legal Aid is the question of who should benefit from the
program, and how they should be identified. It is fair to say that the issue of eligibility
is fundamental .. and also the source of much controversy. 252
The issue of eligibility for legal aid services is closely related to the issue
of coverage, and similarly dependent on appropriate choices about underlying
rationales for such services. Indeed, there is some confusion in the use of these
terms and the extent of their overlap in the context of legal aid services currently
provided. If coverage is defined as the range of legal actions for which legal
aid may be available (both in terms of issues such as criminal or family, and
in terms of scope such as representation or law reform activity), then financial
eligibility criteria must be used to determine those individuals who are entitled
to receive such legal aid services. Some commentators, by contrast, define
coverage in more general terms (for example, representation in criminal matters),
251 For an argument that such an approach should also be used
in Ireland, see R. Grimes
& R. Martin, "Legal Aid in Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland - Some Lessons to
be
Learnt" (1981) J. of Soc. Welfare Law 283:
Legal aid on the British model is an attractive scheme not only because it eases the
financial burden of consulting lawyers but also because it can be implemented without
causing interference to the established legal profession and its methods of practice. ...
However, such a scheme may not bring scarce public resources to bear where they
would have the greatest beneficial effect (at 293).
The authors argued in particular against the introduction of coverage for matrimonial proceedings
despite "a huge and unmet need" as demonstrated by the Airey Case, supra note 168, so
as
to make civil legal aid available for those matters which affect only the poor: social welfare
claims, tenancy disputes and debt counselling.
252 Alberta Task Force, supra note 181.
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and then define eligibility in terms of both financial and other criteria which must
be demonstrated to qualify for legal aid services. In this context, the factor of
serious consequences to the individual (because of the potential for imprisonment,
for example) will be taken into account, along with financial criteria, in determining
253
eligibility for legal aid services. On the other hand, if a social indicator approach
were adopted so that "at risk" groups were identified according to social indicators,
the concept of coverage might be used to define the range of services to be provided
and eligibility criteria would define individuals, within the "at risk" group, who
were entitled to legal aid services. On this basis, this paper uses "coverage" to
define the broad scope of services offered by a legal aid program, and uses
"eligibility" to refer to the level of financial resources (or lack thereof) which
may entitle an individual client to receive such legal aid services.
In the context of current legal aid programs in Canada, most of the
controversy about issues of eligibility has focused on criteria for defining those
whose financial circumstances should entitle them to receive legal aid services.
In the past few years, increasingly restrictive financial eligibility criteria, and the
failure to reflect annual increases in the cost of living in eligibility guidelines,
have been used by legal aid administrators to reduce demands for legal aid services
in the face of diminishing resources. In Quebec, for example, the 1989 Annual
Report of the Commission des Services Juridiques noted again that eligibility
criteria applicable to single persons had not been changed since 1981.254 In firmly
supporting the need to expand the limits in eligibility guidelines for legal aid
clients, the Quebec Report argued strongly for recognition of the extent of statefunded legal assistance for paying clients:
It must be borne in mind that the much-delayed increase of the eligibility criteria
affecting the poor would only partly compensate for the subsidies paid by the
government as a matter of course to the rich individuals and corporations who are
the heaviest users of the legal system. The entire judiciary system (judges, staff,
courthouse) is at their disposal practically free of charge .... In addition, since legal
expenses are deductible from income tax, the government is depriving itself of this
income. This is another way of subsidizing the rich. In addition, these privileges
opinion.2 55
are perpetual and acquired without the need to gain the support of public
In Ontario as well, the issue of appropriate eligibility criteria has frequently
been a matter of controversy, both in the certificate program and in the community
clinics. In the context of the certificate program, the view that eligibility criteria
should be applied with discretion was most forcefully presented in a 1981 report:
To deny access to legal services on the grounds that someone is living up to or
beyond the limits of their income amounts to a refusal of access to the legal system
and the destruction of that person's capacity to assert or defend their rights. Ability
Ibid. at 5-6.
Commission des Services Juridiques, 17th Annual Report (31 March 1989) at 23.
255 Ibid. at 23-24. The Report also noted that suggested increases in the eligibility criteria
would cost an additional four million dollars (of which 48% would be paid by the federal
government).
253

254
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to pay must be viewed in the context of the nature of the legal services required,
the seriousness of the need for services, the likely duration of the case, and the financial
and social responsibilities of the applicant. In addition, ability to pay must also be
judged against an accurate assessment of the actual cost of legal services retained
on a private basis. 256
The recommendations of this report were in part a response to changes in
eligibility criteria introduced the previous year. These changes created a twotier approach for financial eligibility assessments: for those with gross incomes
below a defined ceiling, no detailed assessment was required, while for all others,
the assessment required an analysis of basic needs, transportation costs and debt
repayment obligations.257 Although the two-tier approach was generally approved,
the details of the system were subjected to significant criticism. According
to
the Social Planning Council, for example, "many households living on incomes
at or just above the poverty level [would] be expected to contribute all or part
of their legal aid costs" and "in some instances, people with very modest incomes
could be denied assistance altogether".258
Criticisms such as these raise fundamental issues about the role of eligibility
criteria in achieving overall objectives within a legal aid program, taking into
account that such services are provided within a broader legal services market
in which legal services are also provided to paying clients. Distinguishing those
clients who should be entitled to legal aid services from those who must pay
for such services, particularly where the services are both provided by the same
lawyers in private practice, is an important matter for the clients concerned and
for the lawyers, as it is for the efficiency and integrity of the justice system
as
a whole. Moreover, it is clear that choices about eligibility criteria are intrinsically
connected to those about coverage, particularly in the allocation of scarce legal
aid resources. Assuming the existence of a ceiling on the total amount of funding
available, a decision to expand the range of activities for which coverage will
be available may require that eligibility guidelines be adopted which restrict the
256 "Report of the Sub-Committee on Financial Eligibility
Criteria" (Legal Aid Committee
of the Law Society of Upper Canada, March 1981), as quoted in "Examination of
Ontario
Legal Aid Plan", supra note 181 at 10. The Legal Aid Sub-Committee's report was
cited in
the context of a discussion about the impact of eligibility criteria on the nature
of legal aid
services:
Restrictive financial eligibility criteria have a surface appeal for those who do not wish
to see assistance provided to those who are living beyond their means or who are capable
of paying their own way. In fact, most people would agree that the bulk of legal
aid
money should be directed toward the most economically disadvantaged members
of
society. It must be recognized however that legal aid was never intended to serve merely
as a social assistance program, but rather as a guarantee of access to appropriate
and
necessary legal services for those unable to bear the cost of retaining private counsel
(at 10).
257 For an overview of the details of the new rules, see ibid. at 5-14.
258 Ibid. at 9. The Report also analyzed the eligibility criteria
in detail in relation to issues
of indebtedness, property liens, transportation needs, and requirements for contributions
from
other family members or sponsoring organizations. See also "From Rights to Charity",
supra
note 181.
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groups of persons to whom such services can be offered. By contrast, the narrowing
of the range of services covered may permit somewhat more generous eligibility
criteria within the pool of funds available.
In the context of such choices, it is important to emphasize the need to consider
the underlying rationale for a legal aid program. If the rationale is the creation
of legal aid services for those most disadvantaged in Canadian society, the
eligibility criteria should be designed to take account of their particular financial
circumstancesjust as choices about coverage should reflect the needs they actually
experience. In designing guidelines from this perspective, it is necessary to take
account of the particular features of their financial vulnerability rather than relying
on guidelines drafted by reference to the financial arrangements of paying clients.
Such an approach might, for example, permit greater use of general governmental
statistics on poverty (including aspects of costs for shelter, food and transport)
in the creation of eligibility guidelines for state-funded legal aid services.259
Eligibility criteria may also need to be sufficiently flexible to take into account
the nature of legal aid services required by an applicant. Some legal services
are more costly than others, depending on the nature of the problem and the
length of anyjudicial proceeding required, as well as the requirement that a lawyer
(rather than some other trained person) provide the service. Particularly if a social
indicator approach is used to define legal aid needs and appropriate coverage
for such services, it may be important to design eligibility criteria which ensure
that essential legal services can be provided, using both lawyers and others
according to the nature of the services required. In such a context, it may also
be necessary to integrate decisions about eligibility criteria with rationales for
both coverage and delivery methods for legal aid services. For this reason, an
assessment of appropriate delivery systems is intrinsically part of the process of
defining eligibility criteria.
The Impact of Delivery Systems
The issue of the appropriate model for delivery of legal aid services has
remained a controversial one in Canada.260 A number of different delivery systems
259 See Canada, Ministry of Supply and Services, National Council of Welfare, 1989 Poverty
Lines, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1989) at 4-7. The report concluded that one in seven Canadians
"lived on low incomes in 1987, the most recent year for which data is available" (at 6). It
also described the relative poverty for low income Canadians very clearly:
Poor Canadians have incomes substantially below average. The poverty line for a family
of four is less than half (45 percent) of the average income for a family of four. The

low income line for one person living in a metropolitan area is 48 percent of the average
wage. Keep in mind that most poor people have incomes that are significantly less

260

than the poverty line, so that the income gap between them and the average Canadian
is even wider (at 7).
The controversy occurred again inOntario in the context of rumours about the possible

creation of a public defender system for criminal legal aid cases. See P. Kulig, "Public Defender
System Not on Ont. Horizon Despite Call for Salaried Duty Counsel" Law Times (5-11 March
1990) 9. The news report indicated that the Ontario Legal Aid Plan was considering the
possibility of instituting salaried duty counsel in other cities in Ontario, based on the success

of the model initiated in Toronto in 1979.
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were created originally in the establishment of provincial legal aid programs,
utilizing both fee-for-service or judicare arrangements and a variety of salaried
staff/clinic models. By 1987, the CBA had concluded that "only a mixed model
can deliver effective legal aid services in Canadian jurisdictions",261 suggesting
that innovation and creativity in the design of a variety of delivery models for
different target populations would be more constructive than a continuation of
the "sterile debate of staff vs. judicare".262 In particular, the 1987 CBA Report
recommended that the Department of Justice encourage the use of mixed models
through a comprehensive legal services cost-sharing agreement, a definition of
essential legal services, funding for specific cost-effectiveness studies of different
models, and encouragement of innovation by the definition of shareable expen263
ditures and direct funding of programs.
The tenor of these recommendations was also reflected in the report of the
Task Force in Alberta which assessed legal aid services. Emphasizing the need
for cost-effectiveness, the Task Force recommended that the Board of the Legal
Aid Society "consider employing staff lawyers where circumstances warrant, so
that high quality legal services can continue to be provided to Alberta in a cost-

effective

way".64

The salaried staff model for delivering legal aid services has, of course,
been in existence for some time in a number of other provinces including
Quebec, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Nova Scotia. The
expressed willingness in Alberta to consider departing from its judicare model
to employ salaried lawyers seems to have been motivated, at least in part,
by concerns to achieve cost-effectiveness. Indeed, a major concern in the
debate about delivery systems has been the relative cost-effectiveness of the
salaried model by comparison with judicare. This debate, however, merits close
attention.

261 CBA Report, 1987, supra note 11 at v. This view has been frequently expressed over
the past two decades, particularly in Ontario where a mixed model was established utilizing
the fee-for-service model for criminal and young offender legal aid services and for some civil
services, including family law. Other civil services are substantially provided by salaried staff
in community legal clinics. For an early statement of support for the mixed model of delivering
legal aid services, see Action on Legal Aid, "Delivery of Legal Services" (Brief to the Osler
Task Force on Legal Aid, 1976) at 6:
We ... recommend that while the private bar should continue to deliver the services
presently delivered by the profession under the existing Plan, alternatives to fee-forservice, and particularly community based organizations employing legal workers other
than lawyers, should be relied on to deliver most of the expanded coverage of legal
aid.
262 Ibid. at 247-248.
263 Ibid. at 248.
264 Alberta Task Force, supra note 181 at 13. The recommendation recognized that legal
aid services had been provided in Alberta on a fee-for-service model for a considerable period,
but noted that the possibility of utilizing staff lawyers "merits consideration if it is administratively feasible" (at 13).
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1. Delivery Systems and Program Objectives
In fact, there have been two debates in progress at the same time. One debate
has focused on the relative merits of the fee-for-service model, by comparison
with a salaried lawyer model, in terms of their relative costs and the quality of
services provided. In this debate, the issue has been characterized in terms of
whether the lawyer in private practice, providing services to paying clients as
well as to some legal aid clients (on a fee-for-service basis), provides a service
which is preferable, both in terms of cost and quality, to that provided by a lawyer
who works only on legal aid cases (on a salaried basis in a clinic setting). In
the past decade, the issues of cost-effectiveness and quality of service have been
explored frequently in a number of research studies,265 but no clear conclusions
have emerged because of the difficulty of isolating all the variable factors relevant
to any such comparison. As the 1987 CBA Report concluded in relation to a
study in British Columbia:266
the Burnaby study demonstrates that cost per case in the staff lawyer model
is roughly comparable to that for judicare. Sensitivity analysis would suggest that
higher staff caseloads could generate a significant cost advantage to the staff model,
while tariff levels and the pattern of tariff increases can have drastic effects upon
26
cost comparisons. '
...

Moreover, in addition to the indeterminacy of the conclusions in these studies
about the relative cost advantages of judicare and the salaried staff model, it
is clear that there is a more fundamental issue which must be addressed. The
debate about judicare versus salaried staff services has focused mainly on the
delivery system appropriate to those legal aid services traditionally provided by
lawyers to paying clients; in the studies conducted in Ontario and British Columbia,
for example, the comparison focused only on legal aid in criminal proceedings,
while in the Quebec study, the comparison focused on criminal and family law
matters, with some data on other civil matters as well. Thus, in all these studies,
the cost comparisons were conducted taking account of services provided by
lawyers, but in different kinds of settings.
In the context of a legal aid program which aspires to provide legal services
to those who are most disadvantaged in Canadian society, the debate about
delivery systems must be expressly directed to defining arrangements which meet
such needs. If the legal aid services which are required by potential legal aid
clients are not the same as those routinely provided by lawyers to paying clients,
265 In Ontario, see Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Background Paper on the
Implications of the Salaried Defender Concept for the Delivery of Criminal Legal Aid Services
in Ontario (Toronto: The Subcommittee, 1978); in British Columbia, see P. Brantingham &
P. Burns, "The Burnaby, British Columbia Experimental Public Defender Project: An Evaluation" (Ottawa: Department of Justice and British Columbia Legal Services Society, 1981)
[hereinafter "Burnaby Evaluation"]; in Quebec, see "Evaluation de l'aide juridique" (JusticeAnalyse et Organization: 1982). For an assessment of these studies and the limited conclusions
which can be drawn from them, see "Legal Aid in Canada", supra note 23 at 46-56.
266 "Burnaby Evaluation", ibid.
267 CBA Report, 1987, supra note 11 at 50.
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the debate can no longer be usefully conducted in terms of the relative advantages
ofjudicare and the salaried staff model alone. As the 1987 CBA Report explained,
neither the judicare nor salaried staff model has been successfully adapted to the
delivery of "poverty law" services in Canada to date, suggesting that there may
be three reasons why even the salaried staff model has not done so more effectively:
First, staff models appear to be just as "reactive" as judicare models, in that clients
are required to present themselves with their self-defined legal problems for resolution
by staff lawyers. Second, fiscal restraints and large caseloads create pressures to service
the "hard core" criminal and family needs, leaving little time or inclination to extend
services into non-family civil fields. Third, there appears to be a tendency for staff
schemes to replicate the conventional private practice approach to law, complete with
private sector notions of permissible expertise and what constitute "legal problems". 268
Moreover, if potential clients are not likely to be well-served by lawyers whose
usual work does not include the poverty law issues which must be addressed
or the special needs of legal aid clients, the judicare versus salaried staff debate
(and its assumption that only lawyers provide legal aid services) offers little help
on this issue.
In this way, it is clear that the debate about delivery systems is directly related
to issues of coverage and eligibility because of the crucial links between the nature
of legal aid services to be provided, the definition of the potential clients of such
services and the methods available to provide needed services. The debate about
judicare versus the salaried staff model, for example, is based on assumptions
about the coverage of legal aid services (and probably about eligibility as well)
which really reflect the experience of paying clients. In this context, only the
question of which lawyers should provide the services is at issue. By contrast,
with more recent recognition of the advantages of a mixed delivery system directed
to coverage for other and different kinds of legal aid services, the 1987 CBA
Report expressed support for delivering some legal aid services in poverty law
clinics, delivery systems characterized as more "capable of delivering 'poverty
law' services, . . . largely ignored by staff and judicare models".269
In asserting the need to include poverty law clinics in a mixed delivery system,
the CBA Report suggested that only community legal clinics "seem consistently
Ibid. at 115. The Report also noted that the salaried staff model is "lawyer-driven",
just as is the "judicare" model:
To the extent that a staff lawyer model replicates the private law firm, it equally adopts
a "lawyer's approach" towards the delivery of legal services, with lawyers defining
the areas of practice, the case priorities and the nature of the "legal" problems. To
the extent that staff schemes are seen as a "program", within the network of government
social programs, then it is the administration, not the clients, that define the limits
and scope of the "program". Either way, client input, much less control, is minimal,
given the "top-down" structure of policy-making. Moreover, since staff models
essentially grant a "monopoly" over legal aid services to a defined commission or
agency, there is less pressure to respond to the clientele, as clients have nowhere else
to go. The result can be a narrowing of legal aid practice and less responsiveness to
client needs (at 115-116).
269 Ibid. at 233.
268
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capable of engaging in broader, reform-oriented legal work, through community
legal education, formal and informal law reform activities and interest advocacy".270 The CBA Report acknowledged the need for legal aid services of this
kind, and recommended the use of a mixed model for delivering comprehensive
legal aid services, including judicare, the salaried staff model and community
clinics. This conclusion (that different delivery systems are appropriate for
different kinds of legal aid services) is one shared by a number of other
commentators,27' including those who have addressed the question of appropriate
delivery models for legal aid services elsewhere.
In the American context, for example, it has been suggested that a mixed
model in which criminal and family legal aid services are provided by a judicare
system (using lawyers who act for paying clients in such cases who also act for
legal aid clients) and in which "poverty law" services are provided by a
neighbourhood law firm (community clinic) is the most effective use of available
resources. 272 Since most people can identify legal problems which involve criminal
and family law, and because lawyers for paying clients have expertise in these
areas, a judicare system works quite effectively and efficiently for these problems.
In addition, the use of a judicare system for these problems releases the poverty
law clinic from responsibility for providing these high demand services and allows
its staff time to engage in outreach activities and more specialized legal services
required only by clients who are poor. In this way, the judicare system and the
poverty law clinic are mutually supportive within a comprehensive legal aid
273
program; and neither is truly effective in the absence of the other.
270 Ibid. at 233. The report identified in detail the rationale for poverty law clinics, including
the "distinctive" legal problems of the poor often unrecognized by a judicare system, the need
for outreach to help poor people define their problems as ones for which legal assistance may
be useful, and the lack of expertise on the part of many private practitioners in areas of law
where many poor people experience problems. As the report stated: "Quite simply, a purejudicare
model will almost inevitably ignore 'poverty law' services .. " (at 114-115).
271 See also "Community Legal Clinics", supra note 64 for an analysis of the structures
of such clinics in relation to their legal aid service objectives.
272 B. Garth, Neighbourhood Law Firms for the Poor (The Netherlands: Sijthoff and
Noordhoff, 1980) especially at 160-161.
273 Garth, ibid. suggested that the Quebec model already combined judicare and the
neighbourhood law firm in an effective way, although he noted that the availability of choice
of counsel for clients seemed to use resources of the neighbourhood firm in a way which detracted
from its availability for specialization in the problems of the poor. He also suggested that there
are some disadvantages to this "division of labour" model, including "whether eliminating or
severely restricting choice is desirable". As well:
A healthy competition between the public and private bar, rather than a division of
the labour, might help raise the standards of both parts of the profession. Nevertheless,
the values of choice and competition must be carefully weighed against the possibility
that [neighbourhood law firms] will be prevented from doing the work which they
are best suited to undertake (at 161-162).
Garth's general approval of the Quebec arrangement a decade ago might now be more subdued
in light of the difficulties which have been experienced in implementing the objective of "poverty
law" outreach in the face of mounting caseloads and diminished resources. For discussion of
this issue, see "Legal Aid in Canada", supra note 23 at 29ff.
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The desirability of such complementary arrangements was also recommended in the United Kingdom more than a decade ago in response to a demand
for the creation of law centres (poverty law clinics) as the main method of
providing legal aid services. In spite of the obvious advantages of poverty law
clinics for poor clients' special legal problems, one commentator recognized the
inherent need to augment such clinics with the support of a judicare program:
It will clearly be impossible ... to set up salaried law firms in every area where
there are substantial numbers of potential clients poor enough to qualify for their
services. Even if law centers [poverty law clinics] can be put in the worst slums,
the poor do not all huddle conveniently in ghettoes. In most industrialized countries
they are spread over substantial areas - in rural as well as urban communities.
If clients cannot afford to use private practitioners and there are no law centres
in their areas, they are effectively deprived of the service of lawyers. The only solution
to this dilemma is to permit poor clients to use the services of private practitioners
274
and by one means or another to subsidise such work.
The need for a mix of models seems to be well-accepted as the foundation
for designing a comprehensive legal aid program, with lawyers providing some
services to both paying clients and to those who are legal aid clients, while poverty
law clinics offer specialized services on a broader basis to poor clients alone.
In this context, the arrangements for lawyers' services, in terms of the relative
effectiveness of judicare or salaried staff models, remains an important issue,
despite the indeterminacy of the studies to date. In terms of efficiency, the
possibility that concentrated demands for particular legal aid services (criminal,
young offender, divorce and other family matters, or immigration, for example)
may encourage the use of salaried staff in some locations should not preclude
the use of judicare for such arrangements where circumstances differ. Within
a comprehensive system, there is also a need to ensure an acceptable standard
of quality of legal services, which may be enhanced by a salaried staff model
for some purposes more readily than for others.
Thus, in the context of designing a comprehensive legal aid program,
including a civil legal aid component for such a program, a range of delivery
systems is needed; and there must be some flexibility within the program to design
appropriate methods of providing services which effectively promote the objectives defined by issues of coverage and eligibility. To the extent that legal aid
for criminal and young offender matters is now provided by judicare and salaried
staff models in different parts of Canada, such models are obviously available
for adaptation to an expanded group of services, including those for family
proceedings. In the context ofjudicare, the tariff arrangements currently in place
for criminal and young offender legal aid services may not be entirely appropriate
as models for other kinds of legal aid services, including family law matters.
For this reason, a special assessment of the tariff arrangements for criminal and
family law matters in Ontario is included here, as an example of the kinds of
considerations required in designing effective delivery systems.
274

M. Zander, Legal Services for the Community (London: Temple Smith, 1978) at 337.
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2. Legal Aid Services and Tariff Arrangements
During the past decade, the attention paid to the issue of the cost-effectiveness
of judicare arrangements, by comparison with salaried staff legal aid services,75
has been accompanied by similar expressions of concern about judicare tariff
arrangements per se in those provinces which use judicare arrangements extensively.276 In a judicare program, "the tariff is a major means of leverage for
management of the legal aid plan", and serves "to manage the total budget cost
of legal aid"277:

The tariff plays a central role in the judicare model, defining not just cost-per-case,
but also regulating the composition of panels, the "vintage" of participating lawyers,
278
and ultimately the quality of service delivered.
Moreover, the structure of the tariff may significantly impact on
accessibility to legal aid services for clients and the quality of service
to them from lawyers, by reference to the type of legal aid services
It is for this reason that it is important to examine the operation of
in criminal and civil matters.

issues of
available
required.
the tariff

Such a structural analysis was recommended in the Report of the Fact Finder
in the Matter of the Ontario Legal Aid Tariff279 in the context of an assessment

of the relationship between tariff levels and the original intent of the Plan with
respect to lawyer compensation.280 The Report made several recommendations,
including the abolition of the 25% contribution of fees on the part of participating
275 See CBA Report, 1987, supra note 11; and "Legal Aid in Canada", supra note 23 at
46ff, for details about cost comparisons for British Columbia and Quebec. The latter study
concluded that
... the definition of tariff levels may have a direct impact on the outcome of a costeffectiveness study: a low tariff may mean that a fee-for-service system is more costeffective than a salaried lawyer system (particularly where their salary levels are
reasonably high and their caseload volume is average or low) while on the other hand,
a high tariff may make fee-for-service delivery less cost-effective (particularly if salaried
lawyers receive relatively low salaries and their caseload volume is high). On this basis,
... the cost-effectiveness in any particular case will be determined only by taking into
account, among other things, the level and structure of the judicare tariff (at 57).
See also M. Lightman & M.J. Mossman, "Toward Equality Through Legal Aid in Canada"
(1986) 21 J. Can. Studies 96; and "Salary or Fee-for-Service in Delivering Legal Aid Services:
Theory and Practice in Canada" (1984) 10 Queen's L.J. 109.
276 See Alberta Task Force, supra note 181; Canadian Bar Association, "Access to Justice:
An Inquiry into Legal Aid in Ontario" (1986); and "Report to the Attorney-General by the
Task Force on Public Legal Services in British Columbia" (1984); similar expressions of concern
are apparent in the evaluations of some provincial legal aid schemes: see "New Brunswick
Evaluation", supra note 65.
277 CBA Report, 1987, supra note 11 at 74.
278 Ibid. at 79.
279 G. H. McKechnie, "Ontario Legal Aid Plan Tariff Fact Finder Report" (July, 1985)
[hereinafter Fact Finder].
280 Ibid. The Fact Finder recommended increases to the tariff over a three year period;
and stated "[a]lthough these are across the board increases, the question of structure should
also be investigated" (at 41).
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lawyers, increases over a three-year period in tariff levels, a guarantee of regular
review of tariff levels, and the use of fact finding and arbitration for any future
disputes about such issues.281 However, in the context of efforts to design a
comprehensive legal aid program, the structure of the tariff, as well as its levels,
must be assessed, particularly in relation to the nature of legal aid services in
criminal matters, by comparison with those in matters of civil legal aid, particularly
family law.
The basic structure of the legal aid tariff282 in Ontario is one of block fees
for some defined matters, and hourly-based fees with designated maximum
amounts for others. In addition, there are special services available, including
duty counsel services and legal advice certificates;23 and more recently, a special
program for residents of women's shelters, a program which permits them to
obtain one hour of advice from a lawyer.284 For purposes of the comparison of
criminal and civil legal aid matters, this analysis focuses on the structure of the
tariffs operation in terms of block fees and hourly-based fees with maximums.
The central issue is the nature of the difference in the practice of law in
criminal matters by comparison with civil matters and the appropriateness of
methods of compensating lawyers for legal aid services in these different contexts.
In the context of criminal proceedings, for example, the practice arrangements
are more predictable for lawyers, in part because the court system dictates the
stages of the proceedings. Meetings with clients are necessary as are meetings
with the Crown for purposes of disclosure, but there is not likely to be a great
deal of paperwork involved (and bail hearings and bail review matters are
281 Ibid. at 37-43. The Report also confirmed a need for review of the tariff because of
its impact on the quality of services apparently available to legal aid clients in 1985 by
comparison with 1971, with fewer senior members of the bar doing legal aid cases more recently:
The inadequate tariff has meant that the burden of providing legal counsel to indigent
clients has fallen on a decreasing proportion of the legal profession, thereby affecting
the clients' freedom of choice. Data provided by the CBAO demonstrated that in 1984,
1006 new lawyers were admitted to the practice of law in Ontario, 84% of whom
joined the active Bar, increasing the numbers by 7.6 per cent. The CBAO also reported
that, despite an increase in the number of lawyers generally, the number of lawyers
who participated in Legal Aid decreased by 2.4 per cent. This means that the basic
principle of freedom of choice without regard to ability to pay is clearly affected (at
27).
The Report also pointed out clearly that there was no evidence presented to the Fact Finder
that counsel taking Legal Aid certificates were less competent than counsel who did not do
so; but that there was substantial evidence that less experienced counsel were taking large
proportions of Legal Aid cases, and that senior counsel were not participating in the Plan in
1984 to the same extent as they had done in 1971. For further details, see 32-33.
282 The details of the tariff are found in the regulations under the Legal Aid Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. L-9. See 0. Reg. 59/86, as am. by 0. Reg. 126/86; 0. Reg. 726/86; and 0. Reg.
699/87.
283 Both of these services are compensated according to hourly rates with maximums. See
M. MacLean, "A Preliminary Assessment of the OLAP Tariff' (Background Paper, Civil Legal
Aid Project) at 7.
284 Ibid. at 8.
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independently compensated by the tariff). For reasons which are unclear,
moreover, the tariff compensates lawyers, using two different block fees depending
on the seriousness of the offence, even though the seriousness of the offence may
not affect the amount of lawyer-time involved in preparation and conduct of
the case. Furthermore, although police officers may lay multiple charges including
one which is serious, the more serious charge may be dropped if the accused
pleads guilty to a lesser offence; nonetheless the lawyer is compensated by the
tariff according to the block fee for the more serious offence even though the
case resulted in a guilty plea to a lesser charge. These arrangements raise important
issues about the structure of the tariff itself, as well as by comparison with relative
compensation for civil law matters:
First, it is questionable whether an assumption that underlies the fundamental division
in the tariff, ite. that more serious offenses should be compensated in a different
manner is valid. Second, it encourages counsel to use the system to the detriment
of the client's rights because a guilty plea involving very little work on counsel's
part may result in a substantial fee. Third, it encourages counsel to be selective in
accepting clients. Fourth, it ignores an important factor usually taken into account
in civil assessments, namely the results obtained for the client.285
In contrast to the criminal legal aid tariff, the tariff for family law proceedings
in Ontario is substantially based on hourly rates with maximum amounts. One
exception to this arrangement is the uncontested divorce, for which a block fee
is available. However, in practice, the definition of an "uncontested" divorce is
somewhat malleable because it may often require the negotiation of a separation
agreement between the parties to ensure the respondent's willingness not to oppose
the divorce petition. In such circumstances, counsel for the petitioner may need
to seek an amendment to a legal aid certificate to authorize negotiation of a
separation agreement; or to have the respondent file a defence so that the corollary
matters can be negotiated as minutes of settlement (thereby becoming eligible
for compensation on the basis of hourly rates). While these alternative arrangements are available and quite appropriate, the frequency with which such
changes are required in a family law practice suggests that the idea of a block
fee for an "uncontested" divorce assumes the existence of a legal matter which
seldom accords with the reality of clients' lives. Thus, the existence of block fees
in family law proceedings may be much less appropriate than in the criminal
law context because of the inherent variability of family law (and other civil)
proceedings.
The inadequacy of the block fee approach for family law matters demonstrates the inadequacy of the tariffs approach to civil law matters more generally.
By comparison with criminal law proceedings, family law matters necessitate
much more frequent contact between counsel and the client. In part, this additional
contact occurs because of clients' anxiety about completing an emotional aspect
of their lives, but it may also result from the lack of predictability about the
relationship between one client and the opposing party, and the ways in which
285

Ibid. at 12.
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the termination of the relationship may require time and negotiation to resolve
complex legal arrangements, especially ones which must try to assess future
developments for both the spouses and their children. In this respect, the nature
of the legal advice required is much more complicated,just as it is often somewhat
more speculative.
Another difference between criminal and family legal aid matters is the extent
to which family matters require the preparation of documents, and the impossibility of estimating in advance the amount of time typically required for this
activity because of the significant range of variables in the circumstances of legal
aid clients with family law problems: "children/ no children; property/ no property;
child support/ no child support; respondent's whereabouts known/ not known;
child's residence may have changed; oral agreements may have altered the terms
of a separation agreement executed earlier; and so on".286 On this basis, it is
arguable that the underlying rationale for the existence of block fees - that some
uniformity exists - may be absent from the family law context completely.
On the other hand, there are also problems with the system of hourly rates
in the family law context, again because of the variability of the cases in the
face of maximum amounts for different parts of the process. The categorization
of maximums is particularly aggravating to counsel:
It seems to me that if you spend more time with your client than the maximum
permits and spend less time preparing documents, for instance, so that you don't
exceed the maximum in the preparation category, it is unsupportable for a
compensation system to deny those extra hours simply because of the nature of the
service provided. Creating maximums by way of artificial categories is very different
[from] creating a general ceiling for a particular kind of case which ceiling cannot
be exceeded without full justification .... It seems to me that counsel is in a superior
position to assess where her/his resources are best utilized to serve the client's
needs .... 287
In addition to these problems in the context of legal aid for family law
problems, there are procedural difficulties in other civil legal aid matters. In the
immigration context, for example, a timely response to an application for legal
aid is essential (as in some family law cases), and some counsel may be reluctant
to proceed without at least oral approval (even though there is also the possibility
of retroactive approval). In the immigration context, the tragic consequences of
such a delay are obvious, but similar problems may also be experienced in the
family law context, especially where only one spouse is financially assisted:
In addition to the financially assisted spouse being thwarted to some extent in initiating
emergency proceedings, on the receiving end s/he is at a disadvantage in responding.
Additionally, if the fee-paying spouse is always required to seek approvals, settlements
may be arrived at the expense of real justice. This problem is further aggravated
288
where regional disparities exist.
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Moreover, in terms of cost-effectiveness, it may be appropriate to question
the wisdom of increased tariff levels for experienced counsel in minor and routine
matters, the use of maximum amounts within particular categories of work, or
the provision of counsel in the context of proceedings which are merely formalities
to subsequent ones (the first stage hearings for refugee claimants, for example).
At a more fundamental level, it seems important to re-think the appropriateness
of elements of current legal aid tariff arrangements for criminal law matters,
and the wisdom of using them as the model for tariff arrangements in family
(and other civil) legal aid cases. In a number of respects, the policy-making context
is very different, suggesting that different rules should apply:
The "potential consequence" [to the client] ... doesn't determine the amount of
work required by the service provider [in the family law context], rather, the
complexity does. By way of comparison, if a client is charged with minor theft and
another with murder, the potential penalty is distinguishable and very different.
Correspondingly, the responsibility weighing upon counsel differs as does the requisite
preparation. The necessary work required and provided is easily identified and
adequate compensation easily determined by objective criteria. In family matters
such distinctions cannot objectively be assessed or compared. A client involved in
a child protection proceeding would surely perceive that the potential consequences
are grave, likewise a client who is battered and a client who hasn't the financial
289
resources to solely support her/his children.
On this basis, the need for care in adapting tariff arrangements to the context
of particular kinds of civil legal aid cases, especially in the family law context,
is clear. Thus, any decision to utilize a judicare system for the delivery of legal
aid services in the family law context (or other civil cases) should be accompanied
by a review of tariff arrangements so as to ensure that they accord with the nature
of practice in the civil law context and the needs of such clients. The use of
the criminal law tariff as a model seems completely inappropriate for such
purposes, having regard to the very different context of law practice involved.
As well, the degree to which legal aid clients (and lawyers) in the context of
criminal proceedings seem to be privileged by such tariff arrangements may not
be appropriate in the context of a comprehensive legal aid program.
3. Lawyers and Delivery Systems
A recurring theme for lawyers, legal sociologists, and policy makers has been that
[neighbourhood law firms] are necessary because of the "underutilization" of lawyers
in matters concerning new welfare state rights. The comparison with judicare adds
plausibility to that contention. The effort to make the new rights effective, however,
can be taken beyond the call for a new type of legal aid. The problem may not
be due so much to the underutilization of lawyers as to the overformality of the
judicial system. 290
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The suggestion that the enforcement of legal rights on behalf of the poor
may depend less on lawyers than on alternative arrangements within the justice
system also creates an opportunity to consider the extent to which the creation
of a legal aid program should involve the efforts of potential clients as well as
lawyers in the design process. There has been a long tradition of involvement
by clients and others in the creation and administration of legal aid programs
in a number of provinces in Canada. In the context of fiscal restraint, however,
the idea of broad community involvement in the design and implementation of
legal aid programs has diminished,291 and reductions in coverage (especially, the
lack of "poverty law" services) within legal aid programs has resulted in
significantly less need for the use of personnel other than lawyers in the delivery
of (mainly) traditional legal aid services. On this basis, the creation of a
comprehensive legal aid program offers an opportunity for the federal Department
of Justice to reconsider both the usefulness of non-lawyers in the design and
administration of legal aid programs and the appropriateness of involving
personnel other than lawyers in the delivery system itself.
The issue of the involvement of clients and others in the design and
implementation of a legal aid program is directly related to the issues of coverage
and eligibility for legal aid services. Where a legal aid program is designed on
the basis of providing services to those who are most disadvantaged in Canadian
society, the need for experience in problem-solving in such a context is essential,
skills which (some) lawyers may be unable to provide. Moreover, recognition
of the importance of focusing on the needs of clients may require a departure
from traditional arrangements for providing legal aid services. In Ontario, a recent
example of such innovative arrangements is the agreement entered into between
the Ontario government and the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation for the provision of
legal aid services. According to this agreement, the native community will receive
"government money to set up a legal services corporation which they
will
control".292 The corporation is run by a native board of directors and has wideranging responsibilities to hire and train lawyers as well as paralegal workers.293
In such a context, the choice of priorities for legal aid services is likely to reflect
the legal needs perceived by clients and potential clients much more than the
objectives of legal services traditionally provided by lawyers.
In addition, the focus on the needs of the most disadvantaged within Canadian
society suggests the possibility that paralegals may be able to provide appropriate
legal aid services, along with lawyers. The use of paralegals in the delivery of
legal aid services was frequently advocated in the early years of state-funded
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legal aid programs in Canada,294 although the actual use of such paralegal services
has not been so widespread. At the same time, the focus on criminal legal aid
services, and to a lesser extent on family and related civil matters, has made
the use of paralegal workers much less central to the overall objectives of legal
aid services. Once again, a choice to direct legal aid services to those most
disadvantaged, and to provide services in accordance with their defined needs,
may require a re-examination of the role for specialized paralegal workers,
particularly where the needs of legal aid clients may substantially diverge from
those of paying clients for whom lawyers are more accustomed to providing
services. Even in the context of a range of legal aid services being offered, there
may be an important role for paralegal workers in the delivery of some services,
at the same time as there is reliance on lawyers for the provision of traditional
services available to both legal aid and paying clients.
This analysis of design issues relating to legal aid services, including issues
of coverage, eligibility criteria and delivery systems, demonstrates the critical
link between legal aid objectives and issues of design. Indeed, the possibility of
making effective policy choices about design issues is fundamentally linked to
clarity in the definition of appropriate goals and objectives for a legal aid program.
For this reason, it is essential to define the rationale for legal aid services as
part of the process of implementing program objectives in terms of coverage,
eligibility criteria and delivery systems.
Toward a Comprehensive Legal Aid Program
This analysis of legal aid principles and design features has identified
significant areas for further exploration and research in future policy-making
efforts. To realistically assess the usefulness of the social indicator approach, for
example, a test project which utilized it, both for defining objectives and for
identifying appropriate social indicators, would help to further clarify the
advantages and disadvantages of such an approach, particularly by comparison
with the use of legal needs surveys. As well, ongoing legal and constitutional
advice is needed to clarify the framework of legal principles, and appropriate
strategies for legislative and contractual approaches, within which a comprehensive legal aid program must be designed. Moreover, there is considerable scope
for both empirical research and experimental legal aid projects to assist in defining
coverage in ways which meet overall legal aid objectives in areas such as:
identifying eligibility criteria which are appropriate both for meeting target group
needs and for ensuring fairness in terms of access to justice for legal aid and
paying clients, and; in creating delivery systems which are effective and efficient
for legal aid clients and for the administration of justice generally.
294 See Dalhousie Legal Aid Service, The Legal Paraprofessionalin Canada A Pilot
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In the context of an ongoing research agenda concerned with the creation
of a comprehensive legal aid program, two principles are essential. One is the
need for broadly-based, continuous and systematic consultation about legal aid
services, in the context of the justice system as a whole. To confine participation
in the creation of a legal aid program to governmental advisors and members
of the legal profession is to risk creating a program with ill-defined objectives,
inappropriate eligibility criteria and ineffective delivery systems because it does
not accord with the reality of needed legal services by target groups. Moreover,
recognition of the dynamic nature of legal services means that a process for
ongoing consultation is needed, not just one opportunity for input at the
commencement of the program. Finally, some process for ensuring a systematic
opportunity for community consultation is also required, so that all aspects of
a legal services program can be monitored regularly, by contrast to a wholly
reactive approach to problems.
Such a consultation process requires creativity in its design and implementation, especially having regard to the difficulties experienced by a number of
provincial legal aid programs with similar arrangements for community consultation in the 1970's. Indeed, disillusionment with community input and frustration
about its apparent ineffectiveness led to the abandonment of such arrangements
in a number of legal aid programs. For this reason, both the purpose of the
consultation process and the expectations of participants need to be clearly defined,
and the arrangements for seeking and using such perspectives carefully designed.
In general terms, for example, the use of community consultation processes will
be more effective in the context of smaller, experimental projects with specific
objectives which can be monitored in quantitative as well as qualitative terms
by a combination of professionals (including lawyers) and target group members.
In the context of defining arrangements for consultation, it is also critical
to recognize the pivotal role for lawyers in the creation of a comprehensive legal
aid program in Canada. Quite simply, without the support of the legal profession,
it is probably impossible to create an effective program. At the same time, the
objectives of a comprehensive legal aid program must focus on its clients, and
the welfare and convenience of lawyers cannot take priority over that of clients.
Recognition of the importance of lawyers, and at the same time an understanding
that their importance is secondary to that of clients, requires finely-tuned balancing
of legal aid objectives and the measures necessary to make them a reality for
legal aid clients. The existence of a broadly-based, continuous and systematic
process for creating and monitoring a comprehensive legal aid program offers
an opportunity for the perspective of lawyers to be included, along with ideas
from those for whom the program is primarily intended.
The need for such a consultation process also requires some consideration
of the appropriateness of national, by comparison with regional, provincial, or
even individual, consultation arrangements. This issue is one for which no single
answer may be appropriate, and it may be necessary to design arrangements
according to the needs and objectives of individual projects; as well, some
experimentation with and monitoring of different consultation models may be
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appropriate. In this way, the consultation process is itself a matter for further
research and exploration.
The second principle for consideration in an ongoing research agenda is
the need for independence in legal services, including legal aid services. Whether
such services are provided by lawyers or others, and whether the services offered
are those available to paying clients or not, the need for independence from
government in arrangements for funding and providing legal aid services is
fundamental to the principle of equality of access to legal services. In a number
of Canadian provinces, this need to ensure independence has resulted in
arrangements by which provincial law societies have assumed responsibility for
(and control of) legal aid programs, an arrangement similar to that adopted in
the United Kingdom. In other provinces, legal aid programs are administered
by independent legal service corporations modelled on similar arrangements in
the United States.
The merits of these different arrangements were frequently debated in the
1970's, and the importance of the issue should not be measured by the relative
lack of debate about it more recently. Creative re-thinking about practical
arrangements for implementing the principle of independent legal services in a
government-funded legal aid program may also need to be itself the focus of
further research and exploration. In addition to those models developed when
governmental funding for legal aid services was introduced in the early 1970's,
there may be others which can be designed to maintain the principle of
independence both effectively and efficiently in the context of a comprehensive
legal aid program for the future. Moreover, any such arrangements must take
account of the full range of independent legal services available to paying clients,
and reflect the need to ensure independence for legal aid services without at
the same time constraining the range of services available to legal aid clients.
In identifying further research required and the principles for conducting
such research, the need to recognize the issues as dynamic rather than static is
evident. As well, the importance of process in the choice of objectives and decisions
about measures to achieve them is clear. That neither the questions nor the
solutions seem obvious must be regarded as a challenge rather than a problem,
particularly because of what is at stake in the issue of legal aid. As John Willis,
a wise lawyer and critic put it: "Law is too important to be left to the lawyers;
law is for something".

